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1 Labor Law in the Era of Globalization
This seems to be the worst of times for labor law.  In this era, labor law is 
confronted with an unprecedented crisis; it is immersed in lasting contro-
versy and challenged on both external and internal dimensions (See, e.g. 
Coutu et al. 2013; Coutu 2013; Davidov and Langille 2011; Estlund 2006; 
O’Higgins 2004; Davies 2002). The typical aggressive criticisms of labor law 
usually concern how the values cherished by most economies have been 
impeded, such as efficiency, flexibility, equality, and employment, and how 
inadequately the rationality, self-consistency and normative legitimacy of 
the discipline itself have been maintained ( see Davidov and Langille 2011).
The current situation firstly results from the problems inherent in labor 
law. As analyzed by Davidov (2016: 1-4), the distributional function of 
labor legislation incurs opposition and elusion, thus generating perpetual 
challenges for implementation and a continuing need for the justification of 
lawmaking in this realm. Furthermore, labor law is supposed to be dynamic 
for the purpose of adapting to the labor market. Any adaption may have to 
go through objections or criticisms, and consequently, lawmaking always 
lags behind what reality requires. Over time, doubt has been cast on the effi-
cacy of labor law. The extent to which ‘soft’ regulations should be adopted 
in labor legislation has been considered questionable. Most importantly, 
how to match the goals and means of labor law has been problematic (see 
Davidov 2016: 1-4).
What is notable is that the above problems embedded in labor law are 
amplified due to the social and economic changes in the contemporary 
world. Globalization leads to the free movement of capital, information, 
human resources, and products, expands within-border competition to 
worldwide rivalries, and sets higher requirements for the core compe-
tence of a business and an economy. Such a process of global integration 
is accompanied by the flourish of so-called neoliberalism – a revival of the 
laissez-faire economic liberalism of the 19th century. A significant effect on 
government policymaking is the shift to cutbacks in public expenditure and 
to the minimization of restrictions on free trade, taxation and the labor and 
capital markets (see Goldstein 2011: 30). In addition, new challenges have 
been posed to labor legislation by rapid technological innovation, the change 
in business management ideas, and many other factors, such as the swiftly 
evolving structures of business ownership and the unparalleled develop-




 As a consequence, labor law is called into question on many levels. 
Firstly, the basic ideas and purposes of labor law seem to have become 
obscured. Are the reasons for intervening in employment relationships 
limited to protecting the safety, health and human dignity of employees, 
satisfying their basic material needs, and making up for their disadvan-
taged position in collective bargaining (see  Weiss 2011; Sinzheimer 1927)? 
 If the answer is in the affirmative, it will be difficult to interpret the far-
reaching alterations to the labor law within some countries over recent 
decades. An example is the emergence of mechanisms that reflect growing 
emphasis on employee rights to influence managerial decision-making and 
seek to connect individual and business interests (e.g. employee share own-
ership plans and profit sharing schemes) or to unite labor law and social 
security law (e.g. employee pension plans). These changes may be deemed 
as adaptations to the external environment which would leave the funda-
mental thoughts and goals of labor legislation intact (see Davidov 2011; 
Weiss 2011). However, they may also stimulate a broadening of the ideas 
and functions of labor law. Some scholars therefore propose to update the 
foundations of labor legislation (e.g. Langille 2011; 2006), and some call for 
switching attention from the traditional role of labor legislation in ‘correct-
ing’ and ‘limiting’ employment relationships to its potential to constitute 
the markets and to promote development (e.g. Deakin 2011).
Furthermore, it has become more complicated to determine the cor-
rectness of the methods employed by labor legislation. The efficiency and 
appropriateness of the way a country exerts control over domestic work-
places need to be reflected on more seriously, due to the growing volatility 
of the external environment and the increasing difficulty in balancing the 
social and economic values of labor legislation.
The worsening ambivalence in terms of the goals and means of labor 
law has inevitably resulted in an aggravation of the doubts surrounding 
the actual impact. This raises a string of tough questions concerning the 
practicability of labor legislation in the presence of strong market forces 
and about the extent to which setting certain legal constraints may destroy 
employment and erode the competitive power of an economy.
However, by stepping back and making a macroscopic observation, one 
may decide that the current situation could also be seen as the best of times 
for labor law.  The problem with labor legislation is by and large related to 
the way it responds to the changes in historical and political circumstances. 
Compared with most other branches of law, the making and evolution of 
labor law have been seriously shaped by the level of economic develop-
ment, relevant policymaking, the varying nature of the state, employer 
and employee interactions, the increasing influence of civil society, and the 
ideological shifts (Hepple 2011). Labor law per se is ‘part of an historical 
process and the outcome of struggle between different social groups and 
of competing ideologies’ (Hepple 2011). This indeed implies the plasticity 
and adaptability of labor law. Facing the unequaled complexity of economic 




qualms, and even turmoil, occasionally or frequently, due to deep-rooted 
uncertainty over the foundations, approaches, and results of labor legisla-
tion. This painful struggle gives rise to the on-going crisis within labor law, 
but simultaneously induces motivation for reinvigoration and renewal 
(Davidov and Langille 2011). Endeavors to update perceptions of the 
existing paradigms of labor law, to fully reveal the diversity of problems 
and solutions, and to search for new possibilities of the legal order, may 
brighten the prospect of labor law and inject new energy into this field. 
More significantly, the real potential of labor law as well as its inability can 
be better comprehended because of these efforts.
2 Regulation of Working Conditions
Working conditions can be defined in a narrow sense, as ‘the conditions 
under which employees have to work’, including ‘matters such as permit-
ted breaks, the state of heating, lighting, and ventilation of workplaces, the 
safety and comfort of machinery, vehicles, and other equipment, normal 
manning levels, and disciplinary procedures’(Black et al. 2013). According 
to this definition, working conditions comprise two parts: the physical 
environment and  working time arrangements. However, in recent literature, 
increasingly more importance is attached to the psychosocial characteris-
tics of a job, enlarging the scope of the indices of working conditions (e.g. 
Kalousova and Mendes de Leon 2015; Wahrendorf et. al 2012; Gillen et al. 
2007). The current trend is to consider ‘working conditions’ as a wider con-
cept that contains extensive physical and psychological factors in the work-
place. In the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) by Eurofound
(2016; 2012), a wide set of indicators are investigated to measure the level of 
working conditions across European countries, covering physical environ-
ment, work-related risks for health and safety, working time and intensity, 
earnings, worker participation, access to training and learning, work-life 
balance, and financial security etc. This basically accords with what the 
International Labour Organization (hereafter ‘ILO’) has endorsed.1 Such a 
 broad interpretation of the meaning of working conditions is adopted by 
this research, although not every sub-issue under the concept is examined.
Working conditions are the essential elements of employment relation-
ships. Despite historical and regional differences, conflict surrounding 
working conditions has been the main point that legal interventions have 
been seeking to mediate. From the perspective of the labor contract, work-
ing conditions are relevant to the considerations offered by the employer 
in exchange for an employee’s work, deciding the substantial transaction 
fairness in employment. From the point of market regulation, working 
conditions are among the most significant factors that potentially affect 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/working-conditions/lang--en/index.htm 




the direction and frequency of capital flows and meanwhile exert effects 
on labor supply. Working conditions are also a primary concern for public 
policy, due to the direct bearing on the living standards and well-being of a 
sizable majority of population in a country.
Correspondingly, the regulation of working conditions is at the core 
of labor legislation , and is more likely to trigger political uproars. It is no 
exaggeration to say that working conditions legislation finds itself in the 
center of the current crisis where labor law is procrastinating and tends 
to  vacillate, and the challenges faced by labor law are better embodied in 
working conditions legislation than anywhere else. A crucial and inescap-
able undertaking for labor lawyers is to figure out sensible principles and 
practical methods for regulating working conditions. Thus, this research 
focuses on the regulation of working conditions whiling omitting other 
issues of labor law.
Despite being conducted against a global backdrop, this research con-
fines itself to observations of the domestic legislation of certain countries, 
with the exception of the international trade agreements and ILO conven-
tions mentioned in Chapter 2 and 4. Besides, working conditions law in this 
research only refers to a country’s legislation (statutory law) on working 
conditions, regardless of other types of law, such as case-law, customs, etc.
3 Research Aim & Central Questions
This research has no intention to stay at the level of an abstract depiction of 
the predicament for a country to regulate working conditions, but aims to 
draw attention to the practical difficulties that contemporary countries are 
being confronted with under the combined effects of deepening globaliza-
tion and characteristics of domestic legal systems. It probes into five heated 
debates: a general discussion over the foundation and feasibility of regulat-
ing working conditions in an era of globalization, followed by four parallel 
studies that respectively concentrate on China’s legislation on construction 
safety, Germany’s minimum wage law, the parental leave policies of the US 
and Sweden, and Great Britain’s experiences with employee participation. 
By dissecting the situations in which divergent stances, defective mecha-
nisms and practical straits are entangled, the crisis of labor legislation in 
times of globalization is concretized into specific problems while at the 
same time opportunities for change are uncovered.
One may wonder about the connections between the five studies 
included in this research. Indeed, the first study respecting the foothold of 
working conditions law in times of globalization attempts to address some 
common concerns of policymakers, and the general observations made in 
this study are responded to by the findings of the following studies, to dif-
ferent extent. Based on the foundation laid by the first study, the latter four 
studies go deep into construction safety, minimum wage, parental leave 




most significant material and spiritual facets of working conditions, includ-
ing the protection of occupational safety, working environment, employee 
remuneration, work-life balance, gender equality, and employee right to 
influence organizational decision-making. China, Germany, the US, Sweden 
and Great Britain are selected to be observed because they feature quite con-
troversial and representative legislation or practices in terms of the forgoing 
topics, which will be clearly explained in each of the four studies. Such an 
exploration is not a discursive one that collects together the debris of the 
current broken picture of global lawmaking on working conditions. Rather, 
a couple of questions  continue to hover in the background throughout:
1 What is the main dilemma facing the regulation of working conditions in times 
of globalization?
2 How effectively have policymakers reacted to the foregoing  dilemma?
For the above queries, conclusions will be drawn at the end of the research 
by reflecting on the primary findings of the five studies, which are devoted 
to deal with more concrete issues and provide no direct responses though.
4 Research Methods
Several different research methods are employed in the five independent 
studies. The first study concerning whether and where working conditions 
law can gain a foothold in globalization is mainly based on a retrospect of 
a substantial amount of academic contributions in the recent three decades 
(1980s-2010s) which in some sense demonstrate or attempt to disprove the 
necessity, influence or viability of labor legislation from philosophical, social 
or economic perspectives. Opposite views on working conditions legisla-
tion in times of globalization are initially extracted from the literature as the 
starting point for the subsequent observation, which comprises three levels. 
On the first level, current mainstream approaches to justifying the intrinsic 
foundation of working conditions law are reflected on. What follows is an 
examination of some typical criticisms of the efficacy and economic effects 
of working conditions legislation. On the basis of the previous two layers 
of discussions, the last section provides a tentative suggestion with regard 
to how working conditions legislation may gain a reliable foothold in the 
present era.
The remaining four studies deal with certain countries’ specific legisla-
tion, and an obvious similarity between them is that they all include norma-
tive analyses: value-based comments are made on the relevant provisions 
and institutional arrangements, despite the utilization of factual evidence, 
such as authoritative statistics suggesting the implementation status, effects 
and public acceptance of the legislation. However, there are also evident 
differences among these studies respecting the approaches. To be concrete, 
in the second study, China’s defective legislation on construction safety is 
analyzed from a comparatively macroscopic perspective and regarded as 




safety problem in the country. Hence the bunch of proposals put forward in 
the last section contribute to the establishment of a framework for legisla-
tive reforms in the future, instead of giving concrete advice on the revision 
of specific regulations.
The third study assesses Germany’s legislation on minimum wage in a 
more detailed manner. By identifying the entry point, the minimum wage 
rate and coverage, the adjustment mechanism, and the implementation 
system as the essential components of a minimum wage regime, the cor-
responding provisions in the German Minimum Wage Act are examined 
thoroughly.
The fourth study adopts a comparative approach. Swedish and Ameri-
can legislation on parental leave are compared throughout in terms of the 
models, underlying ideas, and economic effects and social responses. In 
addition, within the American part, the legislation of a few states that pro-
vide parental benefits beyond the federal level is analyzed. Adopting this 
method effectively disproves the presupposed tradeoff between the level of 
parental benefits and economic performance of a country.
Based on British legislation and practice, the last study reflects on the 
three main channels of employee participation and the possibility of cul-
tivating their symbioses in one system, for the purpose of balancing enter-
prise desire for higher productivity and employee right to exert influence 
on organizational decisions. Observing Great Britain’s experience with the 
three channels of employee participation is not the purpose, but these chan-
nels must be materialized and contextualized before their interactions can 
be virtually discerned and the proposition of establishing a ternary system 
of participation channels can be evaluated in a concrete way. Analogous 
with the first study which draws on research achievements from several 
other areas, this study is interdisciplinary in that many findings  of earlier 
research in the fields of economics, sociology, and human resource manage-
ment are taken advantage of.
5 Book Structure
The five studies mentioned above make up the main body of this book, 
from Chapter 2 to Chapter 6.
In Chapter 2 – “Gaining a Foothold: Working Conditions Law in Global-
ization”, the following principal questions are dealt with:
– What is the intrinsic foundation for working conditions law?
–  To what extent do the propositions that predict the negative economic influence 
of working conditions legislation prove correct? 
– What can generate a real foothold for working conditions legislation as the inter-
national competition and cooperation patterns are transformed with the march 
of globalization?
The most important contribution of this chapter is the suggestion of an 




the mainstream approaches to justifying working conditions legislation. In 
addition, it argues that the role of working conditions law in promoting the 
economy has been underestimated, while the harm has been overstated. A 
brief and tentative analysis is presented, replying to the question of how an 
ultimate foothold can be gained by working conditions legislation in times 
of globalization.
Chapter 3 –  “A Legislative Perspective on Construction Safety in China, 
against the Backdrop of an Industry-wide Labor Shortage” –  has been 
submitted to the Journal of Workplace Rights and is presently being given 
consideration for publication in SAGE Open. Two questions are tackled in 
this chapter:
– What are the defects in Chinese legislation on construction safety?
– Are there any strategies that can ameliorate the crisis?
The major deficiencies of Chinese construction safety legislation include 
the impracticability of the construction safety rules, the malfunctions of 
labor contract law and regulations on work-related injury insurance, and 
the undermining of the accountability system. In turn, five reformative 
measures are proposed. Selection of this research subject is due to the fact 
that the construction industry is one of the prime pillars underpinning the 
Chinese economy, but the overall working conditions are very gruelling in 
this section, and the occupational safety and health (hereafter ‘OSH’) issues 
are particularly harsh. The growing resistance of the potential labor force 
to construction jobs has resulted in a grave shortage of manpower across 
the industry in recent years. Improving the OSH level and other working 
conditions within the construction sector is imperative from both ethical 
and economic perspectives.
Chapter 4 was published on European Labour Law Journal in January 
2018, titled as “An Incomplete Breakthrough: Questioning the Momentum 
and Efficiency of Germany’s Minimum Wage Law”. This study concerns the 
following questions:
– Does German minimum wage legislation have any merits in comparison with 
the legislation of its counterparts within the European Union (hereafter ‘EU’)?
– Are there limitations that detract from the efficiency of the German minimum 
wage regime?
This topic is worth examining in that Germany had been an exception to the 
widespread implementation of a national minimum wage within the EU, 
mainly due to fear of the negative influence on employment. After years of 
delay a national minimum wage was finally introduced against the back-
drop of an irreversible decline in trade unions and collective bargaining. 
The newly established wage floor was expected to prevent serious unfair-
ness in wage setting and to alleviate nationwide in-work poverty. However, 
the fact is that the previous conservative attitude has not been abandoned, 
but is reflected in many provisions of the new minimum wage law. It is 





In Chapter 5 – “A Tale of Two Models: Ideas and Results of the Swedish 
and American Legislation on Parental Leave”, the central questions are:
– What are the differences between the two countries’ regulations on parental 
leave?
– What are the ideas that drive the two countries to take different routes?
– Is there a tradeoff between the level of parental leave benefits and the economic 
performance of a country (e.g. enterprise competitiveness, and the employment 
rate)?
Sweden provides one of the most generous parental leave policies in the 
world and therefore forms a stark contrast with the United States (hereafter 
‘US’), a country that has failed to mandate paid parental leave hitherto. 
The meaning of this study is to highlight: 1) compared with the differences 
between objective conditions, cognitive discrepancies may play a more vital 
role in molding hugely diverging legal frameworks; 2) the belief that the 
social and economic benefits of satisfactory working conditions outweigh 
the costs may lead to well-designed rules that are conductive to achieving 
desirable consequences; 3) it is hard to eliminate policymakers’ unreason-
able pessimism on the potential effects of generous labor protection, despite 
the contradictory results shown by empirical evidence.
In Chapter 6 – “Coordinating the ‘three channels’ of employee partici-
pation? Focusing on the British Practices”, the following questions are dealt 
with:
– Why is it desirable to coordinate the three channels of employee participation?
– What is the foremost practical difficulty realizing the theoretical proposal to 
unite the three channels?
This chapter firstly analyzes the potential of representative participation 
and direct participation to complement each other to achieve better results, 
for which there has been a tendency to bridge the divisions between these 
two channels in recent years. On this basis, it is argued that representative 
participation and direct participation are not able to enhance each other in 
every respect, and that FP needs to be incorporated into the alliance because 
of the way it affects power sharing and the redistribution of economic fruits. 
Lastly, it is stated that even in Great Britain the three channels often have 
little or no overlap in the workplace, however, legislation can hardly exert 
direct influence in this regard.
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the five studies introduced above, 
and answers the two main research questions that connect these topics.
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2 Gaining a Foothold: Working Conditions 
Law in Globalization
Abstract
In the face of warnings from economists, tenable reasons are needed for regulating 
the labor market and workplaces in a globalized world. This chapter is devoted 
to examining the vitality of working conditions law on three levels. Firstly, in 
answering the question of why regulations on working conditions should not be 
discarded, the author puts forward an explanation, conquering the vulnerabilities 
of the mainstream philosophical justifications. Secondly, by referring to a wide 
range of economic studies, she points out the  cursoriness of the standpoint that 
regulating working conditions is bound to backfire. Finally, it is raised that an 
approach that places stress on the coordination, rather than the prioritization, of 
economic efficiency and labor protection may enable working conditions legislation 
to remain viable in today’s globalization.






Keen global competition has pushed working conditions legislation to the 
forefront. In the presence of strong market forces, is it possible to make 
effective law on working conditions? If the answer is affirmative, how can 
the conflict between the increase of labor costs and enterprise desire for 
competitive advantages be addressed? There are  contending  viewpoints 
about  the issue under discussion. In the eye of the critics, regulations cannot 
improve working conditions as planned, but in effect cause a general dete-
rioration. For instance, according to Flanagan (2006), the regulatory costs 
may induce employers to slash formal employment and simultaneously to 
increase the exploitation of informal workers who are not under the legal 
roof, so that the laborers who are really disadvantaged (e.g., young workers 
and the unskilled) are harmed in the end. In addition, working conditions 
regulations inappropriately lessen the international competitive power of 
advanced economies and prevent those relying on cheap labor from surviv-
ing and growing (Bhagwati 1995; Heintz 2002).The proponents, represented 
by Heymann and Earle (2010), hold that mandating high standards on 
domestic working conditions can promote the sustainable growth rather 
than impeding the development of enterprises within a country.
In a way that corresponds to the academic debates, policymakers of dif-
ferent countries take sharply divergent views on the orientation of working 
conditions legislation. The EU, the US and China – the three most important 
economies of the world – are the best examples. The EU, an economy with 
social values and goals at its core, features comprehensive and well-imple-
mented legislation on working conditions. The strategic intention is to make 
the European labor market a preferred place to work, which then provides 
a robust impetus for improving productivity and competitive power of the 
economy (European Commission 2014). The US exhibits a different model, 
however. Attaching great importance to market flexibility, and being alert 
to any impairment to the national competitive advantages, the American 
legislature has opted for limited and cautious legislation. It mandates strict 
standards on the central aspects of working conditions, for instance OSH, 
while applying extremely low requirements to the ‘nice-to-have’ aspects, 
such as paid sick leave and paid maternity leave, both of which are con-
sidered to be indispensable and fundamental in the remaining parts of the 
world, though. Compared with the EU and the US, China has displayed a 
somewhat ambivalent attitude. Social unrest arising from the inadequacy 
of labor protection hampers the healthy growth of the Chinese economy, 
and needs to be appeased by upgraded legislation. Moreover, international 
criticism of developing countries’ responsibility for the downwards spiral in 
global working conditions, together with the trade sanctions and preferen-
tial measures adopted by developed countries, are forcing China to improve 
its domestic working conditions by all possible means. On the other hand, 
there is a tacit fear that the increased labor costs as a consequence of huge 
improvements in Chinese working conditions will cause a loss of millions of 
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jobs and diminish the cheap labor-based competitiveness. Hence, although 
China has made striking progress on labor legislation in recent decades, 
some noticeable tolerance – especially towards foreign investors – can be 
perceived in the legal enforcement (Associated Press June 29, 2007).
Confronted with the above issues in both theory and practice, this 
chapter makes the following levels of observations. Firstly, it looks into 
the (to a large extent philosophical) foundation of mandatory constraints 
on working conditions. This helps explain the fact that despite the wish of 
enterprises to acquire competitive advantages in labor costs no country has 
abolished domestic legislation on working conditions. The second layer 
returns to a discussion of the main economic arguments against labor regu-
lation, given that economic consequences will in turn affect the realization 
of labor law values, or, to put it another way, that the culture and discourse 
of labor law is impossibly anti-consequentialist. The primary consideration 
behind the first two layers of discussions is that the existence of working 
conditions law will be justified if it has intrinsic legitimacy and no decided 
harm to the economy. Still, necessity and harmlessness are not sufficient 
for ensuring the viability of working conditions law. Based on identifying 
the transformation of the global competition mechanisms, the last section of 
this chapter provides a tentative analysis of what can be a real foothold of 
working conditions legislation nowadays.
2 The Intrinsic Foundation
2.1 Mainstream Approaches with Vulnerabilities
So far there have been two primary approaches to arguing for the legitimacy 
of legal constraints on working conditions. One is based on the instrumental 
values of working conditions law, and the other classifies employee right to 
a certain level of working conditions as a fundamental human right. Both 
can be called into question.
In the first approach, working conditions legislation is justified by 
the contribution to market efficiency, welfare maximization, social equity, 
individual capacities, or other values. Nonetheless, this approach is put 
at risk when there are alternative measures for promoting these values, or 
when there are important social values arguing against labor regulation. 
For instance, working conditions law might be capable of preventing some 
market failures and protecting the interests of individuals who do not 
make a risk assessment in concluding a contract. However, in the view of 
anti-paternalists, these merits are not worth pursuing at the expense of the 
autonomy and liberty of the labor market. Rather, employers and employ-
ees should be left free to offer and accept particular working conditions, 
since they are adults who know their own preferences (see Collins 2011). 
Analogously, the argument that working conditions law improves the 




why such a goal cannot be reached by taxation and social welfare measures, 
which are less interfering and leave labor market more freedom to create 
wealth ( see Collins 2011).
The second approach must envisage the difficulty of including all rights 
relevant to working conditions in the framework of human rights, which, 
according to Griffin (2008), should be natural, universal and urgent, owned 
by human beings because of their personhood and humanity, and character-
ized by peremptory force. The right to a certain level of working conditions 
merely covers the employed, and varies with the policy orientation and 
financial condition of a country, whereas human rights apply to everyone, 
and represent timeless and borderless fundamental needs of human beings. 
Furthermore, the interests maintained by working conditions law are 
important, but not as imperative as the values enshrined in human rights 
discourse, such as liberty, security and subsistence (Risse 2009). Although 
the rules on maximum working hours and OSH overlap with the protec-
tion of human rights with regard to securing individuals’ life and health, 
most other regulations on working conditions do not carry such compelling 
moral weight.
2.2 An Alternative Interpretation Inspired by Kant
Treating individuals as ends rather than means, a significant idea of Kan-
tianism, possibly provides a starting point for another construction, one 
managing to avoid the vulnerabilities of the above approaches. It is impor-
tant to note here that seeking help from Kantian theories does not mean 
reverting to the arguments on human rights.
Kant clearly states that the human being is his own final end, at the very 
beginning of his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (See Kant 1798, 
translated by Louden 2006: 3). This opinion accords with his philosophy of 
law, placing great emphasis on people. According to Kant, the law is made 
by men with inherent free will, in order that the freedom and actions of all 
men may coexist in harmony; the ultimate goal of the law is to maintain 
men’s freedom and all derived rights (see Kant 1790). To put it simply, the 
law is made for men, not men for the law. This central tenet may lay the 
foundation for the justification of working conditions legislation.
To start with, the law should guard people’s freedom to the largest 
extent, as long as the actions of an individual do not hinder the freedom of 
others (see Kant 1790). For the working population, a rational legal system 
is supposed to regulate working conditions that are essential for the mainte-
nance of life, health, capacity, dignity, and other elements of freedom. Even 
though other means may serve similar purposes, the absence of legislation 
on working conditions would violate the original basis and the paramount 
objective of the law. Moreover, only the law can protect the all-round 
freedom of individuals. Other means, such as taxation and social welfare 
instruments, perhaps make up for low wages, help distribute wealth, and 
improve the financial capacity of individuals to develop themselves. How-
520066-L-bw-Hu
Processed on: 31-5-2018
Gaining a Foothold: Working Conditions Law in Globalization 13
ever, an employee cannot finally enjoy these benefits if working ‘around the 
clock’ or deprived of life or health by a hazardous job.
One may further wonder what would happen if other values went 
against the regulation of the labor market and workplaces. Indeed, based 
on the fundamental principle that people are the final ends, rational legisla-
tors should take into account the way in which each value relates to the 
freedom of individuals, and then make a balanced scheme. The liberty and 
autonomy of the labor market is the best-recognized value that opposes 
mandatory protection for workers. Its logic is that a free man should be 
allowed to make his own choices rather than being told what to do, and, 
more importantly, that more dynamism and momentum is injected into 
the economy when social members are left free to make efficient decisions 
independently. When economic prosperity makes the ‘pie’ big enough to 
share, individuals will not be obstructed by unmet material needs on the 
road to freedom. Nevertheless, this ratiocination has been disproved in 
practice. Because of information asymmetry, a person in search of employ-
ment may not be aware of the actual working conditions of a job, and thus 
may have trouble in making a truly efficient decision in his or her own 
interests. Besides, in an  intensely competitive labor market, a person who 
has no substantial freedom to make a choice is very likely to accept the only 
available job, even one with unpleasant working conditions. The former 
situation can be compared to that a person does not realize that a bridge in 
front is unsafe, and in the latter scenario the person has to cross the river, 
and an unsafe bridge is the only route. Both cases demand well-intentioned 
interference: impeding the person who is ignorant of the danger from cross-
ing the unsafe bridge, or reinforcing the bridge to reduce the danger. Such 
interference does not constitute paternalism, but protects the liberty of indi-
viduals (see Spector 2006). What legislators need to work out is the amount 
of regulations and the forms that they should take; legislative interventions 
aimed at helping people achieve genuine liberty and autonomy cannot go 
so far as to cause substantial detriment to the vigor of the labor market.
Besides, justifying working conditions law grounded on the idea that 
individuals are the ends for the law does not have to invoke human rights. 
Various conditions are required to promote the freedom of the working pop-
ulation, not only the protection of liberty, dignity, safety, and health, but also 
material support and sufficient time for family life and self-development. It 
is the need for these conditions to be met, instead of the imperative force of 
universal human rights that calls for legislation on working conditions. For 
instance, workers are entitled to a paid annual holiday in some countries, 
not because the right to a paid holiday is regarded as a human right with 
peremptory force, but because it has been perceived that people need to be 
free of the shackles of work to revive their weary minds from time to time. 
Labor rights per se do not necessarily carry the same moral weight as human 
rights.
Meanwhile, legal standards for working conditions do not feature the 




that need to be met to promote working people’s (negative and positive) 
freedom vary with the form of work and over time, and the level of labor 
protection that can be ultimately provided usually relates to a particular 
society’s fiscal capacity.
Lastly, justifying labor protection does not rely on the universal appli-
cability of human rights. The nature of people being the ends is that the 
law not only addresses problems shared by the whole society, but also cares 
about the requirements of  a part of members of the society. Labor law con-
forms to this essence by taking account of the realistic needs of the working 
population.
3 Doubting the Economists’ Doubts
3.1 Making No difference? Examples from China and the US
Heymann and Earle (2010:70) generalize about two major arguments 
against ‘getting better labor laws passed’. The first argument questions 
the usefulness of labor regulations radically, contending that the necessary 
resources for enforcement are not always available in developing countries, 
and that developed economies can perform just as well without labor law 
(see Heymann and Earle 2010:70).
The stance taken by the author of this book is as following: It is true that 
the enactment of labor law is the result of long legal and political battles, 
and the enforcement depends on the availability of the requisite resources. 
Nonetheless, it is irrational to deduce that labor legislation has little practi-
cal influence in developing countries whose wealth and resources may not 
be on a par with those of their developed counterparts, or that advanced 
economies would voluntarily offer superior working conditions in the 
absence of legal requirements.
Take the Chinese legislation on minimum wages, for example. With the 
world’s largest labor force (773 million)2 and the second largest number of 
people in poverty (approximately 99 million),3 China faces huge challenges 
stemming from having insufficient manpower and material and financial 
resources to enforce the labor protection laws. In recent decades, the rather 
low minimum wage standards of this country have become a spur for 
intensified social contradictions. Low minimum wages give enterprises 
more room to exploit low-paid workers who may already have suffered 
from wage arrears or illegal wage reductions (Zheng 2007). Simultaneously, 
the slow growth in minimum wages cannot match the soaring prices, leav-
ing many working families struggling in poverty (Zhao 2013). Against this 
2 See China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2015, available at: http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/
Navi/YearBook.aspx?id=N2016030140&fl oor=1### (accessed 1 April 2017).
3 See the Overview of The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/
overview (accessed 1 December 2015).
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backdrop, the State Council is refocusing its efforts on the establishment of 
reasonable standards for minimum wages, and it perceives this as one of the 
main approaches to a more fair and efficient distribution of national income. 
The central government has set a goal of raising the minimum wages in 
most areas of China to 40 percent 4of the local median monthly earnings 
(State Council of China 2013).
A favorable condition for the realization of this objective is the adjust-
ment system instituted by the Labor Law of 1994 and the Provisions on
Minimum Wages of 2004. The former empowers provincial, autonomous 
regional and municipal people’s governments to lay down local minimum 
wages, with comprehensive references to the lowest living costs of workers 
themselves and the number of family members they support, the local aver-
age wage, productivity, the employment situation and the level of economic 
development. The latter supplements this by providing that minimum 
wages should be adjusted promptly when there are variations in the above 
factors, and that the adjustments must be made at least biennially. In accor-
dance with these provisions, thirty-one provincial administrative divisions, 
as of 2014, have set up local mechanisms for adjusting minimum wages.5
In response to the appeal of the central government, most provinces have 
made an effort to propose substantial rises in minimum wages in the last 
few years. Data disclosed by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security shows that minimum wages rose by an average of 22 percent over 
24 provinces in 2011 and by an average of 20.2 percent over 25 provinces 
in 2012; the years 2013 and 2014 respectively saw average increases of 17 
percent over 27 provinces and 14 percent over 19 provinces (CLSSN 2014).
The above information indicates that, even in a country with insufficient 
resources, the law does not exist in name only. There might be no guarantee 
of full implementation, but the law constructs the normative premise on 
which political initiatives are based. More importantly, when legislation 
moves faster than social realities, laws on paper will become motivators of 
social reforms, by shaping political debates and public attitudes, making 
possible court action for enforcement, and driving the follow-through by 
the government (Heymann and Earle 2010:xii).
A counter-example to falsify the proposition that affluent countries will 
perform equally well in offering decent working conditions when there is 
no corresponding legal obligation for employers to do so is the well-known 
and oft-cited absence of federal legal requirements for paid sick leave in 
4 Setting a minimum wage equivalent to 40 percent of the local median wage is indeed far 
from being able to meet the standards established by the international economic research, 
which determines that two-thirds and fi fty percent of the local median wage are respec-
tively the ‘low-pay’ and ‘poverty’ thresholds. However, ‘40 percent’ is a rational objective 
for China to accomplish at the present stage, considering a number of EU developed 
countries have not yet achieved this goal(see Chapter 4).
5 See the transcript of the Press Conference of Q2 2014 of the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China. Available at: http://www.mohrss.




the US. Paid sick leave is provided in nearly 150 countries globally, but the 
US only guarantees unpaid leave for serious illnesses under the Family 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)6, and this limited benefit does not cover 
all workers (Heymann, Earle, and Hayes 2007). Consequently, quite a high 
number of workers, especially vulnerable ones in the private sector, are 
not eligible for paid sick days when they are ill or injured. The US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics disclosed in 2014 that paid sick leave was available to 
61 percent of workers in private industry and 89 percent of state and local 
government workers. Within private industry, only 24 percent of part-time 
workers were offered paid sick leave, compared with 74 percent of full-time 
workers. A similar gap existed among government workers – 98 percent of 
full-time workers versus 41 percent of part-time workers had access to paid 
sick leave. There was also variation in access to paid sick leave depending 
on the size of the establishment – 52 percent of workers in small establish-
ments (with fewer than 100 employees) and 72 percent in medium and large 
establishments (with 100 employees or more) were given paid sick leave. 
Another trend was that low-wage workers were much less likely to have 
paid sick leave – only 30 percent of employees whose wages lay in the low-
est 25 percent had paid sick leave, in contrast with 84 percent of workers in 
the highest 25 percent (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014).
The examples from China and the US suggest that there is no inherent 
causality between an abundance of social resources and the quality of labor 
protection. In both affluent and less-affluent economies, enterprises are, by 
their nature, profit-driven. When they are not legally bound to offer decent 
working conditions, a race to the bottom (rather than to the top) is likely 
to take place. Proper legislation on working conditions has the potential to 
curb vicious competition in this regard.
3.2 Harming Competitive Power? Incentives to Provide Good Working 
Conditions
In accordance with Heymann and Earle (2010:70), the second argument 
against the implementation of high labor standards is that mandating 
decent working conditions leads to lower competitive power and higher 
unemployment. As a matter of fact, this has been a common concern over 
the whole world. Laggard economies surviving on cheap labor dread to 
think about implementing labor standards as high as some of their devel-
oped competitors, and advanced countries that have started from a high 
baseline may fear that any further labor costs imposed on domestic enter-
prises will be ‘the last straw’.
The above proposition that mandating decent working conditions 
is bound to diminish the competitive power and employment rate of an 
economy has contradicted the reality, however. Firstly, the conjectured 
6 Family and Medical Leave Act, Public Law 103-3, codifi ed as 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601-2654.
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tradeoff between decent working conditions and low competitive power 
is questionable. Heymann and Earle themselves are the first researchers to 
look worldwide at whether countries suffer from a lack of competitiveness 
because of mandating good working conditions. It is found that among 
the fifteen countries with the highest competitiveness,7 namely Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (hereafter 
‘UK’) and the US, the overwhelming majority go beyond basic labor stan-
dards (e.g., a prohibition on forced labor, child labor, and discrimination, 
and permission for freedom of association) and provide good working con-
ditions, including an overtime premium, paid annual leave, paid sick leave, 
paid maternity/paternity leave, and even breastfeeding breaks (Heymann 
and Earle 2010: 55-62).
At the center of the argument that high labor standards will reduce 
competitiveness is the priori conviction that squeezing labor costs is the key 
to winning in commercial rivalries, which, to some degree, is true under 
the traditional model of competition. In an era of deepening economic 
globalization, however, the simple equation between cheap labor and 
strong competitiveness is becoming unworkable. The competitive power 
of an enterprise does not lie in labor costs only, but rests with a series of 
factors such as technological level, innovation capability, organizational effi-
ciency, staff quality, popularity and reputation, and adaptability to market 
volatility.
In fact, for contestants striving for higher competitiveness amid fierce 
global competition, there are both internal and external incentives to 
provide good working conditions. For a start, decent working conditions 
contribute to the internal growth of an economy. The improvement in OSH 
alone can produce enormous economic value, given that work-related 
injuries and diseases usually result in astronomical losses8 for the whole 
of society, in both direct costs9 and a string of consequential costs10 (ILO 
7 These most competitive countries are chosen from the twenty countries with the highest 
competitiveness rankings in at least eight of the ten years from 1999 to 2008 according to 
the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (Heymann and Earle 
2010: 55).
8 The ILO estimates that occupational diseases and injuries cost approximately 4 percent 
of annual global GDP (ILO 2009). The following data from diverse sources roughly show 
the loss to various countries: the total costs of hazardous working conditions in the US 
reached 1.8 percent of GDP, or US$250 billion, in 2007 (Leigh 2011); the corresponding 
loss in the UK was £13.9 billion for 2009/10, accounting for nearly 1 percent of GDP (ILO 
2012); Australia incurred a loss of AUD 60.6 billion (4.8% of GDP ) for 2008/9 (Safe Work 
Australia 2012); Singapore lost SGD 10.45 billion (3.2% of GDP) in 2011 (WSH Institute 
2013).
9 For instance, payments made by enterprises to diseased or injured workers, and medical 
expenses.
10 For example, downtime, collateral damage to equipment and materials, negative effects 
on co-workers, compensatory overstaffi ng, the reduced productivity of ‘presenteeism’ 




2012). It has been borne out that the OSH level has a positive correlation 
with national competitiveness, and that firm-level investment in OSH is an 
efficacious and high-return strategy for achieving higher productivity and 
other economic objectives (ILO 2006).
Analogously, paid sick leave is found to reduce losses for employers by 
preventing the spread of diseases and other adverse effects on productivity 
(Chatterji and Tilley 2002; Goetzel et al. 2004; Lovell 2004). Female workers 
who are granted paid maternity leave show a stronger inclination to return 
to the previous jobs after childbirth, greatly reducing employee turnover 
and the costs incurred by the recruitment and training of new employees 
(Waldfogel, Higuchi, and Abe 1999; Waldfogel 1998). Workers are more 
productive and efficient with an appropriate length of the working week, 
whereas markedly extended working hours prove to lower productivity 
(Shepard and Clifton 2000; Shimizu et al. 2004; Thomas and Raynar 1997).
Extra benefits may arise out of the combination of different regula-
tions. An illustration is the contribution of working time limits to OSH. 
A positive relation between overtime work and the incidence of occupa-
tional accidents, injuries and some illnesses has proven correct by a great 
deal of studies (e.g., Dembe  et al. 2005; Ettner and Grzywacz 2001; Folkard 
and Lombardi 2006; Hayashi et al. 1996; Macedo and Silva 2005; Shields 
2000). It thus becomes increasingly significant to establish reasonable work-
ing schedules among enterprises in order to bring down the occurrence 
rates of work-related accidents and diseases. The overall costs to the society, 
employers, workers, and other stakeholders can be reduced accordingly. In 
a similar vein, workplaces characterized by a high OSH level can develop a 
healthier and fitter labor force, in return contributing to a reduction of the 
various costs of paid (unpaid) sick leave (Ahonen 2010).
In addition, there are external stimuli for providing good working 
conditions. First, because of consumer pressure, multinational companies 
are showing growing concern for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
reputations, and hence prefer cooperative partners who offer humane or at 
least acceptable working conditions. The story of  Foxconn (also known by 
the name of the parent company, Hon Hai) is illustrative. As the world’s 
largest contract manufacturer and Apple Corporation’s key supplier, Fox-
conn owns notorious sweatshops in China, and has been accused of violat-
ing labor rights for many years due to the horrible working conditions, such 
as the overcrowded dormitories run by military-like security forces, low 
wages, extremely long working hours and no compensation for overtime 
work (Facing Finance 2015). In 2010, a spate of suicides of migrant workers 
in Foxconn’s Shenzhen industrial park triggered a global scandal about the 
‘bloody’ production of Apple electronics (The Guardian May 27, 2010). Since 
then, Apple Corporation has been under fire for the lax supervision of the 
key supplier. To save its own global reputation, Apple asked the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) to carry out in-depth investigations into the working 
conditions in Foxconn factories, and held critical meetings with the top 
executives of the supplier to force immediate and effective improvements 
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(Apple Insider December 27, 2012). As Apple is too big a client to lose, Fox-
conn has no choice but to commit itself to wide-ranging reform, including 
a sharp increase in wages and a significant curtailment of working hours 
(New York Times December 26, 2012). A tracking report by the FLA suggests 
that Foxconn has greatly improved its working conditions, although many 
chronic problems remain for the future (Fair Labor Association December 12, 
2013).
Simultaneously, there is an evident trend towards the incorporation of 
labor provisions into trade arrangements by open economies. As of 2009, a 
total of thirty-seven North-South and South-South trade agreements had 
included conditional or promotional labor provisions. It is a steep numeri-
cal rise from the 1990 position (Ebert and Posthuma 2011). Besides, both the 
US and the EU have introduced conditional labor provisions into their Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSP), and similar provisions exist in other 
unilateral instruments of the US, such as the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act 
(1990), the Andean Trade Preference Act (1991) and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (2000). Promotional labor provisions in trade agreements 
provide for some rewards (e.g., extra quotas for market access, knowledge 
sharing and technical or financial assistance), in order to encourage the 
involved parties to comply with certain labor standards or to improve 
working conditions. In comparison, the mechanism of conditional labor 
provisions is more like a carrot and stick game: if the parties or recipient 
countries follow certain labor standards (e.g., the ILO core labor standards 
referred to in the EU GSP), or take steps to protect worker rights (which is 
required by the US GSP legislation, for example), they will be eligible for 
lower tariffs or completely duty-free access; otherwise, they will probably 
face the elimination of tariff preferences and sanctions that may or may not 
be related to trade, such as huge monetary fines, the reduction of technical 
assistance, or the suspension of cooperative activities (Ebert and Posthuma 
2011).
In short, the contention that regulations designed to improve working 
conditions harm competitiveness disagrees with the reality. Instead, the 
amelioration of working conditions is a part of the competitive strategy in 
the current phase of globalization. While some developing economies have 
achieved economic growth in the past few decades on the basis of the vast 
supply of cheap labor and the excessive consumption of natural resources, 
only higher labor standards and decent working conditions can foster the 
lasting competitiveness of enterprises and countries.
3.3 Reducing Employment? The Connection Remains Unclear
The European unemployment crisis of the 1980s and 1990s is frequently 
cited as evidence of the link between generous labor protection and unem-
ployment (Heymann and Earle 2010: 54). Yet, by reviewing a fair number of 
empirical studies, some researchers (e.g., Baker et al. 2003; Blank and Free-




and that the adverse effects of labor policies and institutions on employ-
ment is far from being solidly asserted. Gregg and Manning (1997) make 
the following comments: 1) plenty of econometric work that appears to be 
successful in explaining the changes in unemployment across countries 
and over time builds implausible models and uses dummy variables, and 
therefore, fails to provide convincing evidence of the relationship between 
unemployment and increased labor protection. 2) Making simple compari-
sons across countries to judge labor market performance is unreasonable 
too, since the results could be very sensitive to the measures used. 3) 
Conventional analyses that emphasize the disemployment effects of labor 
market regulations only see how employers’ motivation to hire workers 
influences the employment rate, but overlook that job attractiveness to the 
labor supply side also matters considerably.
Apart from estimates at the overall level, studies that assess the employ-
ment effects of specific working conditions regulations have achieved very 
mixed conclusions. A causal relationship between better working conditions 
and lower employment cannot be deduced from these either. Above all, 
great controversy exists in the burgeoning discussion of the influence of 
minimum wages. The proponents contend that moderate hikes in minimum 
wages do not impinge on the employment rate (Card and Krueger 1995: 
389-90; Freeman 1994), and that the elasticity of the labor market is likely 
to ‘absorb minimum wage increases’ (Miller 2008: 274). The growth in the 
minimum wage just offsets the value lost in persistent inflation, and hence 
it cannot possibly lower businesses’ profits or induce disemployment (Batra 
2005: 184-9). In contrast, the opponents of mandated minimum wages are 
firmly convinced that an increase in minimum wages is not cost-free – busi-
nesses must make adjustments to adapt to the higher labor costs, and thus 
low-skilled workers, young people and minorities ultimately suffer, whom 
the policy intends to help indeed (Wilson 2012).
According to a review of the earlier literature, amongst more than 100 
minimum wage studies published since the 1990s when the new minimum 
wage research began to thrive, nearly two-thirds endorse the negative 
employment effects of minimum wages, whereas only eight give a rela-
tively consistent indication of positive employment effects. Among the 33 
most reliable estimates, up to 28 (85 percent) point to negative employment 
effects (Neumark and Wascher 2007).
Nevertheless, the predominance of estimates that prove the disemploy-
ment effects of minimum wages does not of itself corroborate the negative 
relation between minimum wages and employment. Firstly, while more 
studies claim that minimum wages have negative employment effects, 
not all of them provide statistically significant evidence. On the contrary, 
some studies with the minority conclusion present very persuasive data to 
show that minimum wages have a non-negative influence on the employ-
ment rate (see Neumark and Wascher 2007). Secondly, jumping out of the 
research mode of most orthodox studies that concentrate on how minimum 
wages affect the employment rate, a small set of studies reveal that in some 
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areas a reduction in the hiring rate as a result of minimum wage increases 
is accompanied by a distinct decline in the dismissal rate (e.g., Brochu and 
Green 2012; Dube, Lester, and Reich 2012; Portugal and Cardoso 2006). It 
means that an increase in the minimum wage may reduce the chance that 
an unemployed person will find work but also reduce the probability that a 
job will end. This finding inspires a reflection on the question of whether it 
is problematic to describe the employment effects of minimum wages sim-
ply as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’. Last but not least, the relevant literature has 
probably been contaminated by publication selection bias. In other words, 
the genuine negative effects of minimum wages on employment are not 
necessarily as large as has been commonly reported by the majority of the 
existing studies. By applying recently developed meta-analysis methods to 
64 US minimum wage studies, Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) found that 
once publication selection bias was removed, little or no evidence for the 
negative employment effects of minimum wages would remain.
Similarly, there are as yet no conclusive results about the employment 
effects of overtime regulations. On the hypothesis that less work for some 
will create more jobs for others, some scholars praise the reduction of work-
ing time as an instrument against unemployment. However, this verdict has 
been accused of ignoring the consequential increases in labor costs and of 
resting on assumptions that lack empirical support (Börsch-Supan 1999). 
A few other theoretical studies (e.g., Anxo 1998, citing Federal Planning 
Bureau 1997; Oaxaca 2014) take into account several complex scenarios, 
and arrive at the conclusion that a general reduction in working time has 
employment-boosting potential only when the resulting increase in wage 
costs is suppressed; otherwise, shortened working time tends to influence 
employment negatively. Original wage costs will be maintained if there is 
no wage compensation (or increase in hourly wage rates), or if the wage 
compensation is diluted by an accompanying reduction in production 
costs, which may come from a re-organization of production methods 
(Anxo 1998), a direct increase in labor productivity that does not replace 
employees (Zachmann 1986), or supporting policies aimed at reducing 
employers’ charges (Anxo 1998, citing Federal Planning Bureau 1997). In 
terms of empirical evidence, the data from different countries exhibit rather 
contradictory results: positive employment effects of reducing working 
hours were detected in Germany (Franz and König 1986) and Finland 
(Holm and Kiander 1993), whereas non-positive influences were found in 
Japan (Brunello 1989), Germany (Hunt 1999), Canada (Skuterud 2007) and 
France (Chemin and Wasmer 2009; Cré pon and Kramarz 2002). It therefore 
seems too simplistic to draw a conclusion that overtime regulations influ-
ence employment either favorably or adversely.
The employment effects of paid sick leave are not less debatable. How-
ever, in the literature, there is more immediate and convincing evidence 
pointing to the non-negative employment effects of paid sick leave. For 
instance, in a comparative study of employment levels  in San Francisco 




neighboring counties, none of which had a paid sick leave law, between 
2006 and 2009, San Francisco was found to outperform the other counties 
in job growth in spite of the occurrence of the worst recession since World 
War II (Petro 2010). This finding echoes earlier data that demonstrate that 
San Francisco managed to maintain a higher employment level than nearby 
counties in the first year after the implementation of its paid sick leave flaw 
(Lovell and Miller 2008). In another study, this one carried out worldwide, 
Earle and Heymann (2006) examined the labor-related legislation as well 
as the individual country reports of more than 150 countries, and found no 
evidence of a negative correlation between the availability of paid sick leave 
and the macro-economic performance measured by unemployment, pro-
ductivity, Gross Domestic Product (hereafter ‘GDP’), and competitiveness. 
Afterwards, they explored whether the duration of paid sick leave could 
cause more unemployment, by analyzing comparable data of 22 countries 
with the highest scores on the United Nation’s Human Development Index. 
The upshot remained consistent with the foregoing findings: the national 
unemployment rate does not have a statistically significant relationship 
with the length of mandated paid sick leave (Schmitt et al. 2009).
To conclude, the true employment effects of working conditions law 
are not yet clear. The disemployment outcome seems to be a preconceived 
and shaky ground for denouncing the economic efficiency and far-reaching 
social influence of working conditions legislation.
4 The Real Foothold of Working Conditions Legislation
Cheap labor used to be a significant factor that induced the movement of 
capital from industrialized countries to emerging economies. However, the 
situation has been gradually changed. The international community pays 
increasing attention to CSR, and there is a worldwide adjustment of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) strategies. Relying on low labor costs to gain com-
petitive advantages is no longer a wise choice. Instead, an enterprise and a 
country are more like to obtain strong and sustainable competitiveness from 
effective integration of global resources, high productivity, technological 
advantages, and good reputation. Understanding this transformation is the 
basis for figuring out the ultimate foothold of working conditions law.
Legislatures of both developed and developing countries may have to 
dismantle the ideological systems where improving working conditions and 
promoting the competitive power of domestic enterprises are considered 
conflicting objectives. With a view to fitting in with the global trend towards 
more intensive economic growth, a country should recognize the potential 
of decent working conditions to boost the productivity of the labor force 
and to create long-term cooperative relations with foreign countries. This is 
not to overstate the motivational effect of high labor standards or to suggest 
that the increased costs for enterprises can always be justified and offset, but 
to remind the probable existence of a point where the economic and social 
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benefits of decent working conditions are balanced. This balance is a goal 
that may never be realized but can be infinitely approached. The higher the 
level of such equilibrium and the better the relations between enterprises, 
employees and government may be stabilized due to the harmonized inter-
ests of all three parties. The main idea put forward here is that a country 
will not find a real foothold for domestic working conditions legation at 
the current stage of globalization unless continuous endeavor underlies the 
making and revision of relevant regulations in order to achieve a greater 
degree of forgoing balance.
Undoubtedly, numerous challenges may stand in the way of a country 
reaching an ideal balance between economic efficiency and labor protection 
in domestic legislation on working conditions. Above all, it is a prerequisite 
that an optimistic stance is taken by the policymakers towards the coor-
dination between economic and social objectives in working conditions 
legislation. The key is a firm belief in the prospect of moving beyond the 
‘zero-sum’ approach to dealing with employment relations, based on 
which a policy package must be in place to arrange the distribution and 
redistribution, resource allocation, and cost sharing among different social 
actors in order to support the implementation of the law. Secondly, great 
demands are made on the capability of the legislature. The extent to which 
the necessary soundness, flexibility, and timeliness can be met in lawmak-
ing determines the internal rationality and practicability of relative rules, 
and relies on the mastering of a high level of legislative expertise, thorough 
understanding about domestic conditions, and systems of effective evalu-
ation. It is unrealistic to presume that concrete and efficient strategies can 
be developed when the above conditions are absent. Moreover, there might 
be some barriers that are unsurmountable in the short run. For instance, it 
is impossible to make prompt changes to unfavorable social environment 
and the level of economic development so as to facilitate the enforcement 
of a law, even if it has evident significance for transforming the ‘tug-of-war’ 
between employers and employees into a ‘win-win game’.
What is intriguing is that many countries fail to make the first step 
in emancipating the mind from traditional ideas before being faced with 
further practical difficulties. American parental leave legislation is a typical 
example. As is shown in Chapter 5 of this book, the US has implemented 
one of least generous and most ineffective parental leave policies in the 
world, while the humane and efficient model established by Sweden has 
contributed to national employment and competitive power. In fact, the 
widest gap exists between the philosophies adopted by American and 
Swedish policymakers, rather than between the capability of the two coun-






The academic disagreements and the disparities between the legislative 
stances of different countries inspire an exploration of the foothold of work-
ing conditions law against the background of intense global competition. 
In an effort to address this issue, this chapter looks at the following key 
questions: why is the regulation of working conditions indispensable, in 
spite of the widespread worry that enterprises are carrying too heavy a 
burden to compete? To what extent do the propositions that throw doubt 
on the efficiency and predict the negative economic influence of working 
conditions legislation prove correct? What is the real foothold of working 
conditions legislation in globalization?
By rights, the legitimacy of the regulation of working conditions should 
be uncontroversial, considering the conspicuous significance for employ-
ment fairness and for the living standards of the working population. How-
ever, it is not an easy task to clarify the theoretical foundation for the legal 
constraints on working conditions. This chapter categorizes the existing 
justifications for labor law into two primary approaches. Both are found to 
be defective. The instrumental value approach fails to highlight the fact that 
labor legislation is irreplaceable for achieving certain values, and does not 
consider whether other values argue against legislative interference. For the 
human rights approach, it is difficult to explain away the visible differences 
between human rights and the rights to certain levels of working conditions 
in terms of moral weight and applicability. In order to conquer these vulner-
abilities, this chapter proposes an alternative interpretation based on the 
core idea of Kantian legal philosophy –  people, who are born with free will, 
are the ends of law. This is not to resort to the human rights approach again. 
Since the paramount goal of the law is to preserve the inherent freedom of 
individuals to the greatest degree, the existence of other means for the same 
purpose cannot free labor legislation from the responsibility of creating the 
conditions for the employed to realize the freedom. Meanwhile, legislators 
will be able to judge the priority of different values according to whether 
and how they are related to the preservation of individuals’ freedom. This 
construction also avoids the danger of classifying all labor rights as human 
rights. It adopts a dynamic explanation that the regulations on working 
conditions derive from the need of the working population for certain con-
ditions to preserve the basic freedom, rather than from the imperative force 
of human rights. By the same token, working conditions law does not have 
to feature the universal applicability or unified standards of human rights 
protection.
The author then considers whether the inefficiency or the negative influ-
ence of working conditions law on the economy has been overstated. Obvi-
ously, the arbitrary assertion that regulation is useless does not stand up to 
scrutiny, because there is no lack of counter-examples. The experiences of 
China and the US illuminate the fact that, regardless of whether a society 
has sufficient resources to implement the law, the relevant legislation is 
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needed to ‘raise the floor’ for workers. Many studies have tried to rebut 
the long-believed equation between cheap labor and high competitive-
ness, but Heymann and Earle (2010) provide the most direct evidence that 
a majority of the fifteen countries with the highest competitiveness in the 
world offer decent working conditions. The main reason for this unexpected 
consequence is that there are apparent internal and external incentives to 
lift labor standards in a globalized world. To be brief, a country that is 
active in improving domestic working conditions is likely to obtain stron-
ger internal growth, and has access to more international cooperation and 
preferential trade deals. Lastly, abundant studies seem to have corroborated 
the disemployment effects of working conditions law, but not all of them 
find significant evidence, and some even depend on implausible models 
or dummy variables. In contrast, a few findings indicative of non-negative 
employment effects are relatively convincing.
The author finally raises the idea that working conditions legislation 
can gain a reliable foothold in globalization only by making an unflagging 
effort to approach the balance point where the economic and social benefits 





3 A Legislative Perspective on Construction 
Safety in China, against the Backdrop of 
an Industry-wide Labor Shortage■
Abstract
In the context of the ongoing labor shortage in China’s construction industry, 
this chapter examines how the defective domestic legislation related to construc-
tion safety worsens the situation, and also, in the legislative dimension, what 
reformative measures are likely to bring about fundamental improvements. Three 
levels of description in this chapter show, respectively, the impracticability of the 
main construction safety rules, the malfunctions of the Labor Contract Law and 
the regulations about work-related injury insurance, and the undermining of the 
responsibility system. While it would be difficult to construct a more efficient legal 
framework right away, immediate efforts can be made to address specific tough 
issues that are key to ameliorating China’s construction safety performance and 
to decelerating the outflow of the construction workforce. This chapter identifies 
five reformative measures that should be taken: generalizing an IT system platform 
for construction labor management, strengthening the combination of liabilities 
and incentives to guide hesitant building enterprises, exploring the likelihood of 
absorbing migrant construction workers into unions, guaranteeing workers easy 
access to post-accident remedies, and promoting the role of NGOs.
Key Words: Construction Safety; China; Legislation; Labor Shortage
■ This chapter has been submitted to the Journal of Workplace Rights and is presently being 




1 Background: A Tricky Situation for China’s Construction 
Industry
Since the implementation of the Tenth Five-year Plan for National Economic 
and Social Development, the construction industry has thrived in China 
(China AEC Industry Summit 2015). The corresponding gross output value 
exceeded ¥ 11 trillion in 2011, accounting for approximately a quarter of 
China’s GDP for that year (National Bureau of Statistics 2012). However, 
behind this fascinating achievement is a nationwide shortage of construc-
tion workers. The fast-rising labor costs threaten the long-term prosperity 
of the whole industry.
This seems unusual for one of the most recognized surplus labor econo-
mies in the world, but the truth is that construction workers have become 
very sought after in mainland China in recent years. Developers11 and 
building enterprises have to pay increasingly high prices to attract skilled 
manpower (See South China Morning Post, September 15, 2014). According 
to the data available on the China Engineering Cost Network, the national 
average daily wage for each of 18 types of Chinese construction worker 
ascended steeply from Q4 2011 to Q1 2014 (see the comparison between 
these two quarters in Chart 1). In a few cities, for example Changsha (Chart 
2) and Guangzhou (Chart 3), the average daily earnings of all kinds of con-
struction workers grew by more than 100 percent during this period.
There are many reasons behind the situation. To start with, the con-
tinuing currency inflation and soaring price level force all professions and 
trades to increase wages in order to satisfy laborers’ basic living needs, 
especially in the construction industry, where workers are generally unfairly 
paid (China Engineering Cost Association, 2012). Secondly, China’s urban-
rural dualistic economic structure has been changing dramatically. Some 
economists believe that this fastest-growing country in the world is getting 
close to the so-called ‘Lewis turning point’ (e.g. Das and N’Diaye, 2013a; 
Knight et al., 2010). Thus, a few industries that have relied heavily on cheap 
rural migrant labor to grow face a shrinking workforce, such as construc-
tion, manufacturing, and services. Moreover, the serious problem of the 
aging population accelerates the exhaustion of the ‘demographic dividend’ 
in China (Das and N’Diaye, 2013b). Lastly, it is well known in China that the 
working conditions in the construction industry are dreadful. Construction 
jobs have been almost synonymous with severe wage arrears, round-the-
clock working, and a high incidence of injuries and fatalities, so the appeal 
is conspicuously weaker than that of other professions, in particular when 
the competition in the labor market is becoming less stiff (Dai, 2013).
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Focusing on the last reason listed above, some labor lawyers raise that 
the ongoing supply-demand imbalance in the construction labor market 
provides a golden opportunity to stimulate radical improvements in the 
overall situation of Chinese construction workers (see China Real Estate 
Business, April 2, 2012). Agreeing with this perception, the chapter takes 
stock of how construction safety might be alleviated to reduce the domestic 
antipathy to construction jobs.
Different from previous studies that concentrate on the defeat of build-
ing enterprises in managing construction safety (e.g., Tam et al., 2003), 
ineffective government regulation (e.g., Wang1, 2015), historical and social 
reasons (e.g., Yan, 2005), and the characteristics of China’s informal employ-
ment and rural migrant workers (e.g., Swider, 2015), this chapter reflects 
on the multidimensional problems with the national legislation. On this 
basis, it raises new possibilities about the legislative changes that should 
be made to improve China’s construction safety. These measures may play 
a decisive part in slowing down the outflow of workers – new-generation 
rural migrant workers in particular – from the labor pool of the construction 
industry.
2 Major Defects of the Chinese Legislation in Terms of 
Construction Safety
At the beginning of this century, construction accidents and fatalities hap-
pened in their thousands every year in China (see table 1). After a decade 
of inadequate improvement the situation remains grim (see table 2).12 As 
indicated by the aforementioned studies, a collection of particular national 
conditions have combined to result in the high incidence of construction 
accidents. However, from a legislative standpoint, it is more reasonable to 
say that China lacks legal institutions suited to the national conditions.
Above all, China has established an elementary legislative framework 
related to construction safety, but the specific regulations and technical 
codes that serve as criteria for behavior and bases for regulation are far from 
complete, significantly decreasing the effectiveness of the law (Zhang et al., 
2003). In the meantime, Chinese labor legislation has by and large made few 
efforts to assist the 36 million rural migrant workers engaged in the con-
12 Because the data are incomplete, table 2 just shows the number of nationwide construc-
tion accidents and fatalities taking place in the fi rst half of fi ve consecutive years from 
2011 to 2015. Simultaneously, it is important to note that China’s central system for regis-
tering occupational accidents is very unsound (Wang and Fang 2007:9), thus, the actual 





struction industry,13 who are left outside the formal employment structure 
and are accordingly excluded from de facto labor protection. Furthermore, 
the system for legal responsibility is seriously flawed, and hence cannot 
play a proper role in eradicating the malpractice and illegalities that are 
regarded as the cause of most domestic construction accidents.
What follows is a detailed depiction of how these legislative defects 
have militated against the Chinese progress in improving construction 
safety. Several notable initiatives launched in 2014 are given special atten-
tion, because they demonstrate the policymakers’ increasing awareness that 
measures must be taken to enhance construction safety, but these ultimately 
failed to spark sweeping transformations as had been expected.
2.1 Impractical Rules
As the most significant laws containing work safety rules, the Labor Law 
(2009 Amendment)14, Construction Law (2011 Amendment)15, and Work 
Safety Law (2014 Amendment)16 offer inadequate down-to-earth guidelines 
for the management of construction safety.
To be specific, in the Labor Law there are only a small number of sketchy 
clauses concerning occupational safety in all professions (in Articles 52-57). 
For example, “employers shall establish and perfect the system for labor 
safety and sanitation” (Article 52), “labor safety and sanitation facilities shall 
meet State-fixed standards” (Article 53), and “laborers should strictly follow 
rules on safe operation” (Article 56). The practicability of these provisions is 
questionable.
In the Construction Law, the basic law for the construction industry, a 
whole chapter with 16 articles (Articles 36-51) constructs only a few prag-
matic norms for conduct. Many of the formulations cannot be implemented 
as they are too vague and are expressed in terms of principles, and no 
further explanations or supporting provisions are provided. For instance, 
Article 36 stipulates that a system should be established and perfected in 
order to enable the masses to participate in accident prevention and safety 
management, but how to set up such a system is not mentioned. Accord-
ing to Article 47, workers are entitled to propose improvement schemes 
for programs and working conditions that may cause harm to health, 
13 Some 45 million people work in China’s construction industry, so rural migrant workers 
account for 80 percent of these. See http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/gsbxs/GSBXSgong-
zuodongtai/201501/t20150130_150792.htm (accessed 12 March 2016).
14 《中华人民共和国劳动法（2009修正）》(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodongfa (2009 
  Xiuzheng)).
15 《中华人民共和国建筑法（2011修正）》(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianzhufa (2011
  Xiuzheng)).
16 《中华人民共和国安全生产法（2014修正）》(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Anquan
  Shengchanfa (2014Xiuzheng)).
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and have the right to criticize, inform against and accuse management of 
actions endangering their health and safety. However, this provision comes 
to naught as well, since it virtually repeats the Article 56(2) of the Labor 
Law while failing to elaborate on the relevant procedures (including which 
government department should receive the complaints) and assigning no 
social resources or assistance to vulnerable workers. In the Chinese context, 
the millions of migrant construction workers are by no means capable of 
making suggestions and bringing accusations, due to the averagely poor 
educational background and inferior position in the labor market. Hence, 
the foregoing provisions are particularly empty for them.
The 2014 Work Safety Law reinforces the original version of its 2002 
predecessor in many ways. By defining the rights to safety at work and 
the obligations of employers, workers, inspectors and government offi-
cials much better, it overcomes the roughness of the Labor Law and the 
Construction Law. Nevertheless, in relation to the administration of con-
struction safety, it still has notable limitations. As the principal law for a 
number of high-risk industries, one can understand that it should not lay 
particular stress on a certain sector. However, some ‘one-size-fits-all’ provi-
sions are hard to implement in the construction industry, which requires 
concrete regulations addressing its peculiarities. Additionally, some clauses 
of the 2014 Work Safety Law direct people to other specific laws, rules, or 
standards that need to be made by different legislatures or government 
departments. This is especially problematic for the Chinese construction 
industry, because the legislation in this field is rather laggard and unde-
veloped. Last but not least, although the 2014 Work Safety Law is much 
more detailed than the Labor Law or the Construction Law, it continues 
with the prescriptive approach that describes ‘means’ instead of ‘ends’ 
and tries to standardize work processes by applying prescriptive rules and 
procedures backed up by compliance monitoring and by timely sanctions 
for non-compliance (Zhang et al., 2003). Nonetheless, it is impossible for 
prescriptive regulations to embrace all construction hazards. Such hazards 
emerge in an endless stream because of continuous technical innovation 
and the development of material. Moreover, with more than 40 million 
construction workers,17 countless building and labor companies, and the 
large economic gaps between different regions, China desperately lacks 
the human and material resources to uphold the prescriptive approach to 
regulating construction safety problems. These limitations all reduce the 





2.2 The Labor Contract Law18 and the Impact on Construction Safety
2.2.1 The Malfunctioning of the Labor Contract Law in the Construction 
Industry
Enacted in 2007, the Labor Contract Law is considered a landmark in labor 
market governance in China. Nonetheless, the enforcement of this law has 
not improved the number of rural migrant workers who sign labor con-
tracts with employers. Data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics 
from 2009 to 2016 suggest that for the whole labor market the percentage of 
rural migrant workers with written contracts has remained below 45% and 
has declined considerably overall (42.8% in 2009 vs. 35.1% in 2016).19 In the 
years 2009, 2011 and 2012, when data for specific industries are available, 
the construction sector always had the highest proportion (some 75%) of 
rural migrant workers that had not entered into a labor contract with the 
employer.20
In theory, the Labor Contract Law develops the relevant rules of the 
Labor Law, and strengthens the rights of the employed (who, of course, 
include the approximately 290 million21 rural migrant workers) to written 
labor contracts. But what did not change was the legislative indifference to 
the real difficulties of the uneducated rural migrant workers in understand-
ing and defending their own rights.
In the general provisions of the Labor Contract Law, Article 3 highlights 
that a labor contract should be concluded in accordance with the principles 
of lawfulness, fairness, equality, free will, negotiation for agreement and 
good faith. Articles 4, 5, and 6 emphasize the crucial role of labor unions or 
employee representatives in determining rules and important events in rela-
tion to remuneration, working time, health and safety at work, etc. In the 
special provisions (Articles 51-56) on the conclusion and implementation 
of collective labor contracts, the irreplaceable position of different levels of 
unions is again underlined.
These provisions can hardly benefit migrant construction workers in 
reality, although they are aimed at making up for the inferiority of work-
ers in signing a labor contract with the mighty employer. The fundamental 
reason is that since a sequence of ‘reforms’ of the employment system in 
18 《中华人民共和国劳动合同法（2012修正）》(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong
  Hetongfa (2012 Xiuzheng)).
19 See the monitoring surveys of NBSC on nationwide migrant workers, available at: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/was5/web/search?channelid=288041&andsen=%E5%86%9C
%E6%B0%91%E5%B7%A5%E7%9B%91%E6%B5%8B%E8%B0%83%E6%9F%A5%E6%8
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the construction industry in the 1980s,22 unlawful contract awards, multi-
layer subcontracting, contracting-out and affiliating have been prevalent 
in China’s construction works. These illegal actions may occur separately 
or simultaneously. To be specific, developers may award the main build-
ing contract illicitly, derailing the entire operation from the start. At the 
implementation stage, the substantive construction work is not fulfilled by 
the head contractor23, but is contracted out, or split into parts and subcon-
tracted to several small building enterprises, labor service companies or 
labor contractors, most of whom are unqualified and are only nominally 
affiliated to authorized companies. Through 4-6 times of subcontracting, it 
is the lowest level of labor contractors that take charge of worker recruit-
ment and management, based on such social ties as friendship, kinship, or 
coming from the same town. Problems arise here: 1) most poorly-educated 
migrant construction workers know nothing about labor contracts or the 
Labor Contract Law; for the minority who have heard about labor contracts, 
it is too complicated to figure out the other contracting party (Yizhuanyiwa 
Migrant Workers Culture Development Center, 2013). 2) A shocking secret 
is hidden in the foregoing illegal actions: the unclear relationships actually 
enable developers, building enterprises and labor companies to escape 
22 Before 1980, Chinese rural migrant construction workers were fairly well protected, 
and received the same wages and benefi ts as urban workers, because all construction 
projects were planned and managed by the government. In 1980, to stimulate the vitality 
of the brand-new market economy, the State Council introduced a project-contracting 
system to the construction industry by enacting the《建筑安装工程包工合同条例》Jianzhu 
Anzhuang Gongcheng Baogong Hetong Tiaoli (Regulations on Contracts of Construction 
Installation Engineering). In September 1984, another piece of legislation passed by the 
State Council – 《关于改革建筑业和基本建设管理体制若干问题的暂行规定》Guanyu Gaige 
Jianzhuye he Jiben Jianshe Guanli Tizhi Ruoganwenti de Zanxing Guiding (Interim 
Provisions on Several Issues concerning the Reform of the Construction Industry and the 
Basic Construction Management System) – clearly stipulated that state-owned building 
enterprises should gradually replace permanent employment with contract-based 
employment, and that in the near future only a small number of technical experts could 
be employed permanently. However, the household registration (the so-called ‘hukou’ 
in Chinese) and social security institutions were not prepared for this dramatic change 
and enterprises therefore blatantly took advantage of these institutional defi ciencies 
and treated migrant construction workers in a discriminatory way. In November of the 
same year, the Ministry of Construction and the National Planning Commission jointly 
issued《建设工程招标投标暂行规定》Jianshe Gongcheng Zhaobiao Toubiao Zanxing 
Guiding (Interim Provisions on the Tendering and Bidding on Construction Projects), 
further encouraging contractors to lower their bidding prices. In consequence, countless 
private labor contractors and unauthorized labor companies that focused on fi nding 
rural migrant workers emerged, and the practices of exploiting inferior migrant workers 
and carving up interests, in the forms of contracting-out, affiliating and multi-layer 
subcontracting, started spreading widely in the construction industry.





regulatory governance, not to prepay labor costs,24 and to shift various 
risks to construction workers who are at the end of the chain of interests. 3) 
The great informality of employment and the cognitive limitations of rural 
migrant workers work against the solidarity of workers and certainly work 
against the formation of strong unions that would be capable of helping 
workers to conclude a fair labor contract with the employer.
Enterprises that are qualified to sign labor contracts have no direct or 
apparent employment relationship with workers, whereas labor contractors 
that directly recruit and manage workers are not eligible to conclude labor 
contracts with workers. For the sake of addressing this dilemma, regula-
tions that identify who is capable of recruiting construction workers and 
who is obliged to sign labor contracts with workers in different situations 
should have been made for the construction industry.
2.2.2 The Impact on Construction Safety
The low proportion of workers with labor contracts in the construction 
industry stores up trouble for construction safety. First of all, many employ-
ers force rural migrant workers to work extremely long hours due to 
the absence of labor contracts. According to the latest official data in the 
national monitoring survey of 2009, the average working hours in the con-
struction sector is 59.4 hours per week (National Bureau of Statistics 2010), 
far beyond the general limit of 44 hours set by the Labor Law. The research 
of Zhang (2014) about the association between fatigue and construction 
safety shows that the error rate increases significantly as soon as construc-
tion workers feel slightly fatigued, and as they feel further fatigue the 
hazard perception and motor control starts to fail; workers are unconscious 
of most of the errors because the sensory ability is impaired.
Secondly, the unstable contract-free relationship between building 
enterprises and rural migrant workers gives rise to a high level of labor 
mobility in the construction industry. Given that the workers will move to 
another construction project promptly after finishing the first one, many 
building enterprises wriggle out of investing in professional safety train-
ing and facilities, even though they have an obligation to do so. In other 
words, the temporary connection with workers gives building enterprises 
little promise of long-term return for human resources investment, which 
fundamentally discourages any real expenditure on safety training. In 
consequence, many construction sites adopt simple and one-sided rules to 
deter risky behaviors, such as heavy fines for smoking and for not wear-
ing a helmet. The importance of construction safety and the relevant skills 
24 Workers’ basic accommodation is usually offered by private labor contractors, who do 
not pay wages until they themselves are paid by the higher layers of subcontractors after 
the construction work is fi nished. This means that a default on payment at any step will 
give rise to wage arrears, which is not the focus of this chapter but is another huge chal-
lenge for labor protection in China’s construction industry.
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and knowledge are rarely imparted in ways that rural migrant workers can 
understand. For the workers, it is not clear why trivial things like ‘smoking’ 
and ‘forgetting to wear a helmet’ matter, and the unpersuasive penalties are 
more like shackles of the last freedom.
2.3 Legislation on Work-Related Injury Insurance May Worsen the 
Predicament
In addition to the above impact on construction safety, the scarcity of 
contract-based employment relationships in the construction industry has 
an unfavorable interaction with the legislation on work safety insurance. 
In the light of the Regulation on Work-Related Injury Insurance25 issued 
by the State Council in 2003 and revised in 2010, work-related injury 
insurance is the basic mechanism to ensure that workers injured in occu-
pational accidents can obtain medical care and economic compensation, 
and to promote the prevention of work-related injuries and occupational 
recovery (Article 1). The insurance funds are deposited into a designated 
financial account and used to pay work-related injury insurance benefits, 
work ability appraisal fees, fees for publicity, and training with respect to 
the prevention of work-related injury (Article 12). Bearing in mind the great 
significance of these provisions, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security – 
one of the predecessors of today’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security (MOHRSS) – issued the Notification of Doing Well the Work about 
Migrant Construction Workers’ Participation in Work-related Injury Insur-
ance (2006)26. It required that local construction administrative departments 
should only award a safety production license to building enterprises (head 
contractors) that have paid work-related injury insurance premiums for 
all their construction workers. However, as already mentioned, the head 
contractors do not directly employ or contract with construction workers. 
For the purpose of getting the production licenses quickly, some head 
contractors fabricate a roll call of workers and then buy insurance for non-
existent people, while the real workers who are informally employed by 
unauthorized private labor contractors to work on the construction projects 
are not covered by occupational insurance (Li 2013).
With a view to addressing the above frauds and irregularities, the Social 
Insurance Law27 enacted in 2010 prescribes that employers who do not pay 
work-related injury insurance premiums must pay insurance benefits and 
compensation to injured workers or bereaved families following work-
related accidents. If an employer fails to pay these costs, the work-related 
25 《工伤保险条例》(Gongshang Baoxian Tiaoli).
26 《关于做好建筑施工企业农民工参加工伤保险有关工作的通知》(Guanyu Zuohao Jianzhu
  Shigong Qiye Nongmingong Canjia Gongshang Baoxian Youguan Gongzuo de Tongzhi).
 See http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/gkml/xxgk/201407/t20140717_136115.htm (accessed 
27 Jan 2016).




insurance fund must advance the payment and then pursue the debt from 
the employer (Article 41). This means that the building enterprises or 
labor companies that actually use the laborers cannot evade paying either 
work-related insurance premiums or benefits. Nonetheless, the problem 
remains. Injured workers or bereaved families must prove the existence of 
labor relationship with these enterprises when applying for ‘work-related 
injury ascertainment’ (Article 18 of the Regulation on Work-Related Injury 
Insurance), which is the prerequisite for obtaining compensation and 
insurance benefits. So, we are taken back to the start – the ‘missing’ labor 
contract. What can be used as proof of the employment relationship except 
a labor contract? How can rural migrant workers who do not even realize 
the importance of a labor contract be aware that they must collect other 
evidence in advance? Most crucially, building enterprises, labor companies, 
and labor contractors may all take a share of the illegal profits made from 
exploiting rural migrant workers. Would they leave evidence behind? Once 
these queries have begun to be deliberated over, one will probably decide 
that the road ahead for injured construction workers is rather long and dim.
Furthermore, the Regulation on Work-Related Injury Insurance (Article 
17) sets a one-year limit for injured workers or their relatives, bereaved 
families, or unions to apply for work-related injury ascertainment if the 
employer fails to do so within 30 days after the day on which the accident 
occurs. This provision overlooks the fact that one year may be too short to 
allow migrant construction workers to get ready. Sometimes, the treatment 
period exceeds one year, and in addition there is the time spent in getting 
acquainted with the relevant procedures, collecting evidence, seeking 
legal aid, and resorting to labor relationship arbitration and litigation. As 
explained by the labor lawyer Mr. Tong Lihua, the dean of Beijing Zhicheng 
Legal Aid and Research Center (mentioned later), it takes around three 
years and nine months, or six years and seven months when there are exten-
sions, to go through all the procedures for obtaining a due legal remedy.28
On account of these obstacles, most injured workers opt out of the legal 
route and accept the inappropriately low compensation offered by the 
employer ‘behind closed doors’. In this sense, law breakers win in the end, 
which virtually brings about more circumventions of the law.
In order to break the current vicious circle, the MOHRSS, the Ministry 
of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD), the State Admin-
istration of Work Safety (SAWS), and the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU) jointly issued an Opinion on Further Improving the Work 
on Work-related Injury Insurance in the Construction Industry29 (hereafter 
28 See http://www.chinasafety.ac.cn/main/xwzx/aqyw/2013-12-10/6374.html (accessed 
2 February 2016).
29 《关于进一步做好建筑业工伤保险工作的意见》(Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jianzhuye 
  Gongshang Baoxian Gongzuo de Yijian). See http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/
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referred to as the ‘Opinion’) in late 2014. This central administrative docu-
ment puts forward a string of measures to enforce the universal coverage of 
work-related insurance for construction workers.
The first pioneering move is to instruct head contractors to insure 
workers who are not formally employed, based on the construction projects 
rather than labor contracts. The aim is to deal with the high degree of labor 
mobility in the construction industry. The Opinion also emphasizes that 
the cost of insurance premiums should be calculated as an independent 
expenditure and should not be counted as a part of the bidding price. Before 
starting the construction project, the head contractor should pay the one-off 
insurance premiums and put all the safety measures in place; failing this, 
the construction permit must not be awarded. Simultaneously, the Opinion 
makes an appreciable effort to assist injured construction workers in apply-
ing for work-related injury ascertainment and for compensation: 1) aside 
from a labor contract (the primary evidence of the employment relation-
ship), the roster, wage payment proofs, work cards, attendance records, 
recruitment registration, and testimony of other workers should be counted 
as effective evidence for the factual labor relationship; 2) the procedures 
for work-related injury ascertainment should be simplified and shortened 
to make the relief more efficacious; and 3) if the owners (developers) of 
construction projects, head contractors, or subcontractors who are qualified 
to employ workers give out subcontracts to unauthorized organizations 
or individuals, they should jointly bear the liability for compensation for 
the losses of injured workers or bereaved families. Finally, the Opinion 
re-emphasizes the significant role of unions, proposes schemes for policy 
propaganda and training among rural migrant workers, and urges building 
enterprises to give a true and prompt account of construction accidents.
Still, it is doubtful whether the Opinion has revolutionary implications. 
Issued by departments of the central government, it has a certain binding 
force. However, it cannot accomplish much in circumstances where higher 
levels of legislation demonstrate little sympathy for the plight of construc-
tion workers. Moreover, what the Opinion provides is not so much refined 
rules as preliminary proposals, and these will exert actual influence only 
when there is layer-by-layer local legislation to develop concrete provisions. 
The reality is that after the issuance of the Opinion, most provincial and 
municipal authorities only specified the minimum proportion of building 
enterprises’ work-related injury insurance costs to total construction costs, 
and transcribed the other parts of the Opinion into local administrative 
documents. In another word, local legislatures have scarcely improved the 
enforceability of the Opinion. Furthermore, the lack of overall solutions to 
boost the coverage of work-related injury insurance among rural migrant 
workers erodes the Opinion’s momentum. Unions remain feeble since there 
are no sophisticated measures to make them powerful, and developers and 
head contractors are unlikely to make massive changes when there are no 





2.4 The Undermining of the Responsibility System
Under the current legal framework, responsibilities for construction safety 
are mainly imposed on developers and head contractors. However, under 
the veil of subcontracting, contracting-out and nominal affiliating, these 
responsibilities are often shifted to the labor companies or private labor con-
tractors who actually control the behavior of workers on construction sites. 
These lowest-level ‘exploiters’ are unlikely to pay for the costly training, 
equipment and facilities that are necessary for reducing the precariousness 
faced by workers. In such cases, the responsibility system is undermined to 
a large degree.
Here, an underlying question is worth contemplating: why do illegal 
contract awards, multi-layer subcontracting, contracting-out, and affiliat-
ing keep flourishing in practice? The deep-seated reason still lies in the 
defective legislation. According to a disclosure by a MOHURD spokes-
man, around 40 percent of catastrophic construction accidents nationwide 
are bound up with unlawful contract awards, multi-layer subcontracting, 
contracting-out and affiliating.30 However, there have been few systematic 
measures aimed at reducing these offenses, and pronounced legislative 
deficiencies are found in the following aspects.
1) The concepts of ‘illegal contract award’, ‘subcontracting’, ‘contracting-
out’ and ‘affiliating’ have never been defined explicitly in the important 
pieces of construction legislation, although they have been banned for so 
long. In addition, without paying any regard to the many different forms 
in which they are found in practice, the laws and administrative regula-
tions in relation to construction attempt to encapsulate varied cases in 
simplistic provisions. Consequently, the implementation of the law is 
thwarted. In 2014, the MOHURD defined these offenses and listed their 
typical forms for the first time in the Measures for the Administration of 
the Diagnosis, Investigation and Handling of Illegal Contract Award, 
Subcontracting and other Unlawful Actions (for Trial Implementation)31
(hereafter referred to as the ‘2014 Measures’). Nevertheless, interim legis-
lation like this made by the MOHURD should not be used to interpret 
indefinite concepts in laws and administrative regulations, whose ambi-
guity can only be removed by legislative actions of the (Standing 
Committee of the) National People’s Congress and of the State Council.
2) As the legal liabilities for the foregoing offenses and for regulators’ 
dereliction of duty have been either unclear or irrationally light, the 
importance of construction safety has been belittled. In order to deal 
30 http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/zxydt/201409/t20140929_219193.html (accessed 3 March 
2016).
31 《建筑工程施工转包违法分包等违法行为认定查处管理办法（试行）》(Jianzhu Gongcheng
 Shigong Zhuanbao Weifa Fenbao deng Weifa Xingwei Rending Chachu Guanli Banfa 
(Shixing)). Available at: http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/zcfg/jsbwj_0/jsbwjjzsc/201409/
t20140904_218909.html (accessed 7 February 2016).
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with the hollowness of the liability clauses in the Construction Law, in 
the Regulation on the Quality Management of Construction Projects, 
and in the Administrative Regulations on the Work Safety of Construc-
tion Projects32, the 2014 Measures lay down specific standards of admin-
istrative fines for different situations and adopt a variety of sanctions, 
such as suspending construction projects until the failures are rectified, 
revoking or down-grading an enterprise’s qualifications, ceasing to 
disburse funds (for state-funded projects), and so forth. While this is a 
step towards defining the penalties for illegal contract awards, subcon-
tracting, contracting-out and affiliating, the 2014 Measures have not 
established a sound accountability system for eliminating these chronic 
and stubborn ‘ills’ of the construction industry. As departmental rules, 
the 2014 Measures have temporarily filled the gap in terms of the 
administrative liabilities for the above illegal actions, but the corre-
sponding criminal liabilities and civil liabilities based on tort law and 
employment law are of comparable significance and need framing 
simultaneously. Furthermore, since the influence of malpractice has 
been underestimated, the 2014 Measures fail to address the liabilities of 
regulators. It is actually a simple truth that lax regulation by govern-
ment has the potential to subvert the effectiveness of the strictest liability 
clauses designed to deter illegal actions of the monitored entities.
3) The MOHURD has set quite high thresholds for building enterprises to 
enter the construction market. A great many unqualified building/labor 
companies and private labor contractors survive by ‘rent-seeking’, 
namely reaching a trade-off between money and nominal affiliation. A 
number of certificated enterprises make a profit from renting out the 
qualifications, and ineligible organizations or individuals undertake 
construction work in the name of those who lend out the qualifications. 
A comparison between the 2001 and 2014 versions of the Grade Stan-
dards of Construction Enterprise Qualifications suggests a slight trend 
towards looser qualification requirements for domestic construction 
companies. However, the new standards continue to emphasize the 
financial and material condition (net asset value, highest contract 
amount, personnel, and technical equipment) of a company, while not 
touching upon the safety record, safety management level, or compe-
tency to deal with construction hazards.33 This is a deficient way of 
controlling building enterprises and relevant individuals’ access to the 
construction market. One the one hand, when OSH performance is not a 
criterion for qualification assessment, certificated companies need not 
fear that permitting a nominal affiliation may discredit their own safety 
records. ‘Rent-seeking’ is more likely to take place. In the meantime, 
32 《建设工程安全生产管理条例》(Jianshe Gongcheng Anquan Shengchan Guanli Tiaoli).
33 See http://economics.hnsci.net/sites/economics.hnws.cn/files/economics/pdf/2-
root/2.1.7.pdf and http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/wjfb/201411/W020141231012846.pdf 




some building businesses in fact have the ability to manage construction 
risks, but they are totally blocked out of the construction market by the 
high financial thresholds. To stay within this market, they cannot but 
join the ‘rent-seekers’.
3 New-Generation Migrant Workers are Fleeing the Dangerous 
Construction Industry: Legislative Possibilities and 
Challenges
The concept of ‘New-Generation Migrant Workers’ was proposed by 
China’s No.1 Central Document for 2010,34 referring to rural migrant work-
ers born after 1980 and aged over 16. A report by ACFTU (2010) estimates 
that this population amounted to 100 million people as of 2010, accounting 
for more than 60 percent of all rural migrant workers.
In the building industry, the older generation of migrant workers is 
becoming physically inactive and demonstrating a tendency to return 
to rural areas in the near future. The inclinations of the new-generation 
migrant workers towards job selection will therefore have a strong influ-
ence on the labor supply for the construction sector. The fact is that only 
9.8 percent of the new-generation migrant workers opt to work in the con-
struction industry, as opposed to 27.8 percent of the older generation (see 
Table 3). Even though the average wages for all kinds of construction work 
have been growing, the new-generation migrant workers show a fading 
interest in it, and gradually drift into the manufacturing and service sectors 
(National Bureau of Statistic 2011).
Indeed, unfavorable factors, such as long working hours, low wages 
and instability, exist in non-construction sectors as well (National Bureau 
of Statistic 2011). The unwillingness of new-generation migrant workers to 
do construction work is not derived from a shortage of hardworking spirit 
among them, but from the pursuit of a comparatively safe and decent work-
ing environment. The National Bureau of Statistics (2011) discloses that the 
coverage of social insurance among new-generation migrant workers is 
quite low in all sectors, but those engaged in the construction industry feel 
particularly unsafe in every way. Confronted with diverse deadly hazards, 
only 5.2 percent of the new-generation construction workers are covered by 
medical insurance, and 16.1 percent by work-related injury insurance. These 
proportions are even lower than those of the new-generation migrant work-
ers covered by medical and work-related injury insurance in most of the less 
precarious sectors (see table 4). Moreover, depressingly few of the new-gener-
ation construction workers are covered by endowment insurance and unem-
ployment insurance (see table 4). In short, it is the disrespect for life that scares 
the new-generation migrant workers away from the construction industry.
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Whether the safety assurance system for construction work can be 
appreciably improved in short order will have a determining influence on 
future trends in the industry-wide labor shortage. This section digs into 
what would be feasible and effective in the legislative dimension, and puts 
forward the following five possibilities that would probably make a major 
difference.
3.1 Mandating an Real-Name IT System for Construction Labor 
Management
The rather random and informal relationship between workers and employ-
ers is the root cause of the poor safety records and most of the other labor 
protection problems on China’s construction sites. Nothing is more urgent 
than taking measures to regularize the employment status of building 
workers and transform the whole of the labor management system in the 
construction industry.
For a long time the employment status of construction workers has been 
supervised based on the reports by building enterprises. Then the regula-
tory authorities establish and maintain dossiers manually. The technological 
backwardness of this approach leaves clear space for intentional falsifica-
tion and concealment. With a view to accessing real information about con-
struction employment more effectively, a few provincial governments, such 
as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shannxi, and Hebei, have been 
voluntarily experimenting with their respective information systems in 
recent years, establishing an alliance between the internet and other modern 
technologies (such as Radio- Frequency Identification Technology). Chart 4 
displays the typical model for these systems. In short, the regulatory author-
ities, building enterprises, and construction workers are the main users of 
the information platform, and they all contribute to the establishment of a 
central database that embraces complete information about individuals and 
building enterprises. Laborers who intend to do construction work are first 
of all issued with an ‘all-in-one information card’. Their real name, picture, 
date of birth, registered place of domicile, ID number, skill level, training 
history, physical condition, and union membership are input into the card 
with the help of governmental aid workers. After the construction workers 
have been employed, the head contractors, authorized subcontractors or 
labor companies must add information about the labor contract and social 
security status of the worker to the card. The specialized software installed 
in the project division obtains and uploads the on-site records of the labor 
services. As all the messages eventually flow into the central database, the 
regulators and social security agencies are able to learn, analyze and man-
age them comprehensively in order to improve administrative effectiveness 
(see Wang2 , 2015; Wang, 2009).
By applying the network platforms, the aforementioned provinces and 
municipalities have basically achieved the unified management of infor-




huge potential to suppress informal employment and noncompliance with 
obligations concerning the conclusion of labor contracts, payment of wages, 
training, safety protection, and work-related injury insurance.
This chapter proposes that central legislative instruments make imme-
diate efforts to spread the advanced way of administering construction 
employment across the country, and that the systems of all the provinces 
are interconnected to form a national database. With a universally valid 
information card, a construction laborer would be less likely to be exploited 
by anonymous organizations that work outside the legal employment rules, 
since work-related movements and working conditions would be con-
tinuously tracked. The regulatory authorities could also prevent untrained, 
poorly equipped or uninsured workers from entering construction sites. If 
any accidents did happen, rescues and investigations would become more 
efficient.
The major challenge in putting in place the information system under 
discussion lies in ensuring that potential construction laborers know of the 
system and actively seek protection. The new-generation migrant workers 
are, on average, better educated than the older generation and are more 
familiar with the internet and other electronic media. This probably facili-
tates their acquaintance with and the utilization of the all-in-one informa-
tion card and other relevant components. However, the bad news is that it 
has been found that, at present, the new-generation migrant workers use the 
internet and other modern media mainly for entertainment, and rarely for 
learning technical knowledge, labor legislation, policy changes, or industry 
trends (Mei, 2012; He, 2015). Thus, if the real-name information platform 
for construction labor management is brought into play, the government 
should publicize this in various ways and at the same time do its utmost to 
improve the media literacy of construction workers.
3.2 A Two-Pronged Strategy to Guide Building Enterprises
Building enterprises may be aware that there is no more effective way to 
cope with the industry-wide labor crisis than by reforming the existing 
employment mechanism and business model in the construction sector and 
fundamentally improving working conditions, in particular the OSH level. 
Nonetheless, few are willing to spearhead forgoing reforms, since any indi-
vidual endeavor is no more than ‘a drop in the ocean’ when divorced from 
the common efforts of the industry overall. More importantly, taking part in 
a ‘race to the top’ seems very unrewarding for enterprises that are incapable 
of bearing the temporarily increased costs. The point advanced here is that a 
two-pronged strategy should be adopted by construction legislation to spur 
the revolution in construction businesses.
Stronger deterrents must be introduced, so as to raise the costs of 
breaking the law at all levels. Firstly, records indicating how well building 
enterprises maintain on-site safety and comply with other labor protec-
tion obligations ought to be made one of the criteria for grading business 
520066-L-bw-Hu
Processed on: 31-5-2018
A Legislative Perspective on Construction Safety in China, against the Backdrop of an Industry-wide  
Labor Shortage
43
qualifications, granting the entitlement to bid for projects, and awarding 
construction permits. It is worth mentioning that the standards for evalu-
ating safety records should be result-oriented. Building enterprises must 
reduce the incidence of accidents and fatalities, or they will be disqualified 
at the first stage. This also means that building enterprises should minimize 
the influence of uncontrollable factors, and stop conniving with illegitimate 
subcontractors or unauthorized labor contractors. Secondly, it is time to use 
major legislative instruments, instead of tentative regulations, to construct 
a complete responsibility system that intensively and comprehensively 
addresses the civil, administrative and criminal responsibilities of differ-
ent offenders whose actions cause damage or pose a threat to construction 
safety (e.g. those who manage building enterprises, workers, on-site safety 
supervisors, administrative officials, and so forth).
On the other hand, central and local legislation should provide a series 
of incentives to ensure the survival of building enterprises that desire to 
ameliorate their own safety performance. Firstly, building enterprises that 
actively carry out safety-promotion policies ought to be granted certain 
forms of recompense, such as tax preferences, bonus points in the qualifica-
tion assessment, and priority in bidding. Secondly, the government should 
be obliged to allocate or collect special funds in order to support enterprise 
investment in OSH training, facilities and equipment. Thirdly, local admin-
istrative departments shoulder the responsibility of helping building enter-
prises set up long-term cooperative relationships with trustworthy training 
agencies and safety equipment suppliers that offer excellent services or 
products but charge reasonably, with a view to reducing the economic bur-
den borne by building enterprises. Alternatively, local governments could 
utilize the power to integrate available resources and provide uniform 
training and safety equipment based on cost-sharing principles, benefiting 
building enterprises indirectly.
3.3 Creating Adaptable Unions
It has been a Gordian knot that unions are absent or fail to play a proper 
part in the construction industry in China. In striving for fair labor con-
tracts, shorter working hours, and proper payment of wages, and in accus-
ing of actions that expose workers to high risk, unions should undoubtedly 
have exerted an irreplaceable influence and given the strongest backing to 
construction workers. However, as discussed earlier, the very high mobility 
and the cognitive limitations of Chinese rural migrant workers have broken 
up the foundation needed for traditional unions to take root and grow 
(Zhao 2011). Unionism may adapt to this situation and come into play only 
by innovating in the organizational structure and operating model.
In July 2015, the Grassroots Organization Department of ACFTU gave 
suggestions for promoting the establishment of unions in building and 
labor enterprises, from which five constructive ideas can be extracted. 




subcontractors or labor companies, and regardless of whether the employ-
ment is contract-based or not, head contractors should spare no efforts to 
assure every worker of access to union membership. Secondly, allowing 
for the fact that migrant construction workers almost all live where they 
work, construction sites should be the main ‘battlefield’ of unions. Unions 
belonging to the head contractor’s special project division can function on 
behalf of the unions of subcontractors and labor companies, or associated 
grassroots unions can be established so as to carry out project-based union 
activities. Thirdly, within the territory of a county, associated unions can 
be set up for several different construction projects in order to facilitate the 
management of local unions and the selection of chairmen from ‘socialized 
union officials’35 recommended by the superior unions. Fourthly, branches 
of ACFTU should solicit the support of local administrative authorities to 
help unions solve financial problems. Developers ought to lay down in the 
contracting agreements that contractors need to reserve sufficient fund-
ing for union activities, as required by the Trade Union Law, and that the 
spending on project-based unionism must be independent of other parts 
of union expenditure. Lastly, more up-to-date and adaptable means should 
be introduced to cope with the high labor mobility and to make it easier 
for migrant construction workers to join and transfer between unions. For 
instance, a ‘green passage’ could be opened in local job markets to offer 
union-related services; union officials could preach about unionism on con-
struction sites or by mobile phone applications; and union members could 
surely be managed more effectively if the real-name IT system discussed 
previously was in place (Wang and Sun 2015).
The Grassroots Organization Department of ACFTU puts forward the 
above solutions based upon its experience in dealing with local unions. The 
attempt to structure project-based unionism in the construction industry is 
obvious, by defining the responsibilities of relevant parties, ensuring the 
funds for union activities, and developing various means of absorbing 
migrant workers into unions. Central and local legislatures should examine 
the effectiveness and feasibility of these proposals straight away in pilot 
areas, and host hearings and seminars to collect the opinions of union 
experts, social activists, building enterprises, and representatives of migrant 
construction workers. Only in this way can effective legislation be made to 
address the low union density in the construction sector.
3.4 Making Procedures for Post-Accident Remedies ‘Worker-Friendly’
It has been difficult for millions of Chinese building workers to receive post-
accident legal remedies, due to the insurmountable procedural barriers. 
Previous analyses of the legislation on work-related injury insurance show 
35 Socialized union offi cials are employed by local branches of ACFTU as full-time experts 
who are devoted to pushing forward with the establishment and expansion of unions in 
domestic private enterprises and non-public economic and social organizations.
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that the improper time limits and lengthy judicial proceedings discourage 
most injured workers and bereaved families from requesting confirmation 
of the labor relationship, applying for injury ascertainment, and claiming 
insurance benefits. Indeed, victims of construction accidents face similar 
problems in claiming compensation, employer-paid medical treatment, job 
placement assistance and disability (death) subsidies. This is a vital reason 
why the new-generation migrant construction workers demonstrate no 
stronger preference to the older generation workers for seeking legal rem-
edies (Huang and Xing, 2012). In most instances, they would rather reach a 
private settlement with the employer or resort to political power by a group 
petition (Huang and Xing, 2012).
In order to cultivate the new-generation migrant workers’ faith in the 
law and in the prospect of working in the construction industry, a whole 
package of initiatives aimed at improving the practicability of post-accident 
remedies should be put on the next legislative agenda of both central and 
local government. In general, strict liability ought to be imposed on build-
ing enterprises that hamper or fail to assist the application of an injured 
worker or the bereaved family for work-related accident ascertainment.
Moreover, for the main facts in dispute, ‘a principle of presumption’ 
should be implemented to the workers’ advantage, according to which a 
building enterprise would bear the burden of disproving the presumed facts 
that were in favor of the worker’s claim. This principle has been merely 
adopted to deal with disputes about whether an injury is work-related or 
not (Article 19, the Regulation on Work-Related Injury Insurance). There is 
certainly every reason to establish it for the investigation of other key facts 
too, including whether a factual employment relationship exists, whether 
an injured worker is legally eligible for insurance benefits, compensation, 
and subsidies, and so on.
In addition, founding a separate tribunal in the court system to handle 
labor disputes and simplifying the judicial procedures with a view to 
increasing the efficiency of case processing, as advocated by some Chinese 
scholars (e.g. Chen, 2002; Lin, 2007), would be of great significance for 
diminishing the costs and difficulty faced by injured workers or bereaved 
families in seeking judicial help.
Besides, Chinese rural migrant workers are in desperate need of a 
legal aid mechanism, which has only been applied in criminal litigation 
procedures in China. According to 2005-2015: A Ten-Year Report of Legal Aid 
for Rural Migrant Workers released by the Beijing Zhicheng Legal Aid and 
Research Center36, the Beijing Zhicheng alone offered free legal counsel-
ing to rural migrant workers in 65,201 labor disputes during the decade, 
involving up to 200,000 man-hours and ¥ 500 million. In all, 10,069 cases 
had been settled, as of 2015, and the economic losses were reduced by ¥145 
36 Beijing Zhicheng Legal Aid and Research Center is one of the leading privately-run 




million.37 These figures imply the tremendous demand by Chinese rural 
migrant workers for a well-functioning legal aid system in the labor law 
field. One would imagine that most rural migrant workers would be willing 
to use the law as a ‘weapon’ to assert their own rights, if the labor legisla-
tion stipulated that there was free or low-cost assistance to workers who 
were otherwise unable to afford legal advice or access to the judicial system, 
and if it provided sufficient stimuli to the expansion of legal aid services in 
the form of duty lawyers and community legal clinics.
3.5 NGO Training and Supportive Interventions
Apart from the few non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concentrating 
on free legal aid for rural migrant workers (such as the Beijing Zhicheng 
mentioned above), another type of NGO is devoted to interventions at 
community level, with the aim of helping rural migrant workers to achieve 
decent and safe working conditions and to lead a dignified urban life. 
Yizhuanyiwa and Xingzairenjian are the two best-known of these. In the 
northern and southern suburbs of Beijing they provide OSH and legal 
literacy training together with various forms of community services to 
migrant construction workers, and in many aspects they perform functions 
similar to those of unions.
Take Yizhuanyiwa, for instance. This organization has been making con-
tributions in the following areas since it was founded in 2010. Firstly, with 
the permission of building enterprises, the staff of Yizhuanyiwa come to 
construction sites and use various means to implant OSH and legal knowl-
edge into the minds of rural migrant workers, such as by hosting themed 
galas, handing out safety manuals, communicating with workers face to 
face in the latter’s dormitories, and setting up standing offices on construc-
tion sites. Secondly, since Yizhuanyiwa’s training and intervention are more 
than welcome among migrant construction workers, and Yizhuanyiwa has 
achieved very positive outcomes, some building enterprises take the initia-
tive of inviting Yizhuanyiwa to deliver training courses to their workers. 
Thirdly, making the most of their opportunities to collect first-hand data, 
Yizhuanyiwa teams up with academics to do empirical research and to 
hold periodical symposiums on OSH and employment issues in China’s 
construction industry. Its goal is to launch a campaign that culminates in 
the birth of a national code of conduct and social responsibility for building 
enterprises so as to fill the gap in this respect. Lastly, in view of the plight 
of unions in cities,38 Yizhuanyiwa sends its staff to labor-exporting areas 
(rural areas) to establish grassroots labor organizations that collaborate with 
local administrative authorities to give potential migrants preliminary train-
37 See http://yzlx.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=lawfi rmarticles&Gid=1778402821&
keyword=&EncodingName=&Search_Mode= (accessed 4 April 2016).
38 Urban unions cannot try their utmost to safeguard workers’ interests under political 
pressure to balance social stability and economic development.
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ing on OSH and labor legislation. The target audience can therefore make 
a proper assessment of the risks of working in the construction industry 
and have a clear picture of their own rights, legal position, and channels for 
problem-solving (Guo, 2014).
The commitment by Yizhuanyiwa demonstrates the chances of NGOs 
acting as a fourth party in making positive changes to China’s construction 
safety performance. Its endeavors on many occasions smooth over the dif-
ficulties confronting building enterprises, workers, and public authorities. 
The current problem is that, even in the capital city, this sort of NGO is ter-
ribly scarce. To be precise, Yizhuanyiwa and Xingzairenjian are the only two 
in the Beijing area, where all kinds of resources are much more available 
than in the rest parts of the country. Chinese legislators should work outside 
the box without a doubt, and embrace NGOs in their future strategies for 
addressing construction safety issues. This of course means offering them 
sufficient financial support, free space for self-development, and access to 
long-term cooperation with the authorities. It is conceivable that the multi-
plication of these NGOs would be conducive to breaking the logjam in the 
construction sector today.
4 Final Remarks
Given that the recent labor shortage in China’s construction sector is partly 
derived from the growing antipathy of potential laborers towards the seri-
ous and persistent occupational safety problems, this chapter illustrates 
how legislative deficiencies have exerted a negative influence in this 
process, and explores the solutions that could make a change in the status 
quo. In short, China’s major pieces of legislation associated with construc-
tion safety have failed to play a due role because of the low practicability. 
Meanwhile, inadequate attention has been paid to the plight of millions of 
rural migrant workers, who are the primary construction workforce and are 
in the greatest need of extra legal help to realize their rights to occupational 
safety. In addition, there has been no comprehensive liability system to 
deter various violations of construction safety obligations. By elaborating 
on these defects embedded in China’s construction safety legislation, this 
chapter firstly argues that future legislation could mandate a real-name IT 
system in all provinces and municipalities, for the purpose of regularizing 
the recruitment and employment practices in the construction industry. 
Secondly, not only a complete responsibility system and a mechanism that 
gives consideration to the safety records of building enterprises in qualifica-
tion assessment, but also a full set of incentives, such as subsidies, tax pref-
erences and training allowances, should be introduced. Only a two-pronged 
strategy can induce enterprises to participate in the reform within the sector. 
Thirdly, the innovative ideas raised by ACFTU about adapting the structure 
and operating model of unionism to China’s construction industry in order 




deserve serious evaluation by the legislature. Fourthly, it is essential to 
remove the many barriers that hinder construction workers from obtain-
ing post-accident legal remedies, so that people’s confidence and interest 
in construction work may not continue to drop. Finally, a few NGOs have 
been making a silent contribution to construction safety compliance and 
risk management. The multiplication of these organizations, however, cries 
out for official recognition and support.
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Table 3: Main Industries Where Old and New Generations of Rural Migrant Workers Are 
Employed
Industrial Distribution (%) Old Generation New Generation
Manufacturing 31.5 44.4
Construction 27.8 9.8
Transportation, Storage & Postal Services 7.1 5.0
Wholesale & Retail 6.9 8.4
Accommodation & Catering 5.9 9.2
Residential Services 11.0 12.4
Other 9.8 10.8
Data from the Report of NBSC (2011)
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Table 4: Coverage of Social Insurance among the New-Generation Migrant Workers in 
Main Industries









Manufacturing 26.9 14.5 7.8 3.9
Construction 16.1 5.2 2.4 1.3
Transportation, 
Storage & Postal 
Services
25.5 14.9 9.6 5.8
Wholesale & Retail 10.1 8.0 6.2 3.2
Accommodation & 
Catering
11.8 7.0 3.5 1.9
Residential Services 
& Other
13.7 9.0 4.2 2.4
Data from the Report of NBSC (2011)
Chart 1: Data from China Engineering Cost Network




Chart 2: Data from China Engineering Cost Network
Chart 3: Data from China Engineering Cost [accessed March 20, 2016] Network 
[accessed March 20, 2016]
520066-L-bw-Hu
Processed on: 31-5-2018
A Legislative Perspective on Construction Safety in China, against the Backdrop of an Industry-wide  
Labor Shortage
51





4 An Incomplete Breakthrough: Questioning 
the Momentum and Efficiency of 
Germany’s Minimum Wage Law■
Abstract
This chapter reflects on how appropriately the German Minimum Wage Act –  the 
latest national minimum wage legislation within the EU –  has been constructed 
so as to remedy the fading role of collective bargaining in wage setting and curb 
the increasing in-work poverty across the country. Based on identifying four 
fundamental parts of a minimum wage regime, it examines successively the cor-
responding provisions in the German law, with frequent comparisons with the 
legislation of several other member states. It is found that Germany has refrained 
from learning the positive legislative experiences of its EU counterparts, and has 
developed a minimum wage regime that is distinct in more than one aspect. Such 
a wage floor, however, loses efficiency and momentum before serving the original 
purposes of its own introduction.
Key Words: Germany; Minimum Wage Act; In-Work Poverty; Legislation






To prevent the employed from being paid unfairly, EU countries apply two 
principal approaches to the wage-setting systems. For convenience, they 
could be referred to as participative and protective approaches, by draw-
ing on Sengenberger’s distinction between protective and participative 
standards (Bosch 2015; Sengenberger 1994). The core of the participative 
approach is that an employee or a representative has a right to codetermina-
tion or consultation on wage-related enterprise decision-making. However, 
the state does not exert direct influence by means of corrective measures. In 
a protective approach, the state itself intervenes in the wage-setting process 
by fixing a minimum amount. A country’s choice is usually dictated by the 
strength of domestic unions or other labor organizations to affect employer 
decisions on wage rates. Only in countries where unions are strong enough 
to counterbalance the power of employers (e.g. Sweden), can the participa-
tive approach work efficiently with the absence of a wage floor. Otherwise, 
a protective approach is taken in most cases, independently (e.g. UK39) or 
conjointly with the participative approach (e.g. Belgium and France).
Since the 1990s, Germany has been experiencing the obvious dysfunc-
tion of an autonomous wage-setting system. This situation derived from 
a dramatic weakening in the power of trade unions and a decline in the 
percentage of those covered by collective agreements. The low wage sector 
has escalated across the whole country, particularly in East Germany. As 
warned by economists, Germany continued to retain a cautious attitude out 
of the fear that a national minimum wage would have a huge negative effect 
on employment. Subsequently, the enactment of the minimum wage legisla-
tion was postponed until 2015, when it turned out that no alternative way 
would be able to revitalize collective bargaining or enhance union strength. 
In the words of Bosch (2015), ‘the new minimum wage is no ‘planned’ child 
but was born out of necessity’.
In the year following the introduction of the statutory minimum wage, 
‘predicted job drama did not occur’ (Joachim Möller, quoted by Eubel 
2016). Rather, both West and East Germany witnessed the lowest level of 
unemployment since the early 1990s (Amlinger et al. 2016, citing Bundesa-
gentur Für Arbeit 2015). Regular employees with social insurance increased 
by 713,000 from October 2014 to the same month of 2015 (Amlinger et al. 
2016, citing Bundesagentur Für Arbeit 2016). Typical low-income sectors, 
which seemingly suffered the heaviest impact from the new wage floor, 
recorded an above-average improvement in employment, while a few of 
the marginally influenced sectors saw a modest decrease in employment 
39 Albeit the UK might leave the EU based on the result of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 
2016, the process for leaving has not been initiated formally. It is expected that it will take 
at least several years. Considering that the UK minimum wage legislation has signifi cant 
referential values for the improvement of the German Minimum Wage Act, it is included 
in the discussions of this chapter.
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(Amlinger et al. 2016, citing Bundesagentur Für Arbeit 2016). Statistics that 
reflect an apparent decline of marginal part-time jobs – the so-called ‘mini-
jobs’ – were considered by some as strong evidence of the negative effect on 
employment due to the new minimum wage (e.g. Peters 2015; Groll 2015). 
Nonetheless, with further examination, later research reveals that just above 
half of the aforementioned reduction could be ascribed to the minimum 
wage legislation, and crucially, that the affected former mini-jobbers have 
by and large turned to a regular employment relationship subject to social 
insurance rather than getting fired (see Berge et al. 2016).
It may be said that the negative influence on employment as a conse-
quence of Germany’s introduction of a statutory minimum wage is not 
nearly as tenable as alleged. This is nevertheless not the focus of the present 
chapter. Alternatively, this is an effort to investigate another comparatively 
significant but much less debated question: Is the German wage floor 
appropriately constructed so as to ensure its efficiency in achieving the 
original goal of combatting the persistent spread of in-work poverty across 
the country?
In order to explore a materialized answer to the above question posed 
from a legislative perspective, four essential properties of a minimum wage 
regime should be identified. First, fixing a proper initial value is critical 
because a very low minimum wage can barely cut poverty, but at the other 
extreme, if too high, the multi-faceted control over employment, price level 
and compliance with the minimum wage will be impossible to achieve 
(Saget, 2004). Additionally, decisions regarding the exclusion of certain 
categories of workers from the legal coverage of a minimum wage and 
regarding the adoption of a single or combined rates for covered workers 
have to be carefully made. This is dependent on what specific objectives 
are being pursued and what the actual role a state seeks to play in wage 
determination. Besides, the method and frequency of adjusting the level 
of a minimum wage have a sizable bearing on its adaptability to the time-
varying conditions that are necessary for satisfying the basic material needs 
of working families. Lastly, an effective implementation system ensures that 
the purpose of a minimum wage is not defeated by noncompliance. Setting 
this up, however, relies on a wide range of institutional preconditions.
By observing these four fundamental sections of provisions in Germa-
ny’s first Minimum Wage Act40, and by referencing the relevant – success-
ful or unsuccessful –  legislative experiences amongst additional member 
states, this chapter attempts to clarify what progress the German minimum 
wage legislation has achieved compared with its European counterparts. 
More importantly, the major problems embedded in this newly established 
minimum wage regime are revealed, which potentially limit its momentum 
to function as hoped.
40 Unless stated otherwise, ‘Minimum Wage Act’ refers to the German Act Regulating a 




2 A Strong ‘Bite’? Evaluations on the Entry Point of the 
German Minimum Wage
8.5 euros,41 the initial rate of the German national minimum wage, was 
far below the level of several EU states when it started to be applied in 
2015. What is the likelihood of this moderate minimum wage substantially 
improving the increasing working poor in Germany? Differently oriented 
evaluations have demonstrated the multiple facets of this issue. In short, 
the Kaitz Index is the most frequently used measure for having been 
established upon globally recognized concepts of ‘low pay’ and ‘poverty 
wage’, while a purchasing power comparison between EU countries helps 
clarify the actual value of a minimum wage of 8.5 euros. Differing from 
international comparative research, the German domestic investigations 
particularly value the calculation of the magnitude of potential beneficiaries 
as a direct way to see the influence of the initial minimum wage rate. And 
when contextualized against the preexisting income support system of 
Germany, the efficacy of a legal wage floor of 8.5 euros is found seriously 
derogated from.
2.1 Kaitz Index
The Kaitz index is an economic indicator represented by the ratio of a legal 
minimum wage to the national median wage.42 In the light of the standard 
benchmark built up by the reports of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (hereafter ‘OECD’) and by the agenda-setting 
publications of LoWER43, ‘low pay’ means a gross hourly wage below two-
thirds of the national median wage for full-time workers (Grimshaw 2011). 
This definition, amongst many others existing in various studies of differ-
ent countries, has been adopted by most current literature. A respectable 
agreement has been reached regarding the viewpoint that with an hourly 
wage below the ‘two-thirds’ threshold, even full-time workers are not able 
to obtain the socially acceptable level of economic resources in order to sup-
port a working family’s full participation in relative communities (Howell 
et al. 2015: 117). By analogy with the poverty threshold established by inter-
national research in this area, an individual wage below 50 percent of the 
median wage should be deemed to be a ‘poverty wage’ (Schulten et al. 2015: 
337), with which working families cannot even maintain the average living 
standard in the society where they live, not to mention obtaining access to 
social inclusion.
41 Section1 (2), the German Minimum Wage Act.
42 It is necessary to distinguish the median wage from the average wage: the former is the 
amount that divides the overall wage structure into two equal segments, with a half of 
all workers earning more and the other half earning less, while the latter represents the 
arithmetic mean of all wages.
43 The Abbreviation for ‘European Low-Wage Employment Research Network’.
520066-L-bw-Hu
Processed on: 31-5-2018
An Incomplete Breakthrough: Questioning the Momentum and Efficiency of Germany’s Minimum Wage Law 57
With reference to the latest OECD statistics for 2015, Germany ranks 
in the lower middle section of the European countries where the relevant 
data is available (Chart 5). Its value of 48% on the Kaitz Index is not only far 
below the low-pay threshold but it is also beneath the poverty threshold. 
Due to the two-year freeze of the new minimum wage and the general 
wage increases year by year, the corresponding figure for 2016 is likely to 
be lower.
In accordance with the decision of the German Minimum Wage Com-
mission, the statutory minimum wage is 8.84 euros per hour from January 
2017.44 However, even assuming that the median hourly wage of 2017 
does not increase compared with the 2015 level, the value of the German 
minimum wage on the Kaitz Index would not exceed 50%.45 To sum up, the 
German minimum wage is set at an unreasonably low level providing it is 
assessed by the internationally prevailing standards concerning the relation 
between a minimum wage and the national wage structure. However, it 
is worth nothing that none of the inspected EU countries have performed 
satisfactorily under such an evaluation framework.
2.2 Purchasing Power Standard
Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is an artificial currency unit named by 
Eurostat. An evaluation of PPS is desirable for detecting the actual level of 
a minimum wage, because one euro can buy different amounts of goods 
and services in different countries, due to the sizable price discrepancies 
across borders. The latest update of WSI Minimum Wage Database in Janu-
ary 2016 indicates that Germany ranks higher among its EU counterparts if 
its minimum wage is measured by PPS (Table 5). To be precise, after being 
adjusted for purchasing power, the level of the German minimum wage 
compares favorably with that of Ireland and Belgium, both of which have 
fixed higher nominal amounts. Furthermore, the gaps between the German 
minimum wage and the three highest rates paid in Luxembourg, France 
and the Netherlands are noticeably narrowed in the PPS comparison.
44 See https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/InFocus/Archive.html (accessed 20 
November 2016).
45 The value of the German minimum wage on the Kaitz Index in 2015 is the ratio of a 
fi ctitious minimum wage of 8.5 euros to the median hourly wage in that year. Hence, 
Germany’s median hourly wage in 2015 is equivalent to €17.7 (8.5÷0.48). Even if Germa-
ny’s median hourly wage in 2017 remains this level, the corresponding value on Kaize 




2.3 Magnitude of Potential Beneficiaries
As some evident legislative defects in the German Minimum Wage Act 
increase the implementation uncertainty (see the last part of this chapter), 
it is difficult to count exactly how many employees can practically benefit 
from the new wage floor. Relatively speaking, calculating the number of 
employees that earned less than 8.5 euros before the introduction of the 
minimum wage is a feasible method to measure the general magnitude 
of the beneficiaries. Yet, some authoritative evaluations that follow this 
way have produced inconsistent data. For instance, before the German 
Minimum Wage Act came into force, the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, abbreviated BMAS) 
(2014: 7) predicted that some 3.7 million employees from low-wage sectors 
would benefit. One year after the introduction of the minimum wage, WSI 
estimated that between 4.8 and 5.4 million employees – corresponding to 
a share of between 14.8% and 16.6 % of all dependent employees – were 
paid less than 8.5 euros per hour in 2014 (Amlinger et al. 2016). The Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt/Destatis) (2016) provided a differ-
ent statistical result showing that a total amount of 5.5 million employees 
earned less than 8.5 euros in 2014. However, only 4 million would be poten-
tially affected, because the reminder of 1.5 million belonged to the statutory 
exceptions to the application of the minimum wage.
Notwithstanding the indefinite quantity of German employees who 
received less than 8.5 euros before the introduction of the minimum wage, 
it is largely agreed that some categories of employees – according to variant 
partition criteria – faced a higher probability of being paid below this price 
than others. Small (in particular micro) enterprises were characterized by a 
much higher proportion of employees who earned less than the minimum 
wage (Amlinger et al. 2016; Kalina and Weinkopf 2014). In terms of gender, 
the percentage of women working for less than 8.5 euros was twice that 
of men (Amlinger et al. 2016; Destatis 2016; Kalina und Weinkopf 2014). 
Additionally, wage levels are closely associated with working-time arrange-
ments, thus, approximately three-fifths of mini-jobbers were paid less than 
8.5 euros in 2014, in contrast to one-fifth of part-time workers and one-thir-
teenth of full-time workers (Amlinger et al. 2016). Alternatively, according 
to Destatis (2016), people holding mini-jobs accounted for over a half of the 
working poor concerned. As for the distribution of low wages in different 
sectors, hotels and restaurants constituted the major ones that would be 
affected, of which over half of employees worked for less than 8.5 euros. 
The retail sector took the second place with thirty percent of employees 
paid less than this amount (Amlinger et al. 2016). Unsurprisingly, unskilled 
and semiskilled workers were influenced more seriously by the minimum 
wage than skilled ones, due to being confronted with a higher risk of receiv-
ing ‘poverty wages’ (Amlinger et al. 2016; Kalina and Weinkopf 2014). With 
respect to the impact on different regions, in West Germany, mini-jobbers 
were supposed to be the main beneficiaries of the minimum wage. In East 
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Germany, apart from mini-jobs, a considerable portion of part-time jobs also 
paid less than the minimum wage, and even the hourly wages of full-time 
jobs concentrated in the area slightly above 8.5 euros (Amlinger et al. 2016). 
Finally, low-wage earners not covered by collective agreements represented 
more than four-fifths of the working population paid less than 8.5 euros 
(Destatis 2016). On the contrary, around four-fifths of the employees in col-
lective agreements were paid more than 10 euros per hour (Amlinger et al. 
2016).
Indeed, the groups subjected to hourly salaries below 8.5 euros usually 
overlap, because factors that give rise to in-work poverty have been inter-
weaving in Germany from 1990s onwards. In short, under the influence of 
the traditional German family model, women have scarcely been regarded 
as the main breadwinners. It is sometimes taken for granted that women 
would only be able to receive low pay in order to supplement the spouses’ 
earnings (Bosch and Weinkopf 2008: 15). Therefore, in spite of the increas-
ing public attention to low-wage earners in the German society, women, 
especially mothers, have become the main workforce of mini-jobbers. 
One should be able to imagine how difficult it is to organize these loosely 
connected people to maintain the power base for unionism. Meanwhile, 
mini-jobs are mainly provided by hotels, restaurants, the retailing and 
other service businesses. In these sectors, cheap labor expenditure is the 
rule, and the associations of employers are too fragmented to conclude 
an industrial minimum wage (Bosch 2015). Consequently, a vicious cycle 
comes into being, and female mini-jobbers working in service industries are 
particularly trapped in lifelong economic powerlessness. In East Germany, 
mini-jobs are not as common as in West Germany. However, the severer ero-
sion of union power and more widespread noncompliance with collective 
agreements in new federal states has further decreased the lower overall 
wage levels (Bosch 2015).
Undoubtedly, a statutory minimum wage that starts from 8.5 euros could 
exert certain positive effects on the living standards of the aforementioned 
working poor, surviving on lower hourly wages and struggling to make 
ends meet. More significantly, it could play a great role in protecting these 
people against ceaseless ‘wage dumping’ in future (BMAS 2014: 7). Seen in 
this light, the new wage floor is nothing else than an encouraging move.
Still, it has to be acknowledged that with an entry point of 8.5 euros the 
German minimum wage actually confines its influence to the very poor, 
rather than the average poor of the country. For the employees covered 
by collective agreements and accounting for more than 60 percent 46of all 
the employed individuals in Germany, the new wage floor is insufficient 
to bring about any remarkable benefit, since most of them already earned 
more than 8.5 euros per hour before 2015.
46 See http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/




2.4 Efficiency Derogated from by the Income Support System
Taking effect from 2005, the Hartz IV reform replaced Germany’s income-
related unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) with a flat-rate, income-
unrelated and means-tested benefit – unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosen-
geld II ), paid at the same level as the also flat-rate and means-tested social 
benefit (Sozialgeld). Recipients of unemployment benefit II include all the 
long-term unemployed and employees whose household income is below 
the basic security level. Driven by the idea underlying both the OECD job 
strategy (OECD 2006: 63) and the European Employment strategy, Hartz 
(I-IV) reforms were aimed at eliminating low-pay traps and disincentives 
to work, breathing new life into the economy by diminishing the costs 
incurred due to unemployment (Bosch and Kalina 2008: 50). In compari-
son with the other three Acts, Hartz IV has a more direct objective to force 
unemployed people, especially those who used to earn a good salary, to 
accept the next available (often lower-paid) job, in order to reduce unem-
ployment and the benefits paid to those out of work .
The necessity of assessing the level of the new minimum wage in the 
above context stems from the fact that the income support that unemploy-
ment benefit II gives to different types of recipients is a top-up benefit 
pushing up household income to subsistence levels. In a sense, the people 
entitled to income support get an ‘implicit minimum wage’ from the gov-
ernment. Statistics show that the introduction of the ‘real minimum wage’ 
has given rise to a fall in the number of ‘topper uppers’ (Aufstocker), from 
1.268 million in December 2014 to 1.223 million in February 2015 (EurActiv, 
June 23, 2015). Nonetheless, compared with the same period of preceding 
years, which also saw some decreases of the supplementary claims for 
unemployment benefit II for some reasons, this is by no means a significant 
reduction. The limited role of the legal wage floor of 8.5 euros in helping 
the poor break away from unemployment benefit II is put down to sev-
eral unsolved practical issues, which piece together the latent interactions 
between different tools for combating poverty and hitherto lack any com-
prehensive reflection.
Firstly, unless the statutory minimum wage reaches a bar that is capable 
of ensuring earnings above the means-tested income support levels, the 
unemployed will not have any incentive to work. In this regard, the micro-
simulation model established by Müller and Steiner (2008) reveals that the 
suggested minimum wage of 7.5 euros per hour would be ineffective in 
stimulating unemployed people’s motivation to work due to the contem-
porary means-tested income support system. However, few economic stud-
ies have been devoted to make analogous evaluations since the statutory 
minimum wage of 8.5 euros was finally brought in.
Secondly, despite the conversion of the previous generous amalgama-
tion of unemployment assistance and social welfare benefits into the present 
neat package, underpaid part-timers’ motivation to work longer hours has 
not increased. For people who are economically inactive and not employed 
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full-time, a paradox exists in the system of income support that both ben-
efit withdrawal rates and the marginal burden of tax and social security 
contributions increase simultaneously with the increasing wages. Hence, 
there is just no inducement to prolong working time, particularly above the 
mini-job level (Bosch and Kalina 2008: 52). The introduction of a minimum 
wage of 8.5 euros intensifies this conflict and forces mini-jobbers, those 
most affected, to adopt a negative coping strategy in the dilemma: now that 
earning a monthly wage less than 450 euros is a condition for being exempt 
from tax and social security contributions, rational employees in marginal 
part-time employment are prone to work for a maximum of 53 hours per 
month to preserve the privilege and subsequently choose to live on the 
welfare benefits for additional support. This is a complex problem resulting 
from the disharmony between Germany’s income support system, tax and 
contribution collection systems, and the new minimum wage. Further seri-
ous exploration is imperative.
Finally, for both full-time and part-time employees in the low-wage seg-
ment, there is a risk that employers may further reduce wage rates, since the 
government would close the gap against the so-called basic security level 
(Bosch and Kalina 2008: 52-3). Figuring out how widely a statutory mini-
mum wage of 8.5 euros could hold back this type of opportunistic practice 
is a meaningful part of the evaluation of its effectiveness.
3 The German Model of Flexibility within the General Wage 
Floor: Rate Diversity and Coverage
3.1 Rate & Coverage
The German Minimum Wage Act stipulates no second rate other than 8.5 
euros. Groups that are not sheltered by the single minimum wage rate 
include trainees, young people doing their entry-level qualifications, people 
in compulsory practical training as part of an apprenticeship or university-
level study course, and the long-term unemployed who receive a new job 
within 6 months.47
From a global perspective, there is no universal answer to the queries of 
exactly who should be excluded from minimum wage protection and how 
many different rates a minimum wage regime should comprise. Multifari-
ous systems have been developed around the world. At one extreme are the 
oversimplified systems that apply a sole minimum wage rate to all employ-
ees. At the other, overcomplicated systems that set a grid of up to hundreds 
of wage rates by sector, occupation, region, population or enterprise size. It 
is the disparities in the understanding as to how the minimum wage system 
should be structured in order to achieve the original purpose invested in 




it that fundamentally induce policymakers of different countries to make 
divergent choices. In general, the logic behind the application of one rate 
to all the employees of a country is the right to identical wage protection 
regardless of extrinsic factors, and that the basic needs of working families 
should be satisfied equally (ILO 2016). By contrast, systems that set forth 
exemptions or utilize multiple rates give more consideration to the flex-
ibility and direct applicability of a minimum wage policy; in lieu of provid-
ing a base wage rate for the most vulnerable employees, the purpose is to 
facilitate some at-risk workers’ entry into the labor market or to yield actual 
influence on the wage rates of varying sectors and enterprises (Eyraud 
and Saget 2005: 9-10). To avoid broad discussion, the focus of this part is 
narrowed to a comparison between Germany’s uniform national minimum 
wage and other homogeneous systems within the EU, in terms of exemp-
tion or differentiation across groups.
Overall, in the EU, Germany and 21 other countries (including the UK) 
have introduced a general statutory minimum wage,48 protecting the major-
ity of employees whilst excluding particular groups from legal coverage or 
setting sub-rates on top of the standard rate. From a global point of view, 
these countries’ minimum wage systems exhibit simplicity, as opposed to 
excessively complicated systems (e.g. Costa Rica49) in other areas of the 
world. Yet, the intention to draw upon some degree of flexibility from the 
more intricate systems is apparent. As indicated in Table 6, all the listed 
EU countries permit some legal deviations from the general wage floor. 
Exemptions or differentiated rates apply to certain groups, such as young 
workers, disabled workers, the inexperienced (trainees, interns and appren-
tices), or people within some professions that necessitate higher levels of 
qualifications or skills or have specific occupational features. The first three 
categories are linked with sub-average levels of productivity, whereas the 
last features above-average productivity or special responsibility. Imposing 
a flat rate covering everyone would probably hinder less productive work-
ers’ entry into the labor market, or discourage competent people to occupy 
48 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden are typical examples that stick to collectively 
agreed minimum wages. Italy used to include the possibility of introducing a statutory 
minimum wage in its reform of the Jobs Act, but this plan was fi nally laid aside because 
of the strong criticism from trade unions. Cyprus is unique because its minimum wage 
law does not stipulate a statutory minimum wage at national level, but sets specifi c rates 
for nine occupations.
49 Costa Rica brought in its minimum wage in 1933, which developed at the cantonal level 
and later at provincial level. The system was very complicated, because it included 
differences by region, sector, occupation, enterprise size, skill level, etc., and expanded 
at a high speed. Until 1987, the ambitious system had already embraced 520 specifi c 
minimum wages. Afterwards, because of the diffi culties in implementation, the National 
Wage Council gradually reduced the number of minimum wage rates to 23. Nowadays, 
the system is still highly complex, consisting of minimum wages for skilled, semi-skilled, 
unskilled and specialized workers, in addition to fi ve different rates for varying educa-
tion levels (ILO, 2016).
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the more demanding jobs within society. This shared perception results in 
a similar rationale as is behind the EU minimum wage systems in question.
What is notable is that Germany adopts somewhat distinctive strategies 
in respect of both manner and condition of its legitimate deviations from 
the general wage floor. It is manifest that the majority of countries in Table 6
display a preference for utilizing separate rates for certain individual 
groups. Germany is unique in that it sets no sub-rate to supplement the 
standard rate. Its acknowledgement of lower rates for newspaper delivery 
staff and for workers covered by deviating regulations of existent collective 
agreements is merely makeshift,50 with a view to paving the way for the full 
implementation of the uniform minimum wage in the near future. The other 
involved groups are all exempt from the application of the legal wage floor.
However, adding sub-rates to the standard rate of a statutory minimum 
wage is a common means of buffering the impact of absolute exclusion of 
certain groups. Passing over this middle-ground approach means that the 
scope of exclusion must be defined cautiously –  as small as possible but 
as large as necessary. Germany seems to have followed this principle and 
put strict restrictions on the exempted groups: for young workers, only 
those under 18 years old and without any completed vocational training 
are not regarded as workers within the meaning of the Minimum Wage 
Act;51 interns are entitled to wages above the statutory minimum unless 
the internship is a compulsory part of the education or apprenticeship;52
as regards the long-term unemployed, minimum wage protection is only 
absent in the first six months of any new employment.53
It should be clarified that the six-month exclusion of those who used to 
be long-term unemployed is not a finalized rule as yet. The federal govern-
ment was obliged to report to the legislative bodies on June 1st of 2016 about 
the extent to which this rule can promote the reintegration of the long-term 
unemployed into the labor market and provide an assessment concerning 
whether it should continue.54 In other words, verified positive effects on the 
reentry of long-term unemployed people into the labor market will be the 
only effective justification for the necessity of this rule.
50 Section 24, the German Minimum Wage Act.
51 Section 22 (2), Idem.
52 Section 22 (1), Idem.
53 Section 22 (4), Idem.




Meanwhile, vocational training or education is the key factor high-
lighted in the other exemption situations. There is reason to believe that 
such a legislative predisposition is connected with the system of dual 
vocational training in Germany.55 Dual vocational training is a system that 
combines vocational schooling and structured learning through work expe-
rience in undertakings to help young people improve skill and qualification 
levels (Pitch 2015: 4-5). It engages a major proportion of young German 
people and constitutes a formalized core of new entrants into the labor 
market. The point emphasized here is that while the school-based part of 
vocational education is government financed, the remainder of the training 
–  the apprenticeship and on-the-job learning – hinges on the willingness 
of enterprises to afford the training costs within the firms (Pitch 2015:4-5). 
It is well recognized in Germany that applying a remuneration rate that is 
considerably below the wage of a low-paid full-timer to involved young 
people is an acceptable and even necessary tradeoff for motivated compa-
nies to commit themselves to the dual vocational training system. In one 
sense, instead of suffering, young people without completed vocational 
education benefit from moderate earnings, because regular and better-paid 
jobs will be more attainable after they complete the systematic training and 
education.
3.2 Pros and Cons of the German Model
The German minimum wage law is less complex to implement in compari-
son to that of other EU member states. This is a major advantage. As con-
cluded by the ILO (2016), single-rate minimum wage systems are superior 
to multi-rate ones in the following aspects: 1) the determination of the initial 
rate and subsequent adjustment only requires relatively simple aggregate 
information and macroeconomic data, which a wage-setting body (say, a 
national minimum wage commission) can manage to process and analyze 
with the aid of professionals; 2) a single rate is easier to communicate and 
disseminate so that keeping people informed as well as implementing the 
adjustments would prove more effortless; 3) a single-rate minimum wage 
also lowers the difficulty of monitoring, given that inspectors need not 
consider the differences between sectors, groups, regions, occupations, or 
enterprise sizes, but just compare the actual wages with the wage floor; 
4) the chance is greatly reduced that an enterprise refrains from hiring many 
an employee or moves to less developed regions in order to benefit from 
lower minimum wage rates.
55 In Europe, only a small number of countries – Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, and 
Germany – have established systems of dual vocational training. However, among all the 
EU countries that have a general statutory minimum wage, Germany is the unique one 
that has this sort of training system.
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Nevertheless, a corresponding drawback is that an undifferentiated 
statutory minimum wage can hardly benefit different levels of working 
poor. Choosing this solution amounts to throwing away the opportunity 
to enlarge the actual influence of the new wage floor. What is more prob-
lematic is that the German model is unable to avoid the ethical and legal 
concerns primarily faced by systems that adopt sub-minimum wage rates.56
Critics of sub-minimum wage rates have mainly raised awareness of the 
possible violation of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal 
value. The principle was initially acknowledged by the Treaty of Versailles 
in 1919,57 and written into the preamble of the ILO constitution, as a key ele-
ment of social justice.58 Afterwards, it was entrenched by the reiteration in 
the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.100). However, the concept 
of the principle had been limited to ‘equal pay for men and women doing 
work of equal value’. It was not until the adoption of the Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) that the principle 
was officially broadened to protect workers with different characteristics. 
In spite of the strong connection to Convention No. 100, Convention No. 
111 aims to eliminate all distinctions, exclusions or preferences in respect of 
employment and occupation.
Convention No.100 and No.111 are both fundamental ILO conventions, 
and as a result are ratified by all EU member states.59 The prevalent use of 
sub-minimum wage rates within the EU can be attributed to a belief that 
some groups’ work is of less value than that of normal employees per unit 
time, as illustrated earlier. However, the truth is that productivity level not 
only varies from group to group, but also from individual to individual. It 
is questionable whether every individual in a generally advantaged group 
has the requisite mental and physical qualities to guarantee higher produc-
tivity. Indeed, a disadvantaged but industrious employee sometimes can 
outperform a normal one who is sluggish and inactive. In this case it is not 
convincing to apply a lower minimum wage to the more productive person.
A bigger problem may be found in the usage of sub-minimum wage 
rates. The disabled, the young, the long-term unemployed, trainees, interns 
and apprentices are all typical disadvantaged groups in the labor market. 
56 The principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value is different from the prin-
ciple of equal pay for equal work. The latter refers to equal pay for two persons that 
undertake the same work in the same area of activity and in the same enterprise.
57 Article 427 of the Treaty of Versailles: ILO, Offi cial Bulletin, Vol. 1.
58 Constitution of the ILO, as amended in 1946 to add a specifi c reference to equal remu-
neration for work of equal value in the Preamble (originally stated in Article 41): ILO, 
Offi cial Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, No. 4
59 See the ILO Information System on International Labour Standards, at: 
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:10011:::NO:10011:P10011_DISPLAY_




Nonetheless, as shown in Table 6, differentiated rates are not established 
for every foregoing group, no matter in which country. For example, Lux-
emburg sets lower rates for young workers, but entitles the disabled, the 
long-term unemployed, trainees and interns to receive the standard rate. It 
is necessary to query how the legislators determine that young workers are 
systematically of lower productivity while other groups under discussion 
are not. Unless the decision is backed by an evaluation comparing the aver-
age productivity levels of all groups, any imposition of sub-minimum wage 
rates would appear subjective and optional.
Moreover, there are numerous variables that intertwine and produce 
diverse effects on employee productivity, such as gender, age, experience, 
physical condition, skill level, job type and regional and sectoral features. It 
is worth contemplating why the gender-based difference is a taboo in justi-
fying the wage gaps between groups whereas other variables are considered 
as good reasons for differentiated wage protection. In practice, granted that 
a country attempts to promote the employment of women by catering to the 
potential preference of employers, it would not formally legalize less favor-
able remuneration for female workers. Instead, lower minimum wage rates 
might be imposed on where female employees predominate in the name 
of sectoral or occupational differences (ILO 2014). As a matter of fact, the 
principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value is merely in theory 
applied to all kinds of employees that are likely to be discriminated against 
in labor legislation. Voices against the incautious introduction of sub-min-
imum wage rates have never been loud enough to break the parochialism 
in the application of the principle. Nor have they provoked overwhelming 
discussions about the incorporation of productivity variables into an inte-
grated evaluation system that provides both qualitative and quantitative 
bases for differentiated minimum wage protection.
Although the German minimum wage law prescribes a single rate, the 
excluded groups in nature receive differentiated treatment. Similar prob-
lems arise with regard to the legitimacy for exempting these people from 
the minimum wage protection. In fact, the problems pertain to all minimum 
wage systems that abandon absolute egalitarianism in exchange for nec-
essary flexibility. This sort of compromise is not necessarily good or bad 
per se. The crux is whether every determination in relation to weakening 
or removing minimum wage protection is robustly held to ensure that the 
original purpose is best served and the principle of equal remuneration for 
work of equal value is respected to the highest possible degree. This makes 
great demands on minimum wage legislation. In particular, concerning the 
first minimum wage law of Germany, existing inappropriateness can only 
be ferreted out by years of post-implementation assessment. A saving grace 
is that by placing training or education-related restrictions on the exclusion 
of interns, young workers and trainees, Germany’s current legislation dem-
onstrates a tendency to build up relatively objective and consistent criteria 
for filtering out who is to stand a credible chance of being less productive 
and therefore, needing reduced wage protection in a national context.
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4 Germany’s Potential Loss of Efficiency Adjusting the 
National Minimum Wage
4.1 Adjustment Method
Domestic policymaking and lawmaking on the adjustment of the national 
minimum wage mainly tackle two issues –  the method and frequency. 
In the EU, three major adjustment methods are recognized. The first is 
the indexation method, whereby the national minimum wage is adjusted 
automatically in the wake of the changes of certain economic indicators. 
The second is the negotiation method, basing the adjustment of the national 
minimum wage on negotiations between employers and trade unions. 
The state is only responsible for transposing the negotiation outcomes into 
the minimum wage legislation. Thirdly, there is the consultation method, 
which involves employers, trade unions and sometimes other people – for 
instance, academics – in institutionalized consultations on the adjustment of 
the minimum wage, however, ensures the state has the final say (Schulten 
2014).
According to the DICE database (2015), the vast majority of EU mem-
ber states with national minimum wages have introduced indexation or 
consultation methods or the combination of both for the adjustment. The 
reason is that they are more timely and effective means of adjusting mini-
mum wages. The indexation method makes sure that a minimum wage is 
adjusted regularly in light of variations in consumer prices, wage develop-
ment or inflation. With a consultation method, the government lives up to 
its responsibility and takes necessary control over the adjustment of the 
national minimum wage.
Germany is a rare exception in that it has brought in a bipartite negotia-
tion method.60 It rules out automatic adjustments in line with changes of 
cost-living indexes, excuses the government from an obligation to construct 
decent minimum wage levels, and leaves the entire decision to collective 
bargaining parties. Although the procedure takes the form of minimum 
wage commission members voting upon resolutions in respect to the adjust-
ment of the national minimum wage, the competition between employer 
organizations and trade unions is still the determinant. It is noteworthy that 
in Germany’s national minimum wage commission, apart from members 
with voting rights coming out of trade unions and employer associations, 
there are two advisory members without voting rights chosen from the sci-
entific community.61 From this perspective, the negotiation method adopted 
by the German legislation shares some similarities with the consultation 
method. Yet, it is distinguished from the consultation method in essence 
because the ultimate decision on minimum wage adjustment does not lie 
with the state.
60 According to Section 4-10, the German Minimum Wage Act.




Attention should be paid to the fact that Germany’s adoption of a 
bipartite negotiation method indeed reflects adherence to the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of association. To be specific, the German 
Basic Law ensures every individual and every occupation or profession 
the right to form associations in order to safeguard and improve working 
and economic conditions.62 The entitlement to form and act through trade 
unions and employer associations is rigidly protected, and simultaneously, 
the government plays a very limited role in setting working conditions 
(Bröhmer et al. 2012: 546). There is generally no room for the government 
to exert control over matters that are typically negotiated by employee and 
employer associations; legislation enforcing a wage freeze or an increase 
would be challenged in terms of its constitutionality, unless it is applicable 
across all sectors (Bröhmer et al. 2012: 546). In principle, the adjustment of 
the national minimum wage belongs to the scope within which the state 
is allowed to intervene, because it involves the whole economy instead of 
only certain sectors. However, the legislature of the Minimum Wage Act has 
made a ‘path-dependent’ option, despite the attempt to reform the national 
labor relations via the new legislation.
4.2 Adjustment Frequency Tied up with the Adopted Method
The German pace of adjusting the wage floor every other year63sets a record 
for the scantiest adjustments amongst all the EU countries with explicit 
provisions on the adjustment frequency. This is a consequence of the adjust-
ment method, indeed. As the sole representative of the bipartite negotia-
tion model within the EU, Germany attaches greater importance to social 
partner agreement upon adjustment plans than the practical development 
of the minimum wage level. Thus, a definitely lower frequency is prescribed 
for the updating of the minimum wage rate.
On the contrary, the meaning of the indexation method lies in adapting 
minimum wage adjustments to the changes to the living costs of work-
ing families and other economic conditions. Therefore, at least within 
the EU, countries adopting this method usually specify one year (e.g. in 
Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Malta, Slovenia, etc.) or a shorter period (for 
instance, six months in the Netherlands) as the interval between regular 
adjustments. Occasional political adjustments are added during this period 
for the purpose of coping with extra risks caused by the automatic updating 
of the minimum wage or abnormal index variations.
In member states where consultation methods have been developed, the 
timeliness of minimum wage adjustments may not be valued as much as 
the balance between social acceptance and the government’s domination in 
62 Article 9 (3), the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland).
63 Section 9 (1), the German Minimum Wage Act.
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decision-making. A few countries falling into this category fail to stipulate 
how frequently the national minimum wage rate should be adjusted (e.g. 
Bulgaria and Romania), while others basically mandate annual adjustments 
of the national minimum wages (e.g. UK and Croatia).
4.3 The Lost Efficiency: A Diminutive Growth of 0.34 Euros Costs Two 
Years
After being frozen for two full years, the first German minimum wage rate 
of 8.5 euros per hour will finally be replaced by a new one of 8.84 euros 
from January 2017. The real development of national minimum wages has 
been modest in the whole of Europe since the 2000s, due to the economic 
cycle (Schulten 2014). However, it can more or less be anticipated that Ger-
many  – the largest European economy – would probably fall behind many 
of its counterparts in terms of providing an assurance regarding stable and 
regular increases of the minimum wage.
It is stated at the beginning of this chapter that the deterioration of the 
imbalance between the strength of the two parties at the ‘bargaining table’ 
is the fundamental cause of the introduction of a national minimum wage 
in Germany. Against this background, employing a method that virtually 
rests with both sides’ ability to exert political pressure is tantamount to put-
ting ‘old wine in new bottles’. The German trade unions do not possess the 
power to force substantial minimum wage adjustments with which employ-
ers take issue (Schulten 2014).
Despite the German legislation setting a chairperson who has the casting 
vote in the minimum wage commission so as to prevent a potential dead-
lock, the trade unions’ plight is not improved, and adequate adjustments 
are unlikely to take place. To be specific, the chairperson is appointed upon 
a joint proposal of the central employer and the employee organizations; 
if no joint proposal is made, the chair will rotate between the nominees of 
both sides.64 In the former scenario, the jointly nominated chairperson is 
under pressure from both parties, especially the influential employer side. 
Nothing more than a mild increase of the national minimum wage can be 
guaranteed. In the latter scenario, there seem to be opportunities to elevate 
the wage floor markedly when trade union nominees chair the passing of 
adjustment resolutions. Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration 
that the chairperson is requested to abstain from voting immediately 
if the resolution does not have the majority of votes cast. A compromise 
proposal has to be made firstly, and the chairperson’s decisive vote must 
not be cast unless the compromise proposal lacks the majority of votes.65
64 Section 6, the German Minimum Wage Act.




That is to say that capturing the position of chairmanship does not neces-
sarily enable the trade unions to reach sufficient adjustments of the national 
minimum wage.
In the meantime, the biennial rhythm of adjustments worsens the situ-
ation. The initial rate and Kaitz index value of the German minimum wage 
are already below those of a number of EU member states. These gaps are 
likely to continuingly widen, by reason of the infrequent updates that can-
not catch up with the adjustment speeds of other countries nor the changes 
happening within the German domestic wage structure in general. More-
over, the two-year adjustment cycle prolongs the shortest interval between 
considerable increases of the national minimum wage to four years, because 
in the German context, trade unions have little chance of bringing about 
ample adjustments during the chairmanship of its opponent, and can only 
expect to gain the upper hand after another biennium.
It is clear that Germany is crying out for a more dynamic and force-
ful system to update the national minimum wage so that the spreading 
of in-work poverty across the country can be addressed more efficiently. 
The indexation or consultation method needs adopting as a supplement or 
alternative to the retrogressive negotiation procedure. In addition, no mat-
ter whether the adjustment frequency is specified, wage floors should be 
revised opportunely.
5 An Implementation System Flawed by Inadequate Preparation 
of Essential Rules or Conditions
Level of difficulty in implementing a national minimum wage is influenced 
by the other three components of a minimum wage regime discussed in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, only the implementation system per se directly deals 
with the ways and process of putting the minimum wage into practice, and 
remains at the core of achieving employer compliance.
In view of the legislative experiences of a number of EU countries, a 
successful implementation system should touch upon the following key 
points in order to guarantee the execution of a national minimum wage: 
1) instructions for employers must be clear and precise enough to comply 
with, inter alia those defining the contents of the minimum wage and its 
relationship with working hours; 2) the whole implementation system will 
come to nothing if there is no efficient monitoring; 3) to overcome moral 
persuasion’s lack of binding force, it is a must to introduce serious sanctions 
that deter noncompliance by making lawbreaking costs overweigh poten-
tial benefits; 4) employees deserve assistance in suing employers in order 
to recover minimum wage arrears, in particular the circumstances where 
supervision loopholes exist and unfair dismissal or victimization may take 
place.
Below is an analysis of the existence and adequacy of these conditions 
for implementing the German Minimum Wage Act.
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5.1 Provisions on Calculating Hourly Remuneration and Recording 
Working Hours
The primary technical issues envisaged to have direct effects on the realiza-
tion of a minimum wage entitlement are: a) which parts of remuneration 
should count towards the hourly wage of an employee; b) how the working 
hours are calculated and recorded. Until both issues are settled properly, 
ambiguities can give rise to factual evasion of the obligation to pay above 
the wage floor and set barriers for monitoring and liability identification. 
The UK has actually set a model in this regard since its national minimum 
wage was first introduced nearly two decades ago, under which the govern-
ment endeavors to provide exhaustive guidance on the foregoing questions 
in order to eliminate misapprehensions in practice.66
By contrast, the ‘immature’ minimum wage law of Germany has 
hitherto made much less efforts to clarify the issues listed above. Firstly, 
there is no explanation about what components make up an employee’s 
hourly remuneration.67 In the face of the Federal Council’s criticism that the 
unavailability of concrete criteria could undermine the minimum wage, the 
Federal Government argues that the calculation of the minimum wage has 
indeed been clarified by the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, abbreviated BAG). The 
fact is that no further detailed conclusions can be drawn from the ECJ and 
BAG case law, except from the principle of only payments recompensing 
the agreed normal performance being included in the calculation of the 
minimum wage (Schulten 2015). Therefore, it is merely possible to confirm 
66 The UK National Minimum Wage Act 1998 authorizes the Secretary of State to make 
detailed provisions that clarify the determination of the hourly wage rate at which 
a person is actually paid by the employer in any pay reference period (section 2) and 
the maintenance of records as are relevant to establishing whether or not the worker 
has, for any pay reference period to which the records relate, been remunerated above 
the national minimum wage rate (section 9&10). Accordingly, a government guidance 
(titled ‘Guidance on Calculating the Minimum Wage’) consisting of systematic rules has 
been introduced to solve the aforementioned practical issues .The Secretary of State has 
overall responsibilities for the government department that publishes this guidance. 
First published in April 2013, the Guidance is updated quite often. The latest version 
published in October, 2016 is already the 11th update. See https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/publications/calculating-the-minimum-wage#history (accessed 20 December 
2016).
67 The BMAS (2014:15-21)provides some explanations about the components of an 
employee’s hourly wage and the calculation and recording of working hours in a pay 
reference period for the purposes of the German Minimum Wage Act. However, it differs 
from the UK government guidance referred to in the previous footnote. First, the German 
Minimum Wage Act does not authorize the BMAS to make supplementary regulations 
on forgoing issues in its text, so it is constitutionally questionable if BMAS explanations 
represent the attitudes of legislators. Second, the interpretations of the BMAS are far less 
precise, certain and comprehensive than a real guidance, and can probably only offer 





that bonuses for additional work (e.g. wages for overtime, public holidays, 
shift work and night work), payments with specific purposes (e.g. pension 
contributions, reimbursements), or voluntary compensations by third par-
ties (e.g. tips) should be counted out. Salary elements that cannot be clearly 
recognized as payments for an employee’s normal performance (e.g. 13th
month’s wage, year-end bonuses, Christmas bonuses, holiday bonuses) 
continue to be controversial among academics, judicial authorities and the 
government (Schulten 2015).
Apart from the calculation of hourly remuneration, the total amount 
of working hours in a pay reference period is a pivotal factor that could 
be falsified to sidestep the wage floor. Different from the UK law, which 
imposes a universal obligation to record working hours by elaborating 
on measurement rules in various situations, the German Minimum Wage 
Act only includes simplified regulations that oblige employers to docu-
ment the commencement, end and duration of employees’ daily working 
hours and retain the records for at least two years. More importantly, these 
regulations just apply to marginal part-time jobs and the specific sectors or 
industry branches defined in section 2a of the Act to Combat Clandestine 
Employment.68
The current legislative pattern seems not to conform to the social reality 
in Germany. As mentioned earlier, a considerable proportion of full-timers, 
chiefly in the East Germany, earn hourly wages roughly above or below 
8.5 euros. Provided that these employees are frequently compelled to do 
additional unpaid work, the actual salaries they receive for each hour are 
likely to fall (further) below the minimum wage. Besides, when a piecework 
principle – work paid for according to the amount produced –  is adopted 
by employers, it is also difficult to ensure hourly wage rates above the wage 
floor. The most effective way to reduce these manipulative behaviors of 
employers in low-wage sectors is sticking to the principle that the minimum 
wage must be achieved for every hour actually worked, which is confirmed 
by the explanatory memorandum attached to the law, and setting up com-
mon rules for the measurement of working time.
Yet, imposing an indiscriminate obligation to record working hours 
sometimes runs counter to economic realities, given the diverse features of 
different occupations and sectors. For example, for a salesman travelling 
between cities to market products all year round, it is almost impossible to 
precisely distinguish between the occupational and private behaviors that 
are subsumed by the manner of working. Another example is a warehouse 
guard. The person employed to take care of the products and facilities of 
a warehouse may be provided with a residence nearby and required to be 
prepared to handle emergencies at any time, but in reality, this person does 
not work twenty-four seven. Personal activities, such as dining, rest and 
recreations, just proceed between routine inspections. In both instances, 
68 Section 17, the German Minimum Wage Act.
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maintaining timesheets is challenging, due to the inexistence of apparent 
demarcation between on and off work. It may only be workable when 
minimum wage legislation is sophisticated insofar as rules about the 
measurement of working hours are designed for all possible movements 
of the employees in the above two examples. However, this is an endless 
and impractical task. Take UK for instance. Its legislative model is one 
that attempts to exemplify as many scenarios as possible and tailor rules 
for different situations. This includes the calculation method of time spent 
travelling on business and criteria for judging the nature of sleeping hours 
between duties. Still, many possibilities that need clarification on the mea-
surement of working time have been left out. That is because each case may 
be different, and a written law cannot cover all eventualities.
Therefore, the core idea advanced here is that perhaps the German 
minimum wage legislation should not have narrowed the application of 
regulations on working time recording to mini-jobs and sectors susceptible 
to illegal employment. This increases the likelihood that low-wage earn-
ers outside these limits could not practically reach the minimum wage 
entitlements. At the same time, considering the difficulties of recording 
employees’ precise working time in some occupations or sectors, legislators 
must come up with substitutes for a ‘one-size-fits-all’ settlement. Two pos-
sible approaches suggest themselves. First, the obligation to record working 
time could be forced widely on employers, however, the prerequisite is 
that authorized departments of the Federal Government legislate on how 
employers may simplify or modify the general manner of recording and 
retaining workers’ working hours whenever specific features of an occupa-
tion or sector necessitate alterations.69 Second, in some exceptional cases, 
recording the working time of employees is not difficult, but is infeasible. 
Employers should be eligible to apply for exemption from the duty if 
ensuring employees annual or monthly gross salaries above a certain high 
amount. In doing so, working time autonomy is given back to occupations 
and sectors that feature unmeasurable working length or need employees to 
be on standby, and simultaneously, less opportunities are left for employers 
to bypass the hourly minimum wage.
5.2 The Major Monitoring Authority and ‘Risk-Oriented’ Approach
More than one government authority gets involved in the inspection of 
employer adherence to the minimum wage law in Germany, but the Finan-
cial Inspectorate of Undeclared Employment (Finanzkontrolle Schwarz-
arbeit, abbreviated FKS) is tasked with the leading role in this regard, as has 
69 This is actually promoting an expansion of the application of Section 17, paragraph 4 of 
the German Minimum Wage Act, which urges the BMF to determine by way of a statu-
tory instrument how employers referred to in paragraph1 may alter the general way of 
recording and retaining the working time of workers in so far as this is necessary on 




been the case with sectoral minimum wages in the past. The basic reason 
for this is that this customs unit responsible for enforcing the law on illicit 
employment and benefit fraud is endowed with extensive investigatory 
powers to serve the original purpose of prosecuting cases of illicit employ-
ment, nicely facilitating intensive monitoring of the minimum wage. Com-
pliance with the statutory wage floor is required to be examined during all 
FKS audits. Relevant information found by authorities that shoulder other 
labor protection responsibilities, such as the pension funds, trade inspector-
ates, employment agencies, social security funds, etc., in workplace checks 
shall be transferred to the FKS.
While the FKS has been expected to initiate massive scrutiny of the 
carrying out of the minimum wage in enterprises, the reality is somewhat 
disappointing. According to the figures provided by the Federal Ministry 
of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, abbreviated BMF), the FKS 
checked around 43,700 enterprises in 2015, over 30 percent less than the 
amount of 63,000 in 2014. In the construction sector, which is particularly 
vulnerable to illicit employment and ‘wage dumping’, the number of 
inspections fell by approximately half to 17,000 (Süddeutsche Zeitung Febru-
ary 19, 2016a).
The sudden decline of investigations originates from the incapacity of 
the FKS to handle the soaring workload caused by the additional mission 
of enforcing the minimum wage with the present staffing levels. More than 
a decade ago, the former Finance Minister Hans Eichel (SPD70) launched a 
plan for increasing the amount of FKS customs officers gradually from 5,200 
to 7,000 to cope with the long standing staff shortage. At that time, an extra 
demand of investigating officers as a result of the introduction of a national 
minimum wage was not considered. According to the Ministry of Finance, 
600 of the 6865 positions initially planned for 2015 had not yet been filled. 
To take over the monitoring of the national minimum wage, another 1,600 
customs investigators are needed, but further recruitment has been delayed 
to the financial years of 2017-2022.Worse still, hundreds of the existing FKS 
employees have been dispatched to the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees to help with the current necessity of refugee control (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung February 19, 2016 a).
Thus, the FKS has adopted a ‘risk-oriented’ approach for checks on 
unreported employment as well as compliance with the minimum wage, 
reducing the total number of investigations and concentrating available 
resources on the revelation of suspected major violations. Despite the 
concern that such an approach may tempt fraudulent businesses – construc-
tion companies in particular – to make profits from illicit employment and 
disobedience to the minimum wage law, the FKS has no other viable option 
at present (Süddeutsche Zeitung February 19, 2016b).
70 The abbreviation for ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’, referring to the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany.
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In fact, the problem does not lie in the insufficient preparation of the FKS 
for the expanded task, but in reality there is no specialized labor inspectorate 
in Germany. Administrative control of working conditions, leaving aside 
occupational health and safety, is quite a new challenge for the German 
system of labor relations. At the moment, the complex mission to compel 
observance of a national minimum wage can only be assigned to an author-
ity like the FKS who possesses a relatively higher capability of accomplish-
ing the undertaking, despite not having reached the requisite staffing level. 
To some extent, it is an obvious consequence that the efficacy of minimum 
wage monitoring will continue to be thwarted by the staff shortage of the 
FKS in the next few years. Furthermore, due to the shortage of relevant expe-
rience in the inspection of working conditions, a prudent stance is likely to 
be maintained by the legislature on the way how the FKS manages this task.
5.3 Sanctions
In the EU, the most common sanctions for disobeying national minimum 
wages are pecuniary ones in the manner of fines. Still, discrepancies widely 
exist between the legislation of member states with respect to the criteria 
of determining levels of fines and the diversity of penalties. As shown by 
the ILO Working Conditions Laws Database,71 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, 
Estonia, Greece and Spain offer a numerical range of the whole fine system, 
requiring enforcement authorities to exercise discretion based on both the 
seriousness and type of violations. France, Hungary and the Netherlands 
clearly identify the number of employees concerned as a factor that should 
influence the total amount of a fine. The difference is that France and the 
Netherlands specify how much an employer will be fined if one employee is 
paid below the minimum wage – the penalty shall be applied as many times 
as there have been violations,72 while Hungary stipulates different ranges of 
fines for cases involving one or multiple employees. Apart from the quan-
tity of employees with unsatisfied minimum wage entitlements, statutory 
reasons for increasing or reducing fines mainly include repeat offences (e.g. 
in Hungary, Luxemburg and the Netherlands), severe accidents incurred by 
violations (e.g. in Slovakia), the turnover of an enterprise (e.g. in Portugal) 
and company size (e.g. in Slovenia).
Despite the dominance of financial penalties, a few EU countries (e.g. 
Belgium, Romania and Ireland) adopt imprisonment as an alternative. 
Offending against minimum wage entitlements of employees in these coun-
tries results in liabilities of fines or incarceration, or both.
71 Available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/travmain.sectionChoice?p_structure= 
(last accessed 10 December 2016).
72 Notwithstanding the similarities, a small difference exists between the French and Dutch 
legislation. The French law provides for a specifi c fi ne for paying an employee below the 
minimum wage, whereas the Dutch law only sets the upper limit of the fi ne for infringing 




In comparison with the rest of the EU, Germany has set a quite high 
upper range limit (€500,000) for the whole fine resulting from a failure to 
pay employees above the wage floor in due time. How factors, such as 
the number of involved employees, economic losses caused by violations, 
repeated offences and company scale should affect a penalty decision is 
not specified. Breaching one of the ancillary obligations to cooperate with 
enforcement authorities in audits, to notify the required information and 
relevant changes in due time and prescribed manner, and to record and 
retain employees’ working time properly can give rise to a fine of up to 
€ 30,000.73 An enterprise that has been fined more than € 2,500 shall be 
excluded from public procurement procedures in the fields of delivery, 
construction and service until its reliability has been reestablished.74
In short, the sanction system for propping up the implementation of 
the German minimum wage has demonstrated two primary characteristics. 
Firstly, although imprisonment is not adopted, comparatively heavy eco-
nomic penalties – significant fines plus loss of eligibility for tendering for a 
contract of public procurement – have been introduced as strong deterrents 
for various types of noncompliance with the Minimum Wage Act. Secondly, 
the domains in which offenders are deprived of the capacity to participate 
in public procurement procedures are those particularly susceptible to 
incorrect remuneration for employees because of high prevalence of low-
paid work, illegal employment or ‘mini-jobs’. These two points mirror that 
appropriate attention has been paid to the effects of lawbreaking costs on 
employer adherence to the minimum wage and the possibilities of creating 
sanctions pertaining to domestic industrial attributes.
A deficiency of the German Minimum Wage Act is that it lacks provi-
sions requiring an employer who infringes on a minimum wage entitle-
ment to make a supplementary payment to the involved employee within 
a specific time in order to meet the required legal standard. The same 
loopholes are found in the legislation of other member states, except in 
the Netherlands, Malta and the UK. Whether liability to repay minimum 
wage arrears is prescribed as a component of the enforcement system of 
a minimum wage makes an essential difference. With the existence of this 
statutory liability, there is a higher chance that an employer will cover the 
shortfall as required by order of the enforcement authority so as to avoid 
further serious legal consequences. An employee need not necessarily resort 
to litigation to claim adequate remuneration. Conversely, when the statu-
tory liability under discussion is absent, an employer may attempt to put 
off remunerating the employee to reach the wage floor, and it is more likely 
that an employee will take legal action and request arrears based on the 
judicial decision.
73 See Section 15,16,17,20 and 21, the German Minimum Wage Act.
74 See Section 19, idem.
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5.4 Viability of Minimum Wage Litigation
Individual employees are not inclined to make use of judicial proceedings 
to realize minimum wage entitlements for fear of job loss or potential 
revenge tactics from employers. The situation can be altered, however, if 
effective assistance is provided for them in applying the right to judicial 
remedy. This is of particular significance for Germany, where the law fails to 
urge an offender to pay back arrears and an employee stands a good chance 
of needing to sue the employer in a court of law to receive minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, the German Minimum Wage Act has completely omitted this 
section of legislation that should have been put in place to improve the 
viability of minimum wage litigation.
As opposed to Germany, many member states that recognize employ-
ees’ vulnerability in lawsuits against powerful employers offer constructive 
solutions in the domestic legislation. For instance, in the UK, an officer 
of the HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) – the authority that enforces the 
national minimum wage – can take a case to an employment tribunal or 
county civil court (or Scottish equivalent) on behalf of an employee with 
a view to enforcing the minimum wage entitlement to be applied. If the 
employee suffers unfair dismissal or any detriment by the employer, the 
employee is entitled to present a complaint to an employment tribunal. 
In France, the associative right of a labor organization to sue on behalf of 
employees is acknowledged. Therefore, trade unions can bring class action 
lawsuits to protect the rights of employees to be paid above the national 
minimum wage (Schulten 2015).
It is unsure which of the existing solutions agrees with the German 
national conditions, or whether Germany is in need of another way out. 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the realization of minimum wage 
entitlements will be frustrated if the corresponding regulations remain 
unavailable in the German law.
6 Final Remarks
Despite the fact that Germany’s introduction of a wage floor from the 
beginning of 2015 was a great breakthrough for national poverty reduction 
and wage structure rationalization, it is perhaps not complete. This chapter 
throws doubts over the effects of this major policy change at a legislative 
level. By examining the German Minimum Wage Act in terms of the general 
minimum wage rate, flexibility in application, adjustment method and fre-
quency, and implementation system from an EU perspective, it reveals that 
this legislation, despite making noticeable progress in some regards, has a 
huge potential for improvement.
A minimum wage of 8.5 euros can hardly curb the in-work poverty 
across Germany according to the Kaitz index measurement. An evaluation 




tative estimations disagree on the precise amount of latent beneficiaries, 
but it is certain that the main beneficiaries are those trapped in serious 
poverty for multiple interweaved reasons, in particular female mini-jobbers, 
and that the German average poor will not virtually benefit from the new 
minimum wage. An often neglected problem with the general level of the 
German minimum wage is its unsuccessful link-up with the preexisting 
income support and tax and contribution collection systems, which tends 
to significantly detract from the efficiency in promoting people’s economic 
activeness.
Germany has developed a distinctive model of flexibility within the 
general wage floor. It sets no sub-rate on top of the standard rate, but puts 
strict restrictions in relation to vocational training and education, on most 
groups exempted from the application of the minimum wage. Such a model 
is easier to implement, but the disadvantage is that it cannot exert actual 
influence over different levels of working poor nor avoid the ethical and 
legal concerns faced by multi-rate systems.
Ignoring the indexation and consultation methods prevalent in other 
member states, Germany becomes the unique state that adopts a bipartite 
negotiation method of determining adjustments of the national minimum 
wage. Tied up with the adopted method, a biennial rhythm of adjustments 
is fixed. These two elements constitute an adjustment mechanism that is 
unable to ensure timely and efficient adjustments in a country like Germany.
The greatest drawbacks of the German minimum wage law are embed-
ded in the implementation system. There is a lack of comprehensive guid-
ance over the calculation of an employee’s hourly remuneration and the 
measurement of working hours to make employers meet the minimum 
wage. The FKS is assigned the undertaking of checking employer compli-
ance with the minimum wage due to its extensive investigatory power in 
the monitoring of illicit employment, but its present staff level is far from 
adequate to handle both tasks. Compared with most other member states, 
Germany adopts severer economic penalties to deter noncompliance with 
the minimum wage, but it fails to instruct offenders to repay arrears of 
wages, for which involved employees face a higher risk of having to turn 
to judicial proceedings to protect personal interests. Unfortunately, the 
high barriers standing in the way of an individual employee exercising 
the right to sue is entirely disregarded by the German minimum wage law, 
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Chart and Tables
Chart 5: Kaitz Index Values of EU countries’ National Minimum Wages in 2015 
(in Percentage Terms).
Source: OECD.
Available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIN2AVE#(accessed 12 January 2017)
Table 5: Minimum Wages of EU Countries in Euro and PPS (Effective January 2016)
Per hour in Euro** latest change
per hour in PPS
(Purchasing Power Standard)***
Luxembourg 11.12 01.01.2015 Luxembourg 9.40
France 9.67 01.01.2016 France 9.11
Netherlands 9.36 01.01.2016 Netherlands 8.52
United Kingdom 9.23 01.10.2015 Germany 8.50
Ireland 9.15 01.01.2016 Belgium 8.48
Belgium 9.10 01.12.2012 Ireland 7.65
Germany 8.50 01.01.2015 United Kingdom 6.95
Slovenia 4.57 01.01.2015 Slovenia 5.59
Malta 4.20 01.01.2016 Malta 5.14
Spain 3.97 01.01.2016 Poland 4.64
Greece 3.35 01.03.2012 Spain 4.34
Portugal 3.19 01.01.2016 Portugal 3.96
Poland 2.55 01.01.2016 Greece 3.92
Estonia 2.54 01.01.2016 Hungary 3.67
Croatia 2.37 01.01.2016 Croatia 3.60
Slovakia 2.33 01.01.2016 Slovakia 3.41
Latvia 2.20 01.01.2016 Lithuania 3.36
Czech Republic 2.15 01.01.2016 Czech Republic 3.36
Lithuania 2.13 01.01.2016 Estonia 3.25
Hungary 2.06 01.01.2016 Latvia 3.11
Romania 1.40 01.07.2015 Romania 2.62
Bulgaria 1.24 01.01.2016 Bulgaria 2.59
Source: WSI Minimum Wage Database.
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5 A Tale of Two Models: Ideas and Results 
of the Swedish and American Legislation 
on Parental Leave
Abstract
This chapter compares the models, underlying ideas, and results of Swedish and 
American legislation on parental leave. It is found that Sweden, whose parental 
leave policy is characterized by generosity and flexibility, has achieved quite positive 
outcomes respecting economic growth and the employment of both genders. In stark 
contrast, the US has failed to acquire stronger competitiveness or higher employ-
ment rates, despite implementing a much less generous parental leave policy. The 
presupposed tradeoff between the level of parental benefits and economic perfor-
mance has contradicted the empirical evidence so far. Paid parental leave is strongly 
demanded by American society, not only amongst employees but also amongst 
employers.






Sweden and the US both stand out in terms of the national legislation 
on parental leave. The main difference between the two countries is that 
Sweden has one of the most generous policies in the world, while the 
US demonstrates the opposite. In short, under the Parental Leave Act 
(Föräldraledighetslagen)75 and Social Insurance Code (Socialförsäkringsbalk)76, 
a Swedish couple is entitled to share 480 days of paid parental leave in the 
event of the birth or adoption of a child. In the US, each parent has a statu-
tory right to 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave under the condition that the 
parent works in an enterprise with more than 50 employees, according to 
the FMLA.
Consequently, there is a huge gap between the two countries in respect 
of the availability and actual take-up rates of paid parental leave. All Swed-
ish employees are entitled to paid parental leave, and almost all of them use 
it ( Duvander et al. 2016).In contrast, paid parental leave is beyond the reach 
of the vast majority of American working families, although there have 
been a few states providing partial wage replacement for parents around 
the birth or adoption of a child (IWPR 2013). According to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2016), only14 percent of all the American employees had 
access to paid family leave (paid parental leave included) in 2016. For the 
remaining 84 percent, parental leave and other types of family leave were 
unpaid. In line with the data drawn from a 2000 U.S. Department of Labor 
survey, employees who used unpaid family leave totaled 35 million, and 
among these people merely 26 percent took unpaid leave to care for a new 
child or for maternity disability reasons. In addition, few of them took the 
maximum amount (Vahratian and Johnson 2009; National Partnership for 
Women & Families n.d.).
When almost the whole world presumes paid parental leave to be indis-
pensable, the US has insisted on the exceptionalism, staying with Oman and 
Papua New Guinea as the only countries that do not require employers to 
provide paid time off for new parents (ILO 2014). Only recently, the admin-
istration started making efforts to change the situation and embarked on 
planning what president Trump had proposed on his campaign trail – intro-
ducing six weeks of paid leave for mothers of newborns, and for fathers and 
new adoptive parents in the future (NPR May23, 2017). Although this would 
be a milestone in the improvement of American working conditions and 
would remove the country from the ‘exception list’, there are still doubts 
surrounding the rationality of passing the proposal (NPR May23, 2017). 
It is thus intriguing to examine what the US may lose or win by closing
75 Parental Leave Act (Föräldraledighetslagen), codifi ed as SFS 1995:584.
76 Social Insurance Code (Socialförsäkringsbalk 2010:110) is a coherent and comprehensive 
social security law that replaces over thirty previously existing social security statutes 
such as the laws on child allowance, housing allowance, national insurance and occupa-
tional injury insurance. It is now codifi ed as SFS 2017: 232.
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the door upon the introduction of paid parental leave. Meanwhile, as a 
country that mandates subsidized and considerably lengthy periods of 
parental leave for all employees, Sweden has succeeded in maintaining high 
employment and sustainable economic growth since the 1990s, provoking 
reflections on the possibilities of concerting generous parental benefits into 
robust impetuses for economic transformation.
This chapter firstly offers a brief description of the two different 
models of parental leave established by the existing legislation of Sweden 
and America. Following this is an analysis of the predominant thoughts 
that drive the two countries to follow these present routes that are poles 
apart. By taking stock of the actual effects on business performance, social 
responses, and financial feasibility, the last part of this chapter reveals that 
a generous and well-structured parental leave system is far superior to a 
‘money-saving’ one that only offers unpaid leave, and that the time is ripe 
for introducing a national policy of paid parental leave in the US.
2 Different Models Erected by Sweden’s Parental Leave Act & 
Social Insurance Code and the United States’ FMLA
2.1 The Swedish Model
Paid parental leave was first introduced in Sweden in 1974, replacing the 
previous maternity leave. Since then Swedish family policy has continued 
to be reformed on the basis of the dual-earner model, with the aims of facili-
tating work-family balance and strengthening gender equality (PERFAR 
2014). The current domestic legislation, mainly consisting of the Parental 
Leave Act (hereafter ‘PLA’) and the relevant provisions included in the 
Social Insurance Code (hereafter ‘SIC’), constructs a comprehensive system 
of parental leave featuring both generosity and high levels of flexibility.
This generosity is reflected in many an aspect. In the first place, all 
parents are entitled to leave from work in the event of a child’s birth or 
adoption, irrespective of the size of the enterprise, the accumulated working 
hours of the parent, or any other conditions. Unlike in the US, where only 
biological and adoptive parents or other legal guardians of a child have the 
right to unpaid parental leave,77 Sweden extends the entitlement of paid 
parental leave to an employee who resides permanently with a parent 
provided that the employee is, or has been, married to, or has, or has had, a 
child with the parent.78
77 In accordance with the FMLA § 2611(12), the ‘son or daughter’, the birth or placement 
of whom is the ground for an employee taking the 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave 
(FMLA § 2612(a)(1)(A)and(B)), refers to ‘’a biological, adopted, or foster child, a step-
child, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis.…”




In terms of duration, a parent is entitled to full-time leave from work 
until the child is 18 months old, or as long as full parental benefit is paid 
under the SIC.79 Therefore, each parent is eligible to 240 days of paid leave, 
among which 195 days entail wage replacement at the sickness benefit 
level or the basic level and 45 days at the minimum level (Försäkringskas-
san80 2017). For a child born in 2016 or later, 90 days paid at the sickness 
benefit level are reserved for each parent and cannot be transferred to the 
other parent, while the remaining 105 days and the 45 days paid at the 
minimum level may be transferred (Försäkringskassan 2017). For children 
born or adopted from 2014 onwards, the paid leave benefit can be used up 
before the child is 12 years old, with a maximum of 96 days can be claimed 
after the child is four years old; for children born or adopted earlier than 
2014, the paid leave benefit may be used up before the child is 8 years old 
(Försäkringskassan 2017).
In principle, parental compensation at the sickness benefit level means 
that a parent is paid around 80 percent of the previous income while on 
parental leave, with a ceiling of SEK 94281per day. For a parent who worked 
less than 240 consecutive days before childbirth, parental benefit is paid at 
the basic level (a flat rate of SEK 25082 per day) for the first 180 days. After 
this, the parent is eligible for a wage-related benefit at no less than SEK 
250 per day. A parent who has had low or no income, such as a job seeker 
or a student, is also entitled to the basic level of parental benefit.83 The 
minimum level is SEK 18084 per day for parents of children born from 1 July 
2006 onwards, or SEK 6085per day if the child was born before 1 July 2006. 
All parental leave benefits, no matter whether income-based or flat-rate, 
provide pension credits.
A ‘Gender Equality Bonus’ (jämställdhetsbonus) has been adopted to 
promote gender-equal parenting. Both parents receive a tax refund of SEK 
50 per day each, for each day that the parent who has taken the fewer days 
of parental leave after the reserved 90 days takes leave. The bonus applies 
to the 390 (195+195) days of income-related leave, after both parents use up 
their reserved days (90+90). A complete equal use of parental benefit may 
bring the family a combined bonus of SEK10,500 (Duvander et al. 2016).
In addition to the general parental leave, Swedish law provides narrow-
sense maternity leave and temporary benefit days in connection with a 
child’s birth or adoption. Maternity leave means that a female employee 
79 See Section 5 (SFS2014:948) of the PLA.
80 The Swedish Social Insurance Agency.
81 Approximate to €97.7, based on the exchange rate on Apr. 21st, 2017.
82 Approximate to €25.9, based on the exchange rate on Apr. 21st, 2017.
83 https://www.forsakringskassan.se/privatpers/foralder/nar_barnet_ar_fott/
foraldrapenning/!ut/p/z0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8ziTTxcnA3dnQ28_
U2DXQwczTwDDcOCXY1CDc31g1Pz9AuyHRUBTbm8uw!!/ (accessed 5 January 
2017).
84 Approximate to €18.7, based on the exchange rate on Apr. 21st, 2017.
85 Approximate to €6.2, based on the exchange rate on Apr. 21st, 2017.
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is eligible for full leave associated with childbirth during an uninterrupted 
period of more than 7 weeks ahead of the expected date of delivery and 
7 weeks after the delivery; it is obligatory to take two weeks of maternity 
leave before or after delivery; the employee also has a right to take leave to 
breastfeed.86 The employee can decide whether or not to take part of the 
paid parental leave insurance benefit during the compulsory two weeks, 
which are not extra benefit days but are counted in the 390 (195+195) days 
(Duvander et al. 2016). The temporary leave in connection with a child’s 
birth or adoption is a gender-neutral benefit, a substitute for the previously 
existing ‘paternity leave’. At the birth of a child, the non-pregnant parent 
(used to be defined as ‘a father’) or a person closely related to the single 
pregnant mother can receive compensation for 10 days of leave in order to 
attend the delivery, to take care of other children, or to participate in other 
childcare affairs. This compensation acts as a temporary parental benefit, 
approximate to 80 percent of the salary loss during the leave.87 In the case 
of adoption, each adoptive parent receives compensation for 5 days of leave 
to get acquainted with the child on condition that the child is younger than 
10 years old; a single adoptive parent is entitled to 10 days of paid leave; the 
compensation rate is roughly equal to 80 percent of the income loss.88
Another major characteristic of the Swedish model is the consistent 
pursuit of flexibility for the sake of enabling working parents to choose the 
best way of using parental leave in order to satisfy the needs of the family. 
Firstly, 300 (105×2+45×2) paid days are left to be freely transferred between 
the two parents according to their own suitability and plans, while it is 
evident that the tendency of the legislation is to make increasing efforts to 
promote gender equality in parenting, from introducing a non-transferable 
quota of 30 days for each parent in 1995, to extending it to 60 days in 2002, 
to further extending it to 90 days in 2016 (Duvander et al. 2015). Secondly, 
expressing the duration of parental leave in actual days, instead of in 
weeks or months, demonstrates a latent preference for flexible usage of the 
leave. However, there is a restriction that prevents extreme uncertainty: 
the whole leave period can be divided into a maximum of three periods 
for each calendar year,89 and working parents can elect to take leave in 
several blocks of time or in one continuous period ( Duvander et al. 2016). 
Thirdly, the Swedish law attempts to enhance the flexibility of paid parental 
leave by permitting working parents to take time off in the form of reduc-
ing normal working hours by three quarters, one half, one quarter or one 
eighth while receiving the same proportions of the full compensation rate.90
Lastly, the total length of paid parental leave in relation to a child’s birth 
or adoption is fixed, but the Swedish model embraces several extra types 
86 Section 4 (SFS2000:580) of the PLA.
87 See https://www.forsakringskassan.se/privatpers/foralder (accessed 5 January 2017).
88 Id.
89 See Section 10 of the PLA.




of (paid or unpaid) parental leave, such as the aforementioned maternity 
leave, temporary leave in connection with a child’s birth or adoption, leave 
for an employee’s temporary child support, and leave for a parent of child 
for whom full child-raising allowance is paid. Parents have the freedom 
to combine the usage of different leave forms in order to serve different 
purposes. In short, the current approach adopted by Sweden avoids the 
obvious irrationality of long non-interruptible parental leave, despite pos-
ing higher challenges to the management concerning the maintenance of 
attendance, leave administration, and the reassignment of work tasks.
2.2 The American Model
The FMLA is the first federal legislation that grants American working par-
ents the right to take time off after birth or adoption of a child. By 1990, one 
half of mothers with infants younger than one year old and two thirds of 
mothers with children below three years old had to work, and the introduc-
tion of parental leave was necessary to maintain the participation rate of 
women in the labor market (Grill 1996). However, the FMLA fails to address 
the real problems faced by most American working families, despite fill-
ing the void of statutory parental leave. According to the FMLA, it is not 
obligatory for employers to offer paid parental leave. Should an employer 
voluntarily provide wage replacement for less than 12 workweeks, the 
additional weeks of leave necessary to attain the 12 workweeks do not 
entail any compensation.91 An eligible employee may elect, or an employer 
may require the employee, to substitute any accrued paid vacation leave, 
personal leave, or family leave for all or part of the twelve-week leave 
period.92 Because there is no ensured compensation for income loss during 
leave, many working parents refrain from taking advantage of the ‘benefit’, 
and a lot of those who use it are found to face economic hardships (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2015).
Under the FMLA, the duration of parental leave is 12 workweeks, 
which must be claimed within 12 months from the date of the birth or 
adoption placement of a child.93 This length is quite short in view of cross-
country comparisons. In 2016, the average duration of paid maternity 
leave plus paid parental leave available to mothers was 55.2 weeks among 
OECD countries, and paid paternity leave plus paid parental leave avail-
able to fathers in these countries averaged out at 8.2 weeks (OECD  Family 
Database 2017). In appearance, the FMLA establishes a standard above the 
OECD average level that entitles each parent to take 12 weeks of leave,94
so that a father is able to be equally responsible for the care of a newborn 
as the mother. In reality, the lack of mandatory compensation during the 
91 See FMLA § 2612 (d) (1).
92 See FMLA § 2612 (d) (2).
93 See FMLA § 2612(a) (1)(A)and(B), and § 2612 (a)(2).
94 See FMLA § 2612 (a) (1).
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leave forces many fathers to retrench the twelve-week leave period. No 
recent data is available on how quicker American working fathers return to 
work from parental leave than working mothers, but a Bureau of National 
Affairs survey in 1993 recorded that 43 percent of female interviewees and 7 
percent of male interviewees would take the full 12 weeks off after the birth 
or adoption of a child; 4 percent of working women and more than 20 per-
cent of working men would take no leave at all, and the average lengths of 
parental leave taken by women and men under the FMLA were 8.5 weeks 
and 2.7 weeks (Grill 1996). It can be seen that the 12 workweeks of leave 
period available to eligible fathers is undermined more seriously in practice, 
in comparison to mothers.
The influence of the federal statutory parental leave is further limited 
by the restrictions on eligibility. The FMLA only applies to an employee 
who is employed at a worksite in the US or in any territory of the US where 
the employer employs no less than 50 within 75 miles, and the employee 
must have worked with the employer for 1,250 hours during the previous 
12-month period.95 Otherwise, an employee will be excluded from the 
entitlement to the 12-workweek unpaid parental leave. The FMLA further 
shrinks the benefits package for a couple employed by the same employer; 
it is legal for the employer to limit the aggregate duration of parental leave 
that the two parents share to 12 workweeks.96
3 Ideas Underlying Route Selection
It is the diverging ideologies that have driven the Swedish and American 
legislation on parental leave to take different routes. In Sweden, positive 
explanations prevail, concerning the result of providing generous parental 
leave. Swedish employers take it for granted that an employee is paid. 
A few problems have to be managed, such as what strategies should be 
developed to fill vacancies, but the inconvenience is in general bearable and 
offset by the societal and economic gains (see Allen 1988: 257-8). Owing to 
paid parental leave, infants can be better cared for by parents. This is a merit 
that Swedish employers are willing to sacrifice for, since all society mem-
bers, including employers themselves, benefit from the increased harmony 
(Allen 1988: 258).  More importantly, it is well recognized in Sweden that the 
productivity is likely to be improved by paid parental leave, because it can 
make employees more satisfied and healthy (Allen 1988: 259).
From the perspective of employment policymaking, Swedes believe that 
paid parental leave has the potential ‘to encourage high and continuous 
labor force participation of men and women, to narrow the gender employ-
ment gap and ensure similar patterns of employment over the life course’ 
(Anxo  and Niklasson 2008: 11). Denying employees’ need for parental leave 
95 See FMLA § 2611 (2).




in the event of the birth or adoption of a child will not evoke greater efforts 
at work, but cause higher turnover rates, in particular of mothers.
In addition, the concept of the welfare state is fully developed in 
Sweden (Grill 1996). Egalitarian redistribution of economic fruits, poverty 
elimination, gender equality, and full employment have been the ethos 
of the society. Swedes endorse that the government applies high average 
and marginal tax rates, various forms of social benefits, and the transfer 
systems to pursue the forgoing objectives. Thus, two significant obstacles 
that stand in the way of introducing a generous parental leave policy have 
been removed. One is the challenge posed to the government’s budget to 
afford a generous parental leave. In Sweden, the parental leave allowance is 
financed primarily through employer-paid payroll taxes and partly through 
general government avenues. According to the data for 2016 and 2017, 
employers pay 31.42 percent on all employees’ earnings, of which about 2.2 
percent is embarked for parental insurance (Nordisk eTax 2017;  Duvander 
et al. 2016).97 The government plays a supplementary role by making up 
any shortfall (Duvander et al. 2016). Such arrangements enable Sweden 
to bear the high public expenditure on parental benefits while balancing 
the budget.98 The other possible barrier is that the public may be unable to 
reach an agreement on spending taxpayers’ money on a matter of personal 
choice. The Swedish welfare state does not have this problem, in general. 
As mentioned above, most members of society and taxpayers, including 
employers, appreciate the benefits brought about by the paid parental leave 
policy. Childbirth is not deemed to be a complete personal matter, but each 
family is a ‘social unit with primary child-bearing responsibility’ (Allen 
1988: 268). Thus, government spending on this aspect of public welfare has 
been well supported.
From the viewpoint of the US, high costs are the most important argu-
ment against the introduction of paid parental leave of any considerable 
length. Mandating publicly-subsidized income replacement for those who 
take parental leave may cause a huge increase in the fiscal expenditure, 
therefore, appears challenging for the American government, which faces 
tax-averse citizens and the pressure to cut down on social expenditure (Grill 
1996). Simultaneously, as excessive economic burdens may be imposed on 
employers, the general employment level and the competitiveness of the 
economy might be impaired. While evidence to support such estimates is 
inaccurate and inconclusive  (Kistler and Mcdonough 1975), policymakers 
have chosen to adopt a cautious attitude towards enforcing paid parental 
leave nationwide.
97 Employers’ contributions include general payroll tax and the following charges: old-age 
pension charge, survivor’s pension charge, sickness insurance charge, parental insurance 
charge, work injury charge, and labor market charge (Nordisk eTax 2017).
98 The OECD Family Database (2017) suggests that the public expenditure of Sweden on 
maternity and parental leave per child born ranks the fourth highest among OECD coun-
tries, following Luxemburg, Norway, and Estonia.
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Apart from fearing enormous expenses, there is a worry that providing 
wage compensations during a long leave period may foster ‘policy abuse’ 
(Kistler and Mcdonough 1975). An employee who receives wage replace-
ment during the leave period can be motivated to stay at home until the 
leave is used up, instead of returning to work as soon as possible. This 
would more or less reduce the vitality of the labor market.
Moreover, the lack of the welfare state tradition that features high tax 
and generous benefits, and the nonexistence of a common awareness of 
collective responsibility for childrearing produce an American tendency to 
deem pregnancy as a matter of personal choice (Grill 1996). The govern-
ment therefore has no reason to subsidize working parents during parental 
leave, nor should employers pay the bill (see Kistler and Mcdonough 1975).
4 What Happens in the Real World?
4.1 In Sweden
Sweden has refuted the worries about the negative effects of a generous 
parental leave policy by its extraordinary achievement in promoting the 
employment (in particular of women) and maintaining stable economic 
growth and competitive power of the country. While paid parental leave 
is a core element of the social protection system, it has played a positive 
role in increasing the vitality of the Swedish labor market, which indirectly 
contributes to the current robust economy of Sweden.
4.1.1 Consistent Participation and Employment of Women
Sweden has the third highest female employment rate (OECD 2017) and the 
highest maternal employment rate99 in the OECD  (OECD Family Database 
2016). Around 83 percent of Swedish mothers with at least one child aged 
0-14 are in employment, far beyond the OECD-31 average (66 percent) and 
the level reached by the US (65 percent) (OECD Family Database 2016). 
A study conducted by the Australian Government (n.d.) further divides 
mothers into mothers with the youngest child aged 0-5 and those with the 
youngest child aged 6-14. It is found that Sweden considerably outperforms 
OECD average, Canada, the US, New Zealand, the UK, and Australia 
respecting the employment rate of the first group, and performs the second 
best (following New Zealand)when it comes to the employment rate of 
the second group  (Australian Government n.d.). What proves particularly 
interesting is that Sweden distinguishes itself from t he other aforemen-
tioned countries and the OECD average because its first group has an even 
higher employment rate than the second group (see Australian Government 
99 According to the way OECD uses the term ‘maternal employment rate’, it refers to the 




n.d.). The same study indicates that the smallest difference (about 2 percent) 
between the employment rates of all females (25-54 years) and those with 
at least one child under 15 years old is found in Sweden (Australian Gov-
ernment n.d.). Furthermore, Sweden achieves a good balance between the 
female employment rate and the national birth rate. While maintaining the 
highest female employment rate, it has the second highest national birth 
rate among the selected countries. Sweden and the US form the starkest 
contrast: the national birth rate in Sweden is higher than that of the US, 
and on the other hand Swedish females are about13 percent more widely 
employed than their American counterparts (Australian Government n.d.).
In accordance with the research by Thévenon and Solaz (2013) which 
demonstrates the trends of employment rates in OECD countries from 
1970 to 2010, Sweden has an overall high employment level and one of the 
smallest disparities between male and female employment rates. In the 
light of the charts they provide, more than 90 percent of Swedish men were 
employed in 1970, while the labor force participation rate of women was 
slightly above 60 percent. However, female employment improved steadily 
in the following two decades. In the economic downturn of the early1990s, 
the employment rate of women even equaled that of men due to less 
decline. With the recovery of the macroeconomic and labor market condi-
tions since 1994, the employment rate of men has grown a little faster than 
that of women, but only a small gap has existed between the two (Thévenon 
and Solaz 2013).
In addition to the low gender differences in labor market participation, 
 Anxo and Niklasson (2008) find Swedes’ high employment continuity over 
the life course.  Contrary to the usual presumption, family formation and 
having children are positively related to the employment rates of both men 
and women in Sweden. The birth or adoption of children only exerts short-
term effects on male and female labor supply. Mothers, affected more than 
fathers, typically work full time before childbirth, take parental leave, and 
resume work on a part-time basis until the children reach a certain age. As 
children grow up, mothers’ working hours increase stably and gradually 
achieve a level similar to fathers’  (Anxo and Niklasson 2008).
Paid parental leave has contributed on two interrelated levels to the 
prominent employment records experienced by Sweden in the past few 
decades. Firstly, Sweden is a country with a high concentration of depen-
dent employees around the standard full-time norm (40 hours), due to the 
high union density and the also high degree of centralization and coordi-
nation of collective bargaining (Anxo and Niklasson 2008). A role of paid 
parental leave is helping the conversion of most women into full-time work-
ers and significant breadwinners. The positive relation between generous 
parental leave benefits and women’s continuous labor market commitments 
is not difficult to understand: it is a common and desperate need for women 
to reduce workload around the birth or adoption of a child and when the 
child is still very young, therefore, meeting the need is the wisest way to 
keep their full participation in the labor market and reinforce their bargain-
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ing power and position, despite the temporary work discontinuity (Anxo 
and Niklasson 2008).
Secondly, the endeavors made by Sweden to pursue the largest extent 
of employment equality between the two genders are embodied in the paid 
parental leave policy. By taking parental leave, fathers share the childcare 
burden with mothers, whose employment ties can then be strengthened. 
Once mothers increase their presence at work and improve the concentra-
tion on career development, accompanied by fathers’ taking more respon-
sibility for child care, the disadvantages of women in the labor market will 
be reduced. In principle, the more equal the division of parental leave, the 
greater women’s employment level will be improved. The non-transferable 
‘quota’ for each parent and the Gender Equality Bonus adopted by Swe-
den have promoted male usage of the paid leave benefits. In 2014, men 
accounted for 45 percent of parental leave benefit recipients in Sweden. 
The average length of men taking the 10 eligible days of temporary leave at 
the birth or adoption of a child was 9.2 days (Duvander et al. 2016). As for 
the paid parental leave, Swedish men have been found to use an increas-
ing number of days. In 2000, fathers took approximately 12 percent of all 
parental leave days, and the proportion had increased to 25 percent by 2014 
 (Duvander et al. 2016) and to 26 percent by 2015 (Försäkringskassan 2016). 
Although women are still the main users of the paid parental leave, the 
number of days taken by men and the percentage of couples who take paid 
parental leave days equally show a general upward trend.
4.1.2 Effects of the High Labor Participation on Economic Growth
 In accordance with the OECD economic surveys of 2017, Sweden’s eco-
nomic growth has been strong in recent years. Both of its output and GDP 
per capital have grown faster than in most other OECD countries, including 
the US. Despite the weak global environment, it is very likely that the Swed-
ish economy will remain robust over the coming years (OECD 2017).
The OECD Economic Surveys have also found out the main reasons 
behind Swedish economic performance. It is firstly attributable to the great 
emphases placed on scientific research and technological innovation – in 
particular the development of environment-friendly technologies. Addi-
tionally, Sweden gains competitive advantage from its high level of integra-
tion in the global value chains, the ability to supply high-value services, 
and the enhancement of business investment, all of which have pushed up 
the total factor productivity (TFP). Another important reason for the solid 
economic growth is the expanding labor force stemming from increasing 
immigration as well as rising labor participation in recent decades  (OECD 
2017). The positive effects that generous paid parental leave has wielded on 
the participation rate of women and on the overall employment level have 
become favorable conditions for Swedish economic development.
In short, the increase of female labor force participation elevates the 




to growing firm-level evidence, is positively related to innovation and prof-
itability (Noland et al., 2016; Hunt et al., 2015; Curtis et al., 2012; Catalyst, 
2011). Moreover, employment equality enables women to receive higher 
income, more opportunities for self-development, and better access to health 
and education, breathing new momentum into the economy (OECD 2017).
Simulations based on OECD long-run growth scenarios suggest that 
even though the gender gap in participation is already significantly small, 
a country may still have the potential to enlarge the size of the economy by 
narrowing the gap. In the case of Sweden, if the gender gap in participation 
can be halved by 2030, the GDP would be raised by 2.3 percent, and clos-
ing the gap completely would even raise 4.6 percent (OECD 2017; 2012). 
Thus, including but not limited to the benefit of paid parental leave, policies 
that seek to promote female participation in the labor market have been 
identified as a crucial part of the institutional foundation for a continuous 
strengthening of the Swedish economy.
4.1.3 Generosity Breeds ‘Policy Abuses’?
As analyzed above, Swedish employers and the government are willing to 
afford the ‘generosity’ due to the wide social acceptance of a high-tax-high-
benefit approach to social equality and the general consensus on the social 
and economic significance of supporting the reproduction of working fami-
lies. However, it should be noted that Sweden has developed some ‘smart’ 
rules that keep leave-takers active in the labor market rather than breeding 
abuses of the ‘generosity’.
Firstly, notwithstanding the high level of de-commodification and uni-
versalism of the Swedish welfare state, employees are not supposed to take 
the generous parental benefits for granted. As introduced in the previous 
section of this chapter, the income replacement rate varies with the number 
of days that are actually taken. Only a minimum level of wage compensa-
tion is provided during the last 90 (45+45) days. To receive wage-related 
compensation during the first 390 (195+195) days, both parents should work 
full time and have good work history prior to childbirth. Otherwise, just a 
basic level of compensation is available. This results in a strong incentive for 
parents to work hard before having a child and to resume work to earn full 
salary afterwards (Anxo and and Niklasson 2008).
Moreover, the built-in flexibility of the Swedish model leads parents to 
a more rational usage of the parental leave. Above all, the period in which 
the paid leave benefits may be used has been extended from 8 to 12 years. 
It means that parents are encouraged to disperse the paid leave days over a 
longer period to deal with parenting matters, instead of using the hundreds 
of days intensively after the birth or adoption of a child. Besides, after the 
child is 18 months old, a parent is only allowed to take paid parental leave 
in the form of part time work, which in fact pushes the parent to maintain 
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It is a reality that Swedish parents, not only fathers but also mothers, 
rarely withdraw from the labor market completely despite benefiting from 
the paid parental leave. What can be seen from this is that as long as the 
policy itself is well structured, employees’ enthusiasm for work is not 
reduced by the ease brought on by parental benefits.
4.2 In the US
4.2.1 American Families are not Less in Need of Paid Parental Leave
That most American families manage to survive with unpaid parental leave 
gives rise to the illusion that the entitlement to paid time off from work 
at the time of childbirth is not so imperative in the US as in the rest of the 
world. Nevertheless, the fact is that hundreds of thousands of American 
employees, in particular low-wage earners, struggle painfully between the 
responsibilities of parenting and ‘bringing home the bacon’ (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 2015). Working parents are not so much capable of coping 
with such a serious bind as they are compelled to confront it by all means. 
Paid parental leave is one of the deepest needs of American families.
In general, the past half century saw the substantial increase of Ameri-
can female labor force participation, from 33.9 percent in 1950 to 57 percent 
in 2014 (IWPR 2015).Women now comprise nearly half (48.6 percent) of 
the US labor force ( U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). It is particularly 
noticeable that the participation rate of women with children has increased 
significantly. Only 18.6 percent of married women with children under 6 
years of age took part in the labor force (Grill 1996). As of 2016, the labor 
force participation rates of mothers with children under 6 years and those 
with infants under a year old were respectively 64.7 percent and 58.6 per-
cent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).
The US is on its way to a ‘full employment society’ that expects all adults 
to work (Allen 1988: 273). The ‘traditional male-breadwinner / female-
homemaker model of family life’ is becoming an exception  (Gornick and 
Meyers 2004: 2). Instead, a dual-earner and dual-carer model prevails, under 
which the majority of families depend on the income of both spouses to 
make ends meet (Grill 1996) and have to find private solutions concerning 
the internal division of the caregiving duty (Gornick and Meyers 2004:2). 
Such a model is not unique to the US. However, in few other industrialized 
countries do working parents have to balance work and family to the same 
extent as in the US, due to ungenerous family policies with the FMLA at the 
core.
American families ‘make valiant efforts’ to accommodate, through 
‘reducing the employment ties of one parent’ (overwhelmingly the mother), 
taking turns to be the carer, or leaving a child at daycare (Gornick and 
Meyers 2004:2). None of these strategies is satisfying: reducing work attach-
ments may negatively influence the earning level and career development 




job market; ‘split-shift parenting’ increases the chance of family conflict 
and instability;  the high expenses100 of daycare do not entail a high quality 
of caregiving, but spur parents to keep working hard in order to sustain it 
(Gornick and Meyers 2004:2-3).
Taking unsubsidized parental leave is the last resort that working 
families turn to, and this only occurs when there is no other alternative. In 
particular, the first few months immediately following the birth or adop-
tion of a child are the foremost period that parents should spend together 
with the child. In the event of childbirth, at least the mother needs to stay 
home for a certain span of time, in order to recover from delivery and to 
take care of the physical and emotional well-being of the newborn. As 
for adoption, parents also need time to get acquainted with the child and 
cultivate parenthood. However, the price of taking unpaid leave is income 
loss that can substantially worsen the living standards of a family. The 2012 
FMLA survey by the Department of Labor discloses that over 60 percent 
of employees who took unpaid or partially paid leave (including parental 
leave) found it somewhat or very difficult to subsist during the leave period 
( U.S. Department of Labor 2015: 15; Klerman et al. 2012: 106). Eighty-four 
percent reported cutting down spending, 37 percent relying on savings, 
36 percent putting off paying bills, 30 percent accumulating debt, and 15 
percent seeking public assistance (U.S. Department of Labor 2015: 16; Kler-
man et al. 2012: 105). Parents taking unpaid leave to care for a new baby 
were found to be especially representative of those whose family budget 
suffered a devastating impact, due to the combination of a sharp increase 
of expenses and the lack of income replacement (Department of Labor 2015: 
16).
The desire of dual-earner and dual-carer families for the right to paid 
parental leave does not vary by country. What varies is the extent to which 
the legal and political reforms of a country take account of such a common 
need. As opposed to Sweden, whose family policy has been molded into 
what helps both parents achieve a good balance between work and family, 
the US has continued underestimating the significance of introducing paid 
parental leave in the federal level of policymaking.
4.2.2 Increasingly More Employers Favor Paid Parental Leave
Despite the standard set by FMLA, some American enterprises provide 
generous paid parental leave voluntarily (Levmore 2007). ‘From Amazon 
(20 weeks) and Abobe (26 weeks for new birth mothers) to ZestFinance (six 
months)’, these employers offer paid time-off benefits as they realize that 
the cost of doing so is outweighed by that of losing talented employees and 
finding and training new hires (Fast Company, Jan 28, 2016). In the book 
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Work Rules! Insights from Inside Google That Will Transform How You Live 
and Lead, the senior vice president of Google’s People Operations (HR) 
describes:
“The attrition rate for women after childbirth was twice our average attrition rate. Many moms 
coming back to work after twelve weeks felt stressed, tired, and sometimes guilty. After making 
the change in leave, the difference in attrition rates vanished. And moms told us that they were 
often using the extra two months to transition slowly back to work, making them more effective and 
happier when the leave ended. When we eventually did the math, it turned out this program cost 
nothing (Bock 2015: 215).”
According to the estimation by the American Management Association 
(2006), the direct cost of replacing a lost employee reached roughly a quar-
ter of, to up to five times, of the annual salary of the employee, regardless 
of the indirect losses. Offering paid parental leave is conductive to retaining 
existing employees because it prevents the severing of workforce attach-
ment. Parents may have stronger motivation to work before taking leave, 
and face less difficulty in returning to work. It is found that women who 
quit jobs prior to delivery are less likely to have paid leave than are those 
who continue to work, and that women who take paid parental leave after 
childbirth tend to work averagely one month longer than their counterparts 
who quit (Guendelman et al. 2006). Moreover, women who take paid leave 
demonstrate  a significantly higher likelihood of returning to work for the 
current employer compared with those who do not take any time off (See 
Klevens et al. 2015; Appelbaum and Milkman 2013; Houser and Vartanian 
2012).
Aside from avoiding unnecessary recruitment expenses, the adoption 
of paid parental leave has been recognized by many employers to have 
positive or nonnegative influence on the general performance of a business. 
To be specific, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York State, and Rhode 
Island have had disability insurance programs that give women ‘temporary’ 
or ‘short-term’ insurance benefits during time off taken before or imme-
diately after delivery (Houser and Vartanian 2012). Among these states, 
California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have successively implemented 
legislation to provide paid family leave, on top of the disability insurance 
benefits, for parents to bond with a newborn or adopted child. The legis-
lature of New York has adopted a new paid family leave program, to take 
effect in 2018 and be fully implemented by 2021( National Partnership for 
Women & Families 2016b). One additional state, Washington, took a similar 
legislative activity in 2007, but the program has not been implemented yet 
due to the lack of funding mechanisms (Montana  Budget & Policy Center 
2015). Hence, California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island are the jurisdic-
tions enforcing the most generous local parental leave policies in America 
so far. Surveys conducted in these three Sates present strong evidence that 
employers widely acknowledge the positive or neutral effects of paid leave 
on enterprise performance, disproving the general presumption that man-




California passed the nation’s first comprehensive Paid Family Leave 
(PFL) program in 2002. This program operates through the preexisting 
State Disability Insurance (SDI) system, which typically grants mothers up 
to four weeks of paid leave before delivery plus up to six/eight weeks of 
paid leave afterward at a doctor’s discretion (Appelbaum and Milkman 
2011:2). The PFL program supplements the SDI benefits with an additional 
six weeks of paid leave postpartum for infant-parent bonding (Houser and 
Vartanian 2012). The PFL program is available to both women and men, 
and nearly all private-sector (and nonprofit sector) workers are embraced, 
regardless of the size of an enterprise ( Appelbaum and Milkman 2011). 
However, the initial fear that employers would hold grudges against such 
a policy has not materialized. The California Society for Human Resource 
Management, a group of human resources professionals who objected to 
the passage of California’s PFL law, has admitted that the law is ‘less oner-
ous than predicted’ (National Partnership for Women & Families 2016a; 
Redmond and Fkiaras 2010). Few enterprises have been challenged by 
workers taking leave (Appelbaum and Milkman 2011). In the survey by the 
Center for Economic and Policy Research, which interviewed 253 California 
employers from both private companies and nonprofit organizations, most 
employers reported that PFL had either a ‘positive effect’ or ‘no noticeable 
effect’ on productivity (89 percent), profitability/performance (91 percent), 
and employee morale (99 percent)( Appelbaum and Milkman 2011). More-
over, small businesses report even more positive or nonnegative outcomes 
than large enterprises, despite being anticipated to suffer extraordinary 
hardship due to the introduction of the paid leave law (Appelbaum and 
Milkman 2013).
New Jersey enacted paid family leave in 2009, under the Family Leave 
Insurance (FLI) Program. Akin to California’s PFL, New Jersey’s FLI is an 
extension of its Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) system  ( Houser and 
Vartanian 2012). Women and men are entitled to wage replacement for a 
period of six weeks, when taking family leave for up to 12 months after the 
birth or adoption of a child or at any time for the care of a seriously ill fam-
ily member (Houser and Vartanian 2012). It is found that local businesses 
have experienced little difficulty adapting to the FLI law, regardless of size 
(National Partnership for Women & Families 2016a). In line with a survey by 
 Rutgers University in 2012, around 69 percent of the sample businesses with 
employees who had taken advantage of the paid leave benefits reported a 
positive or no effect on business (Fortune, Feb 5, 2015). According to another 
study interviewing several New Jersey employers, the FLI program reduces 
employee stress and improves morale among ‘leave-takers’ and their col-
leagues (Lerner and Appelbaum 2014).
Rhode Island enacted Temporary Caregiver Insurance (TCI) in 2013, 
which was also built on the TDI program of the state and designed to pro-
vide both medical and family leave benefits. What is worth mentioning is 
that the program of Rhode Island has improved upon those of California 
and New Jersey.  Employees have the reassurance of reinstatement to return 
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to work and to be protected from negative workplace retaliation for taking 
time off (National Partnership for Women & Families 2016a). Researchers 
of Columbia University conducted a study involving small- and medium-
sized food service and manufacturing employers in Rhode Island. The find-
ings indicate that the paid leave program has exerted no negative influence 
on employee workflow, productivity or attendance (See National Partner-
ship for Women & Families 2016a).
Because of the above benefits for businesses, American employers have 
become increasingly supportive of nationwide paid leave policies. A survey 
by Small Business Majority shows that a plurality of enterprises with fewer 
than 100 employees strongly or somewhat support paid leave programs 
(National Partnership for Women & Families 2015a; Small Business Majority 
2013). Besides, an increasing number of small and large businesses from 
states ranging from Florida to Wisconsin have offered testimonials in favor 
of paid leave, advocating the introduction of a national paid family and 
medical leave insurance program (National Partnership for Women & Fami-
lies 2015a; Better Workplaces, Better Businesses n.d.).
4.2.3 Financially Feasible
Whether paid parental leave is affordable for the US is the most crucial 
question that makes the federal legislature hesitant to introduce a national 
policy, despite the positive results of the legislation in California, New 
Jersey, and Rhode Island. By means of the existing tax structures and 
employee-paid contributions, these three states demonstrate the absolute 
feasibility to sustain the paid family leave programs.
To conclude, California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island all establish two 
separate insurance pools to fund disability insurance and family insurance. 
Benefits for medical leave and family leave come out of these insurance 
pools respectively (Montana Budget & Policy Center 2015). In California 
and Rhode Island, medical and family leave allowances are financed com-
pletely through employee payroll contributions. In New Jersey, disability 
insurance relies on both employee and employer contributions, but the 
paid family leave program is solely funded by employee-paid contributions 
(National Partnership for Women & Families 2015b).
Typically, payroll taxes are set at a fixed percentage of an employee’s 
annual earnings, which however cannot surpass a threshold (Montana 
Budget & Policy Center 2015).101 Provided an employee’s annual income 
exceeds the threshold, the excess part will not be taxed. As of 2017, Califor-
nia workers contribute 0.9 percent of their annual earnings with a taxable 
101 Establishing a taxable wage base is necessary for ensuring insurance benefi ts for program 
participants who really need them. The reason is that high-wage earners, if contributing 
premiums based on their entire income, “could potentially claim large benefi t amounts 
during leave, leaving less for low- and middle-income individuals…”(Montana Budget 




wage ceiling of $110,902 (California Employment Development Department 
2017), and Rhode Island employees contribute 1.2 percent of their annual 
income up to $68,100 ( RI Department of Labor and Training 2017). These 
employee-paid contributions fund both local medical and family leave pro-
grams. In New Jersey, employees contribute 0.1 percent on the first $33,500 
of their annual wage to fund the Family Leave Insurance program (New 
Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development 2017a). The cost of 
DTI is shared by employees and employers. The former contribute 0.24 per-
cent of their annual income up to the first $33,500, and the latter contribute 
between 0.1 and 0.75 percent into the disability insurance pool (New Jersey 
Department of Labor and Workforce Development 2017b).
Accordingly, the maximum worker contribution per year is $998 in 
California, $817 in Rhode Island, and $114 (34+80) in New Jersey. Based on 
the data disclosed by the U.S. Census Bureau (2013), the median annual 
earnings are slightly above $30,000 in California and Rhode Island, and 
close to $40,000 in New Jersey. Thus, median-wage earners in the three 
states respectively contribute around $23, $32 and $9.5102 per month. While 
it sounds like a heavy burden for employees to fund all or a part of paid 
leave programs, payroll deductions are very insignificant indeed  (Montana 
Budget & Policy Center 2015). New Jersey employers are obliged to fund a 
part of the disability leave program, but their actual contributions are also 
minimal, ranging from $ 3 to $21 per month for each employee.
The seemingly small contributions made by employees have managed 
to ensure that working parents receive a substantial income during leave. 
California provides an allowance equal to 55 percent (increasing to 60 and 
70 percent in 2018) of the previous earnings of the leave-taker, New Jersey 
67 percent, and Rhode Island 55 percent (Isaacs et al. 2017). It means that 
they equal many OECD countries in terms of the wage replacement rates 
during parental leave (See OECD Family Database 2017).
Furthermore, the paid leave programs based on payroll contributions 
have succeeded in embracing more employees in comparison with the 
FMLA. In California, Rhode Island and New Jersey, employees who need 
time off to bond with a new child, care for a sick family member, or recover 
from illness are in principle eligible for paid leave benefits, no matter how 
large or small the enterprises (Montana Budget & Policy Center 2015). How-
ever, all of the three states have adopted strategies that are analogous to the 
Swedish legislation. Employees should maintain good work history prior 
to taking leave, otherwise, may lose eligibility for paid leave benefits. For 
instance, an individual in New Jersey must have earned more than $8,300 in 
the past 12-month period or have worked for 20 weeks with a weekly wage 
of at least $165. Similarly, the condition for an employee in Rhode Island to 
receive paid leave is earnings of $10,800 in the previous 12-month period; 
alternatively, earnings in the past 12 months must amount to $3,600, with no 
102 In New Jersey, the median annual earnings surpass the taxable wage base of $33,500, 
therefore, the calculation is based on latter, rather than the former.
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less than $1,800 for each quarter, and the total amount should outnumber 
the highest quarter earnings by at least 150 percent (Isaacs et al. 2017).  To 
summarize, making good use of the existing tax-collection structures to 
finance the insurance pools may be a feasible approach to implementing 
paid parental leave programs throughout the country. This method proves 
to be more operable and less defective than providing paid leave through 
private insurers or motivating employers to give paid leave voluntarily by 
tax preference (Montana Budget & Policy Center 2015). The main challenge 
is that non-TDI states need to come up with alternatives to address opera-
tional and administrative issues (Montana Budget & Policy Center 2015).
 5 Final Remarks
Sweden and the US represent the most and the least adequate parental 
leave policies in the world. The regulations of these two countries diverge 
seriously in terms of the adoption of mandatory paid parental leave and 
the corresponding wage replacement, the length of the leave period, and 
the flexibility and coverage of the benefits. Such differences stem from the 
almost opposite views held by policymakers. Swedes believe that the social 
and economic benefits brought by a generous parental leave policy far out-
weigh the ensuing cost, while in the US, federal and most state legislatures 
caution against any economic turmoil that may result from the implementa-
tion of paid parental leave.
This is all very well in theory. In practice, however, Sweden may have 
taken a wiser route. This is demonstrated by the maintenance of its strong 
economic competitiveness and enviable equal gender employment, partly 
owing to the high level of work-family balance achieved by dual-earner 
households. The US, which insists on being an exception when paid 
parental leave is ubiquitous in today’s world, is outperformed by Sweden 
in many evaluations concerning economic growth, competitiveness, and 
employment. A more crucial fact is that not only American employees are in 
sore need of paid parental leave, but increasingly more employers begin to 
call for the adoption of paid parental leave throughout the country because 
of its significance for retaining employees and the positive or nonnegative 
influence on productivity. In addition, the current experiences of the states 
that have guaranteed paid parental leave above the federal standard have 
nullified the pessimistic presupposition that paid parental leave would 
cause resistance from employers and pose challenges to the government’s 
budget.
 Responding to the nearly obsolete question of whether paid parental 
leave needs to be provided becomes important again for the US, given 
that it has never been closer to the introduction of paid parental leave at a 
federal level than it is now. However, even if the US does take the first step 
towards a paid parental leave policy, its success cannot be ensured unless 




US may not transplant the Swedish model considering the differences in 
national conditions. To be brief, many factors such as the welfare state tradi-
tion and the production system – heavy dependence on large enterprises 
and multinationals – have given Sweden an advantage in implementing a 
generous parental leave policy. Due to a lacking in these favorable condi-
tions, the US needs to develop a paid parental leave policy that is adaptive 
to its domestic economic and social environment. Despite all this, Sweden 
sets a good example in establishing rules that have managed to coordinate 
the actual need of working families and the national economic objectives.
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6 Coordinating the ‘three channels’ of 
employee participation? Focusing on 
the British practices
Abstract
Concentrating upon the experiences of Great Britain, this chapter reflects on the 
 possibility of coordinating the three channels of employee participation, for the 
purpose of balancing the dual goals of higher productivity and greater employee 
voice. The recent attempts seen in Great Britain to align representative and direct 
participation is indeed based on these two channels respectively possessing some 
attributes which enable them to complement each other. However, the picture is far 
from complete. The ‘third channel’ – financial participation – may further enhance 
the representative and direct participation, and itself will become more efficient 
when united with the other two channels. In theory, the three channels are likely 
to form a self-complementary system, but a practical difficulty is that they rarely 
coexist and overlap in practice because of the different levels of popularity.






‘Employee participation’ in all its kaleidoscopic guises is underlain by an 
invariable ultimate purpose: to allow employees to ‘exert influence over 
their work, over the conditions where they work, and over the results of 
their work’ (Poutsma 2001). The various forms of employee participation 
fall into three basic channels. The first channel can be summarized as rep-
resentative participation (hereafter RP), as participation is achieved by the 
representation of formal institutions, such as trade unions, works councils 
or board-level representatives. The second channel is direct participation 
(hereafter DP), embracing informal and direct voice schemes like quality 
circle103, employees’ self-management, and autonomous work groups. 
Distinct from the preceding two channels whereby employees mainly have 
a say on working conditions or work content, the third channel – financial 
participation (hereafter FP) – gives employees access to the fruits of their 
work through employee share ownership plans or profit sharing schemes. 
This is believed to be capable of contributing to greater economic democ-
racy at work (D’art, 2003).
Despite the homogeneity in the nature of RP, DP and FP, they have 
rarely been taken as comparable channels of employee participation, and 
the interactions between the three have scarcely been examined in a bal-
anced way. As shown by literature, some studies probe into the relationship 
between FP and DP, both of which are comparatively vibrant in promoting 
the productivity of enterprises (e.g. Pendleton and Robinson, 2010; McNabb 
and Whitfield, 1998); some look at how typical voice arrangements – RP and 
DP – interact to enhance labor protection and job satisfaction (e.g. Gonzalez, 
2010; Dundon et al., 2006; Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005); a few others 
are devoted to investigate the position and impact of representative institu-
tions on the introduction and implementation of the other two channels (e.g. 
Pendleton and Poutsma, 2004; McHugh et al., 1999; Eaton and Voos, 1989). 
Apart from the divergent perspectives from which certain channels are con-
nected, previous research has put forward two opposite directions about 
how the channels in question might interact with each other. One direction 
can be concluded as ‘substitution’, indicating that (a) certain channel(s) can 
substitute for other redundant ones for they have overlapping functions. 
The other can be called ‘complementarity’, meaning that plural channels 
may coexist in a system and strengthen each other for congruent objectives.
This chapter proposes that neither higher organizational efficiency nor 
greater employee voice alone, but the balance between these two goals, 
ought to be enshrined in the reflection on possible connections between 
different channels of employee participation. In the past several decades, 
globalization has posed huge challenges to enterprises that struggle to 
103 A quality circle refers to a small group of employees ‘who work together and volunteer 
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survive the volatile global market, and productivity is becoming a crucial 
determinant to make or break situations. In the meantime, fighting for labor 
rights, no matter fundamental labor rights (e.g. the right against unfair 
dismissal) or the right to be heard in organizational decision-making, has 
never stopped in modern workplaces.
Given that each of the three channels of employee participation touches 
upon limited aspects in an enterprise’s reaching the dual objectives, it 
makes better sense to look at the possibility of cultivating their symbioses 
in one system. However, the urge to jump into so abstract an exploration is 
tempered by the realization that the three channels must be materialized 
and placed in context before the connections can be virtually discerned. 
Therefore, this study focuses on the practices in Great Britain104 since it 
has experiences in developing all of the three channels. Based on a brief 
introduction of the specific patterns of RP, DP and FP growing in the Brit-
ish soil, it firstly takes stock of the potential of RP and DP to join hands 
for better results, because of which there has been a perceptible tendency 
to interlock them two in recent years. Yet, RP and DP cannot complement 
each other in all respects. This chapter advances the idea that the manner FP 
influences power sharing and the redistribution of economic fruits is what 
the participation system requires. Provided FP is included in the ‘alliance’, 
it stands a good chance of remedying the drawbacks of RP and DP, and vice 
versa. Nevertheless, this conclusion is likely to be thwarted by the reality, 
since even in Britain the three channels have little or no overlap in many 
workplaces due to the low prevalence rates and coverage of RP and FP. 
A general observation is then provided in relation to why legislation can 
hardly change this situation.
2 British Patterns of the ‘Three Channels’
2.1 RP
In Britain, union representation has traditionally been the core of the RP 
channel. Prior to 2005, recognized unions even had a monopoly on worker 
representation in British enterprises.105 No second force could deprive 
104 As is well known, the ‘UK’ and ‘Great Britain’ are two different geographical concepts. 
The UK includes Great Britain, Northern Ireland and some smaller islands. This chapter 
focuses on the practices in Great Britain, instead of the UK, because the existing data 
concerning employee participation basically come from Great Britain, few from Northern 
Ireland or other parts of the country. While the legislation of the UK is implemented 
nationwide and some statistics cited in this chapter are valid for the whole country, the 
relevant practices in Great Britain are the major part that the author attempts to observe.
105 According to the UK’s legislation, employees in general have no legal right to be 
represented at the board-level. This has not been changed. With regard to the chances of 
employee representatives being informed and consulted about work issues, the year of 




unions of the leading position in exerting influence over British employ-
ment relations or act more vibrantly in safeguarding the workers’ voice. Yet, 
a noticeable phenomenon over the last 40 years is that the dominant role of 
unions has been seriously fading. In stark contrast to the peak of over13 mil-
lion union members throughout the UK in 1979, merely 6.5 million employ-
ees were trade union members in 2015, approximate to 24.7 percent of the 
whole working population (BIS106, 2016). The density of union members in 
the private sector was below 14 percent, while that of the public sector was 
considerably higher – close to 55 percent (BIS, 2016). For Britain, there were 
only 6.3 million union members in 2015, accounting for 24.4 percent of all 
employees.107
The reality that a high proportion of employees are not covered by 
unions and that few other legalized representation methods could make up 
for the widening unionism gap (e.g. national works councils and board-
level representation) create the need for alternative approaches to RP. Two 
major methods have been developed in Britain: joint consultative commit-
tees (JCCs) and stand-alone non-union representatives.
In relevant discourse JCCs are used interchangeably with works coun-
cils or representative forums, which function as information and consulta-
tion platforms. JCCs had existed in some British employment relations prior 
to the enactment of the Information and Consultation of Employees Regula-
tions (hereafter ICER) in 2004 – a consequence of transposing the EU direc-
tive on national level information and consultation (2002/14/EC). The ICER 
formally entitles all employees working in an enterprise that comprises 
more than 50 employees to request the employer to set up a consultative 
body. Simultaneously, enterprises are given considerable freedom to select 
the information and consultation procedures by negotiating an agreement 
with employees. If a valid pre-existing agreement (PEA) has already made 
certain arrangements concerning the information and consultation process 
within an organization, and employees do not request to change it, the 
employer need not even negotiate a new one. From multiple points of view, 
the obligation to inform and consult employee representatives is more flex-
ible and adaptable in the UK, and consultative bodies established under the 
ICER are not as onerous as the typical continental European works councils. 
However, despite the enterprise-friendly provisions, the ICER has not given 
rise to a blossoming of consultative bodies in British workplaces since its 
implementation. The Workplace Employment Relations Survey (hereafter 
‘WERS’) for 2011 reveals that the prevalence of JCCs dropped between 1998 
106 The abbreviation for ‘the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ of the UK.
107 Data concerning the total amount of British union members in 1979 and about the density 
of union members in the private and public sectors in Great Britain are not available. 
However, the consecutive statistics from 1989 to 2015 (see BIS 2016) suggest that the trade 
union membership level of Great Britain has always been slightly below that of the UK, 
in terms of both the total amount and proportion of union members. The scale of British 
unionism in 1979, and the present density of British union members can be generally 
reckoned based on the data for the UK.
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and 2004 but remained the same between 2004 and 2011, with only 7 percent 
of workplaces having JCCs (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013: 14-15).
Another avenue of representative voice is the stand-alone non-union 
representation. The appointed representatives do not connect with a trade 
union or sit on a JCC, but perform the general representative function on 
behalf of employees. At present, there is no formal legal structure for this 
representative method. In practice, it is introduced as seldom as JCCs. 
Workplaces with the presence of stand-alone non-union representation 
accounted for 7 percent of all workplaces in both 2004 and 2011, in accor-
dance with the WERS 2011. An exception to the general trend is that 10 
percent of workplaces belonging to  large private sector enterprises had 
stand-alone non-union representation in 2011, in comparison with 6 percent 
in 2004. (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013:15).
2.2 DP
DP methods vary from time to time, from enterprise to enterprise. It is 
not possibly to maintain stable and universal patterns of DP, because this 
comparatively innovative idea is employed by enterprises voluntarily, 
and management strategies are usually altered fast to adapt to internal 
reforms and the changing external environment. This is different from RP, 
for which the profound social and legal foundation provides the necessary 
environment for growing longstanding apparatuses like trade unions and 
works councils. Thus, in lieu of delineating the forms and coverage of DP 
in current British workplaces, what follows contextualizes the advent of the 
main DP methods as from 1979 and demonstrates the general trends in this 
regard.
On the whole, the dramatic changes in the political and legal environ-
ment of the UK since 1979, particularly the learning from the US neo-liberal 
model of employment relations in the 1980s and the reorientation towards 
a European social partnership model from the end of the last century (see 
Ewing 2003; Marchington 1998), have strongly impacted the evolution of 
every single channel of employee participation. However, in comparison 
with RP, of which the strength and scale have been influenced more notably 
than other aspects, DP can derive its own varying patterns and even the 
occurrence in British enterprises from the above social background.
To simplify, the year of 1997 is a cut-off point, dividing the last four 
decades into two distinct phases (See Ackers et al., 2003). From 1979 to 1997, 
the Conservative Government was in power, and insisted on weakening 
trade unions and withdrawing support for some collective bargaining struc-
tures, accompanied by the fall of employment in highly unionized sectors 
and the alteration to management policies, gave rise to trade unions’ sudden 
decline as of 1979. Meanwhile, the deepening globalization and worsening 
recession forced enterprises to try fresh means to improve organizational 
performance. Due to growing recognition of the value of human resources 




brought in what can be seen as early forms of DP in order to supplant the 
antagonism in employment relations and improve employee motivation 
and commitment to business success (Marchington and Wilkinson 2005). 
However, the methods were confined to top-down information sharing and 
bottom-up problem solving schemes, and employees had no substantial 
right to participate in decision-making at higher levels (Wilkinson 2001). 
According to a 1992 Marchington et al. study that depicts the 1980s and 
1990s employee participation initiatives in Britain on the basis of observing 
25 company cases,108 the downward information sharing was basically by 
means of newspaper and briefing systems, and upward problem solving 
apparatus in the main referred to suggestion schemes and customer care/
total quality management (TQM). Employee reports and quality circles 
were occasionally seen in a small number of enterprises.
The Labour Party’s leadership by a landslide victory in 1997 started a 
new period of employee participation. Under the name ‘New Labour’, a 
bunch of policy changes and legislation following the election reshaped 
participation methods markedly post-1997. A closer engagement with 
European social policy, more active governance of the labor market, and a 
renewed attention to employee representation (in particular through unions 
and consultative bodies) as an essential approach to social partnership are 
the most significant characteristics of the legal and political environment 
of this period (Ackers et al. 2003). This is the well-known backdrop of the 
increasing public concern with the large representation gap over the past 
two decades and the context of the enactment of the ICER in 2004, but the 
effects on the development of DP are also perceptible.
Overall the DP has been more widely adopted by British enterprises 
since 1997, however, in no way wedded to the initial ways of downward 
communication and upward problem solving. In accordance with the 2003 
Marchington et al. study, methods embracing all employees and making 
for management briefing, such as regular meetings with entire workforce, 
began to be substituted for previous localized or elitist techniques, for 
example the quality circles(Ackers et al. 2003). In line with the findings of 
2004 WERS, slightly more enterprises started utilizing regular newsletters
than in 1998, with the application of suggestion schemes dropping a little in 
general. However, neither of these two methods was found to be in a domi-
nant position. A further spread of systematic use of management chain could 
be seen, but what really came to the front was the broad introduction of 
noticeboards and employee surveys (See Kersley et al. 2006: 17-19). The abrupt 
prevalence of modern electronica media, including email and intranet (See 
Kersley et al. 2006: 17-19), had tended to supplement and even replace the 
traditional paper and oral methods, and more importantly, the one-way 
information sharing and problem solving had gradually been fused by 
these new methods.
108 This is indeed a part of the longitudinal research conducted by Marchington et al..
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DP has a high level of presence in the current British workplaces. In 
particular meetings with entire workforce or team briefings were adopted by 
90 percent of workplaces in the private sector and 97 percent in the public 
sector, according to the 2004 WERS. As the second and third most popular 
methods, the coverage of noticeboards and systematic use of management chain
respectively reached 86 percent and 81 percent in the public sector, and 72 
percent and 60 percent in the private sector. Suggestion schemes were the 
least prevalent, but still were introduced by 30 percent of workplaces in 
both private and public sectors (See Kersley et al. 2006: 18).
2.3 FP
It is the favorable legislation offering both employees and employers tax 
incentives that has underlain the introduction of the first FP schemes and 
their expansion in the UK since 1978 (Poutsma 2000). The Labor Party was 
in alliance with employer associations and trade unions against the adop-
tion of any FP form, but the rise to power of the Conservative party in 1979, 
which followed the Liberal Party109 in approval of FP, successfully cleared 
the obstacles standing in the way of FP’s advancement. In consequence, dif-
ferent types of statutory profit sharing, share ownership and share option 
schemes together with a variety of non-statutory schemes have been devel-
oped in practice, and the UK becomes one of the European countries with 
the highest incidences of FP (Wilke, Maack and Partner 2014).
Two categories of FP have been prevailing in British enterprises. The 
first category comprises profit sharing schemes called Profit-Related-Pay 
(PRP), which connect a part of employees’ payments or bonuses to changes 
in the profit levels of their organizations (Wilke, Maack and Partner 2014; 
WERS 2011; Poutsma 2000). The second category encapsulates four types 
of employee share ownership plans.110 The most prevalent ones are the 
Save-as-You-Earn (SAYE) Share Option programs, in which employees 
who pay fixed monthly contributions for a certain duration are offered 
an option to buy shares of their enterprise at a fixed (and often reduced) 
price free of income tax or simply get the savings back in cash. Additionally, 
Share Incentive Plans (SIP), another kind of tax efficient and all-employee 
schemes, are becoming particularly popular with small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) that are incapable of offering their own share option 
schemes. Under SIP, SMEs can tailor plans to suit their own organizational 
conditions and objectives. SIP actually replace the approved Share-based 
Profit Sharing Schemes in existence between 1978 and 2002. In addition to 
the aforementioned all-employee schemes, Company Share Option Plans 
(CSOP) and Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) have been imple-
109 The Liberal party merged with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1988, forming 
today’s Liberal Democrats.





mented. CSOP permit an enterprise to provide selective employees – usu-
ally key managers and employees –  at its discretion with a chance to buy 
shares with discount on the stock market price. Similarly, EMI programs 
purport to facilitate smaller and risk-exposed enterprises’ recruitment and 
staff retention via offering tax-sheltered share options to selected employees 
(Wilke, Maack and Partner 2014; Poutsma 2000).
3 A tendency to interlock the DP and RP in a binary system
Closely linked with the government’s reemphasis on employee representa-
tion after 1997, a transformation of employee participation in British enter-
prises is that the erstwhile model of separating DP and RP has gradually 
been abandoned. Instead, efforts have been made to bridge their divisions 
(Ackers et al. 2003), as it is found that optimal results are achieved when the 
two go hand in hand (Purcell and Hall, 2012). The practicability of allying 
the direct and representative methods of employee participation stems from 
the fact that their different inherent attributes enable them to complement 
and strengthen each other in many ways.
3.1 Defects of RP
 The operational mechanisms of trade unions have been established upon 
the presupposed antagonism existing between employers and organized 
labor, which naturally entails the rigidity of dispute settlement and person-
nel practices. This disagrees with the volatile global market and enterprises’ 
need for higher efficiency. In another respect, unions’ uppermost mission is 
the so-called ‘redistributive’ function – fighting against employers who try 
to monopolize all the surpluses. Yet, the common pursuit of flexibility in 
recent decades makes it increasingly difficult for union alliances to realize 
redistributive objectives through protective labor legislation combined with 
industry-wide or sectoral collective bargaining (Estreicher 2009). Redis-
tributive bargaining has been undergoing an inevitable weakening and 
decentralization in the UK and many other countries around the world (see 
Katz 1993; Freeman and Gibbons 1993), giving way to firm-based negotia-
tions and other plant-level instruments that promote workers’ objectives in 
a manner favorable to enterprises’ competitiveness (Estreicher 2009).
Compared with unions and collective bargaining, JCCs and stand-alone 
non-union representation are ‘softer’ ways of representation possessing 
little power to affect managerial decision-making and profit redistribu-
tion, because they do not hold labor’s main weapon – organizing strikes 
to threaten more advantaged employers. The intention behind JCCs and 
stand-alone non-union representation is to foster labor and management 
cooperation with the purpose of enlarging the enterprise ‘pie’, rather than 
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A defect shared among all representative methods is that the formal 
procedures, no matter collective bargaining or meetings with different types 
of representatives, better suit problems which have a relatively significant 
bearing on employees’ interests and can be solved by representatives’ deal-
ing with the employer (e.g. an envisaged threat to employment, substantial 
changes in contractual relations, occupational safety and health, etc.). This 
means that the need of an organization for informal daily communication 
cannot be met through representative structures. This problem is especially 
serious when it comes to the SMEs. The rapid expansion of SMEs has been 
seen in the UK and most other parts of the world. However, the fact that 
representative methods are inherently designed for the resolution of big 
formal issues limits their own practicability in SMEs, where quick and 
straightforward exchange of opinions between the employer and employees 
is more requisite than representative communication. In line with the 2004 
data, 94 percent of all private sector enterprises in the UK fell into the scope 
of SMEs,111 but merely 7 per cent of employees in small enterprises and 10 
percent in medium-sized enterprises were members of trade unions (Forth 
et al. 2006: 49). Furthermore, there was a slight drop in the union coverage 
of SMEs and other workplaces with more than 5 employees from 2004 to 
2011, corresponding to the general downward trend reflected by the official 
statistics covering all employees (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013:14). Meanwhile, 
British SMEs have shown weak reliance on non-union representation. The 
WERS 2004 suggests that just 10 percent of workplaces belonging to SMEs 
were covered by consultative bodies, and 6 percent had a stand-alone non-
union representative (Forth et al. 2006: 49-50).
3.2 DP Complements RP by Adding Flexibility and Diversity
As RP methods are not always effective in reaching better organizational 
performance and greater employee voice, DP – a mild and flexible channel 
of employee participation – has a role to play and breathes new life into 
the employee participation system. Firstly, expressing ideas and exchanging 
information face to face lower the cacophonies in employment relation-
ships, and help enterprises adapt to the current economic environment in 
favor of cooperation.
Secondly, whilst time or money-consuming channels – like collective 
bargaining or meetings between the management and employee representa-
tives – function periodically to cope with significant collective problems, 
most routine matters can be tackled through multiple forms of DP. To put it 
another way, when the representative tools stick to those underlying princi-
ples or ‘common rules’ of working life, employees’ direct involvement brings 
innovation, experimentation and diversity (see Strauss and Hammer 1987).
111 There are no globally universal defi nitions of SMEs. In the UK, small firms are defined as 





Thirdly, the challenges that the special situation of SMEs poses to rep-
resentative methods highlight the meaning of DP in these workplaces. It is 
true that SMEs are less likely to have representative tools or other formal 
social dialogue at the company level (Voss and Wilke, Maack and Partner 
2009), but employers that seek to address problems in a democratic way 
within the company can still resort to employees’ direct involvement. More-
over, from the point of the issues that different participation channels are 
concerned with and the practical results, DP, by nature, is a better ‘fit’ in 
small enterprises than RP (Forth et al. 2006: 51).
3.3 The Merits versus the Achilles’ Heel of DP
As concluded by extensive studies(e.g. Bhatti et al. 2011; EPOC 1999; 
Wallace 1995; Randall 1990), DP can reinforce employees’ attachment, 
commitment and allegiance to their organization, which then give rise to 
greater endeavor, less absenteeism, reduced sickness and other positive 
effects on productivity. It is particularly noticeable that a five-year EPOC112
survey interviewing managers in around 5,800 workplaces of 10 European 
countries, including the UK, indicates that the positive effects of DP on 
throughput time, cost, output and quality were present in most of above 
investigated undertakings. More importantly, these effects were intensi-
fied as the concrete forms of DP increased and the scope of each form was 
enlarged (Sisson 2000).
The above potential of DP stems from the likelihood that it promotes job 
quality from multiple perspectives. On one hand, delegating some discre-
tion to employees or offering them multiple mechanisms for information 
sharing and communication does result in better work relations ( Gonzalez 
2010), high levels of autonomy (Valeyre et al. 2009), increased job satisfac-
tion (Bauer 2004), and greater sense of achievement and trust (Green and 
Tsitsianis 2005; Ramsay, Scholarios, and Harley 2000). The experiences of 
British workplaces specifically disclose that employee direct involvement 
leads to superior labor productivity because of the higher managerial 
responsiveness to worker voice in related programs (Bryson et al. 2006).
On top of spiritual incentives that make a job feel more decent, DP 
may bring benefits in such aspects as salary level, job security and career 
prospects (Gonzalez 2010). These are areas where employees usually show 
the greatest concern. By rights, committed employees who make special 
contributions to organizational innovations or productive efficiency in DP 
programs should have access to promotion or bonuses. When the organi-
zation’s productivity is elevated, at least a part of the additional surplus 
should be used to improve employees’ remuneration (or keep wage level 
unchanged, or at least reduce salary cut) and guarantee employment sta-
112 EPOC is the abbreviation for a research project titled ‘Employee Direct Participation 
in Organisational Change’, which was carried out by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement and Living and Working Conditions from 1993 to 1998.
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bility (or minimize job loss) (Strauss and Hammer 1987). Provided that an 
enterprise makes these efforts to keep DP mutually beneficial, employees’ 
enthusiasm for participation is more likely to be sustained. In light of the 
findings by Forth and Millward (2004) based on the data from WERS1998, 
British DP practices had an 8% wage premium in comparison with tradi-
tional management, and the wage premium was only in existence under 
the condition that employees’ involvement was supported by job security 
guarantees. An earlier study by Fernie and Metcalf (1995) reveals that the 
endeavors made by British enterprises to increase employees’ interest in DP 
contributed to the employment growth between 1984 and 1990.
However, it cannot be guaranteed that an employer must value the 
sustainability of the cooperative relationship in DP programs by sharing 
the surplus outcomes with employees. After all, DP is a high performance 
strategy adopted by the management on a voluntary basis, and the law is 
unable to oblige the employer to distribute the growing profits in a ‘fair’ 
way. It is quite probable that productivity improvement is appropriated 
by the enterprise itself to gain greater flexibility in crew sizes, production 
standards and job assignment, which can result in more lay-offs, decreas-
ing wages, and the deterioration of job quality (Gonzalez 2010; Levitan and 
Werneke 1984). This is the Achilles’ heel of DP, where the opportunities 
to take part in managerial decision-making and influence organizational 
changes may be turned into ‘traps’ for employees.
3.4 RP Underpins the ‘Healthy’ Growth of DP
Early in 1977, the UK Bullock committee foresaw that participation at top 
level or representative organizations would facilitate the development of 
lower levels of participation (see Dickson 1981). This prediction has proved 
true by different evidence. The EPOC survey indicates that either work 
councilors or workplace trade union officials, depending on specific condi-
tions of targeted EU member states, can be crucial actors for the successful 
introduction of DP. The amount of forms, scope of each form, and economic 
performance of DP are positively influenced (Sisson, 2000: 10). Data from all 
the ten involved countries are persuasive, including the UK. To be concrete, 
26 percent of the investigated British workplaces with RP found employee 
representative involvement ‘very useful’ in the introduction of DP, and 61 
percent ‘useful’ (Sisson, 2000: 10).
RP can play a positive proactive part in sculpturing DP programs for 
the following reasons. Firstly, employee representatives inform the man-
agement of collective rather than individual viewpoints on the design and 
operation of DP plans, which helps address issues of common concern in 
the earliest stages (Eaton and Voos, 1989). Furthermore, possessing rela-
tively more expertise and experiences, employee representatives often bring 
necessary legitimacy to the introduction of innovative programs and pro-
vide the management with constructive suggestions (Cutcher-Gershenfeld 




plans per se are the products of imposition from above (Elden, 1976), hence 
lays a good normative foundation for worker participation (Witte, 1980: 
155).
As to the result, Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy (2005) reveal that the 
overall level of employee voice is lower in British workplaces that foster DP 
without the presence of RP than where DP is endorsed by indirect voice via 
trade unions or other representative bodies. Purcell and Georgiadis (2007) 
further point out that not only the ‘sonority’ of employee voice should be 
based on the complementation with workplace representation, but also the 
realization of the maximum value of direct, face-to-face communication.
As already stressed, the most  salient defect of DP is the risk that 
employers might increase the flexibility in job assignment and in labor costs 
after exclusively absorbing the productivity improvement that is supposed 
to benefit not only enterprises but also employees. Active workplace repre-
sentation may play a positive role in this scenario.
Firstly, at a general level, collective bargaining, consultation, and seri-
ous dialogues between stand-alone representatives and the management 
are all conducive to reaching an agreement on how to avoid or at least 
reduce compulsory redundancy and wage reduction. The function of trade 
unions is especially worth specifying. In line with the study by Bryson 
(2004: 481), many British trade unions bargain over employment levels 
as well as wages. This is different from the usual understanding that the 
two parties bargain over wages while leaving employment levels decided 
by the employer unilaterally. In consequence, collective bargaining over 
employment levels and wages is found to reduce the occurrence of existing 
employees being dismissed (Bryson 2004: 494-5).113 From this perspective, 
the danger embedded in DP is ameliorated.
Another intriguing point is that some British trade unions have been 
found to take part in ‘managing’ job reduction. Relying on the bargaining 
power, job security guarantees are imposed that forbid compulsory redun-
dancies (White and Bryson 2013: 857-9).114 The aforementioned study by 
Forth and Millward (2004) emphasizes that the productivity improvement 
brought about by DP merely gives rise to a wage premium in workplaces 
where job security guarantees exist, and that there is a positive relation 
between union strength and the amount of the premium.
113 This argument does not contradict most empirical evidence suggesting that in the UK 
union presence has negative effects on workplace employment because of increasing 
labor costs. According to Bryson (2004), what has positive effects on workplace employ-
ment is the collective bargaining over employment levels as well as wages, for which the 
forgoing relationship between workplace dismissal and union presence is weakened.
114 White and Bryson (2013:859) add that Job security guarantees entail a promise not to 
impose compulsory redundancies, but the side effect is that they push up labor adjust-
ment costs and discourage employers to hire more labor. However, this just implies the 
negative infl uence on employment fostering. The current employed ‘insiders’, including 
participants of DP programs, are the benefi ciaries of job security guarantees.
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Should the above internal solutions fail, trade union officials and other 
employee representatives can still intervene ‘externally’. To be specific, 
employees are usually provided with judicial remedies or arbitration 
procedures to protect their own employment rights. In the British context, 
an employee is entitled to complain to an employment tribunal that the 
dismissal is unfair and that the wage reduction is a breach of the employ-
ment contract, provided this employee is laid off or receives a significant 
pay cut as a consequence of the employer abusing the additional surplus. 
In this situation, employee representatives can offer support to the involved 
employees by making and presenting their claims, representing them at the 
tribunal hearing, or assisting with other legal matters.
4 The Necessity to Incorporate FP into the ‘Alliance’
Because of the traditional doctrine that FP is not germane to employee 
voice, the relevant discussions over the relations between voice schemes 
rarely include how FP interacts with RP and DP. However, when attention 
turns to the subject of ‘employee participation’, it is hard to disconnect FP 
from the other two channels. As is defined at the very beginning of this 
chapter, the essence of employee participation is to wield influence on 
managerial decision-making and organizational changes. FP certainly 
serves this purpose but in a different manner from that of RP and DP. The 
way FP affects power sharing and the redistribution of economic results is 
an advantage that can complement RP and DP opportunely. In the mean-
time, FP has limitations that need remedying by the other two channels. 
This arouses enlargement of the current binary ‘alliance’.
4.1 FP Helps Relieve the Fading Redistributive Function of Unions
Consistent with the general global trend, British trade unions’ involvement 
in pay determination becomes increasingly feeble. In both private and 
public sectors, the coverage of collective bargaining over pay has declined 
dramatically in the past three decades. By 2011 only 7 percent of private 
sector workplaces bargained with unions over employee pay, and just 16 
percent of private sector employees had the pay set by collective bargaining. 
In comparison, in the public sector, 57 percent of workplaces bargained over 
pay, and 44 percent of employees had pay set by collective bargaining (Van 
Wanrooy et al. 2013: 22). This means that the vast majority of private sector 
employers and nearly half of public sector employers determine pay unilat-
erally. What is interesting is that in the private sector, where pay bargaining 
was extraordinarily infrequent, a proportion of workplaces introduced 
FP – 33 percent had PRP schemes and 10 percent had share plans (See Van 
Wanrooy et al. 2013: 25).
For employers, FP is a part of the systematic performance and appraisal 




commitment. From the perspective of employees’ interests, however, FP 
may provide extra opportunities to share organizational success, especially 
in the situation where the traditional negotiation mechanism has lost 
ground. FP enables employees to acquire payoffs through capital income 
or profit sharing that are calculated by a formula or a rate, depending on 
the agreements of different schemes. This differs from collective bargaining, 
which seeks to absorb profits in order to improve employees’ regular wages, 
pensions, bonuses and other fringe benefits (Mishel and Walters 2003). If 
enterprises make a profit, financial participants will receive a supplement to 
the fundamental remuneration. Equally, when enterprises suffer a loss, par-
ticipants gain a reduced premium or no premium, which has no impact on 
the normal wages or benefits. Therefore, FP is a flexible reward instrument 
that promotes the pluralism of compensation tools (Gevers and Cludts 2002).
Yet, one practical problem is that many FP schemes are designed exclu-
sively for managerial employees, significantly limiting the potential of FP 
to remedy the weakness and rarity of collective bargaining. The WERS 2011 
shows that 84 percent of British workplaces where PRP were adopted and 
93 percent of workplaces with share schemes covered 0 percent of non-man-
agerial employees (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013: 25), whose incomes especially 
need supplementing by additional means in the absence of pay bargaining. 
A saving grace is that the majority of the remaining workplaces with PRP 
or share schemes had 100 percent of non-managerial employees covered 
(Van Wanrooy et al. 2013: 25). In these workplaces, the positive meaning of 
FP as an alternative tool for profit redistribution between employers and 
employees has been maximized.
4.2 Employee-Owned Shares with Voting Rights May Make up for the 
Lack of A Statutory Right to Board-level Representation
There is no statutory basis for employee representatives in the UK to partici-
pate at board level, for which employees lose access to  company informa-
tion and top-level policies that might not otherwise be available to them 
in other occasion (Kassalow, 1989). In theory, employee share plans may 
change this situation.
Participants of employee share schemes have no statutory voting rights 
in the UK. Employee shareholders’ voting rights and the conditions under 
which they can vote are determined at the enterprise’s discretion. Provided 
an enterprise renders full or substantial voting rights, employee sharehold-
ers will be allowed to vote all or a wide range of issues as non-employee 
shareholders. In this case, employees have certain leverage to affect busi-
ness decisions at general meetings of shareholders, and may be able to 
nominate representatives to company boards.
However, as mentioned above, the concentration of employee shares in 
the hands of managerial employees is a realistic problem. In the overwhelm-
ing majority of workplaces with employee share plans, non-managerial 
employees are completely excluded. There is no given opportunity to send 
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representatives to company boards by virtue of the voting rights carried by 
shares. Only in the tiny minority of workplaces where share plans carrying 
voting rights embrace non-managerial employees, might the composition of 
board members be altered.
4.3 FP May Enhance Employees’ Enthusiasm for DP
In DP, outstanding individuals may get promotions or salary raises, but 
these rewards are at the discretion of the management. The lack of estab-
lished mechanisms to share company results poses a challenge to the 
sustainability of employees’ motivation, because ‘economic men’ in the 
modern society demand decided financial incentives for long-term com-
mitment, innovative ideas, and the disclosure of production-relevant infor-
mation. In the words of Levine and Tyson (1990: 209), “ sustained effective 
participation requires that employees be rewarded for the extra effort which 
such participation entails, and that they receive a share of any increased 
productivity or profits…’’
FP may provide a solution to this issue in that it distributes productivity 
gains within a comparatively larger scope and in a fixed way. This indirectly 
converts part of the organization’s success resulting from employee involve-
ment into expectable and reified feedback for participants. However, this 
assumption is again subjected to the query as to how widely a FP scheme 
covers non-managerial employees. Whilst DP methods are usually applied 
to most or all of non-managerial employees, it is very probable that FP 
schemes are just available to a small part of non-managerial employees, or 
none. The meaning of FP as an incentive mechanism for DP is out of the 
question when the two have no overlap at all. With this fact in mind, it 
would be more pragmatic to limit the discussion here to enterprises whose 
FP programs let in non-managerial employees. In these workplaces, FP may 
strengthen employees’ enthusiasm for DP on a second level: in addition to 
functioning as a channel for profit feedback, FP makes sense to the control 
of the risk that productivity improvement due to DP adversely threatens 
employees’ job security and wage levels. The reasons are as follows.
First of all, DP is believed to be particularly risky in the UK and other 
liberal market economies because the widespread short-termism ampli-
fies employees’ distrust and impels employers to break promises (Godard 
2004). In fact, in an enterprise where non-managerial employees are covered 
by share plans – an extreme example is an employee-owned business115, 
a (large) proportion of employees become the capital owners themselves. 
The problem with employees’ trust is unlikely to be very serious. On the 
contrary, employees who are also capital providers may have stronger incli-
nation towards the use of DP, since its potential to improve organizational 
115 In an employee-owned business, employees don’t necessarily possess extremely high 





efficiency and performance has been perceived. In some cases, employee 
shareholders are endowed with substantial voting rights and, therefore, are 
able to wield influence on collective redundancy and wage reduction at the 
general meeting of shareholders or by the action of their representatives 
on company boards. Thus, the chance of deterring abuses of the increased 
surpluses grows.
Secondly, both employee share plans and profit sharing schemes 
disperse profits and dilute the probability that increased surpluses are all 
absorbed by the management to raise the flexibility of crew sizes. If an 
employee is eventually dismissed, benefits from FP will become a ‘silver 
lining’. For participants of profit sharing schemes, there are usually mul-
tiple ways to take out their benefits after the employment relationship is 
terminated, depending on the rules set forth by scheme documentation. For 
participants of employee share plans, more actions can be taken. Choices 
include holding the shares to get periodical dividends, making a profit by 
selling the shares to the former employer, or trading with someone else if 
there is no agreement requiring these shares to be sold back to the employer. 
The employer can also be taken to court on grounds of claims that the dis-
missal violates the fiduciary rights of the employee shareholder, in which 
case, employers must prove to the court that there are business justifications 
and that the dismissal is not an excuse to freeze the employee shareholder 
out of the investment.
4.4 FP Is More Effective When Combined with DP
As suggested earlier, FP schemes are open to non-managerial employees in 
the minority of British workplaces. These workplaces may benefit from the 
motivational influence of FP on productivity. The reason is that enhanced 
employee interest in collective success and in long-term organizational 
performance is likely to cause greater work effort, lower turnover, long-
term commitment, reduced absenteeism and so forth. Yet, these positive 
productivity effects are unlikely to happen unless employee qualms and 
inertia are eliminated.
In the first place, an inclination to shirking or ‘free-riding’ is easily 
bred, because each participant of profit sharing schemes is only offered a 
small fraction of additional profits (Vaughan-Whitehead, 1995). Without 
efficacious mechanisms for mutual monitoring, this kind of participant 
indifference is likely to become serious. The same is true of employee share 
plans and all other group-based incentive systems facing the ‘1/N problem’ 
(Pendleton and Robinson, 2010).
Moreover, employees are cautious about taking responsibility without 
having corresponding rights to participate in managerial decision-making. 
To some extent, employees are more acquainted with production-relevant 
information. When they are granted few opportunities to give suggestions 
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DP is a potential ‘antidote’ for the above issues. Firstly, direct com-
munication and information exchange strengthen the connection between 
individual performance and company success, and simultaneously make 
up for the insufficient power of non-managerial participants to influence 
decision-making in FP. This has been well capsulized in the study of Levine 
and Tyson (1990: 209): ‘Just as participation can lead to demands for profit 
sharing, profit sharing can lead to demands for participation. When there is 
profit sharing, workers’ incomes depend on the decisions of the firm, and 
workers want to have a say in these decisions.’ Secondly, through teamwork 
and cooperative behaviors, DP programs produce positive peer pressure 
(Conyon and Freeman, 2004) and help eliminate the tendency of shirking 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 1995). In other words, DP fosters the relevant cogni-
tive potential of employees as well as a work climate that repels shirking 
(Dong-One, 2005). Finally, letting risk-averse employees directly take part 
in business operations is an essential way to provide reassurance, because 
more control rights are needed in order to limit personal exposure to risks 
(Pendleton and Robinson, 2010).
4.5 RP Drives the March of FP
In general, FP schemes are introduced by British employers on a unilateral 
basis, in a favorable environment provided by the government. While not 
being so crucial actors, trade unions, JCCs and other methods of employee 
representation have played a part in shaping relevant schemes. To start 
with, the introduction and design of FP are usually considered significant 
activities that change the economic situation of an enterprise, therefore, 
subject to consultation with employee representatives. One merit of formal 
dialogues between management and employee representatives is that inte-
grated opinions on FP are transmitted so that the legitimacy and efficiency 
of FP schemes can be improved and employees’ fear of unreasonable risks 
is more or less reduced.
Above the company level, the transforming positions and approaches 
of the national union confederation have had important impact on the 
routes taken by member organizations. British trade unions used to take a 
negative stance against the introduction of FP because of a lack of trust in its 
prospects and effects and a fear of losing employee support for independent 
representation. However, most unions adopted a disinterested approach, 
with no specific policies made on profit sharing or employee share plans 
(Poutsma 2001: 95). The major trade union confederation in Britain –  Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) – did not take a quite positive view of FP until the 
1990s, when many state-run enterprises were privatized and some trade 
unions were actively engaged in defining employee share schemes(Wilke, 
Maack and Partner 2014).
Although the TUC is a typical weak union confederation, it has been 
committed to the development of FP in recent decades. By formulating 




ing FP proposals from employers and to promote the spread of schemes 
that meet safeguards centering on equal opportunities for all employees to 
participate, protection of employees from unreasonable risks, prohibition 
of wage substitution and the consent of employees and employee represen-
tatives  (Pendleton and Poutsma 2004). Meanwhile, it has stressed that FP 
should be introduced alongside other channels that improve cooperation 
and trust between the management and employees and facilitate participa-
tion in decision-making (Pendleton and Poutsma 2004). With these sensible 
and encouragement-oriented ideas seeping gradually into lower levels of 
the collective bargaining system, many affiliated unions have experienced 
a shift in attitude towards FP, from outright opposition to conditional 
acceptance. Some local unions even take the initiative to propose schemes 
that conform to the principles put forward by the TUC (Wilke, Maack and 
Partner 2014). In addition to providing constructive guidance, the TUC used 
to get involved in relative legislation on FP by virtue of its nominee on the 
Inland Revenue Advisory Group that helped to design the Share Incentive 
Plan and Enterprise Management Incentives (Pendleton and Poutsma 2004). 
Undoubtedly, it was a golden opportunity to propagandize its main ideas 
regarding the implementation of FP.
Notably, what the TUC has insisted on is conductive to minimizing the 
threats that the inappropriate design of FP schemes poses to participants’ 
economic security, forming sustainable cooperative relationship between 
employers and employees, and restructuring workplace participation via 
allying FP with other means. In particular demanding to open FP schemes 
to all employees concerns the elimination of the serious participation 
inequality between managerial and non-managerial employees in Britain. 
Such inequality is a significant barrier hindering FP playing a due role in 
improving economic democracy and collaborating with other participation 
channels to produce ideal results. While TUC involvement is not an imme-
diate portrait of union intervention at the company level, it helps mold the 
relevant policy and framework nationwide and has profound meaning for 
the orientation of workplace practices.
5 Coordination Rests on the Overlap between the Three 
Channels
From the above analyses, the three channels of employee participation are 
not necessarily mutually independent or exclusive. Rather, these channels 
can penetrate into each other’s growth and play complementary roles in 
one system. By virtue of its dominant position and profound social basis, RP 
functions as a ‘safety valve’ that controls unreasonable risk lurking inside 
the other two channels and safeguards employees’ fundamental interests. 
DP provides ‘grassroots’ employees with ‘hands-on’ tools to exchange 
information and participate in decision-making, greatly remedying the 
inefficiency of representative communication. FP displays very mixed func-
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tions. It offers an extra avenue for profit feedback on top of traditional redis-
tributive bargaining, strengthens the influence of board-level representation 
by giving employees a chance to send more representatives to company 
boards, and reduces the risk that increased productivity derived from DP 
threatens employees’ economic security.
RP demands the supplementation of DP and FP, both of which stimulate 
a greater internal productivity growth, broaden the concept of ‘participa-
tion’, and enable employees to feel valued at various levels. The other way 
round, DP and FP as emerging channels may be rendered fragile by conflict 
embedded deeply in an employment relationship (Godard, 2004). The 
expansion of them both requires the underpinning of traditional vehicles 
that rely on collective power and constitute the strongest counterbalance to 
employers’ might.
A fundamental presupposition of the coordination between RP, DP and 
FP is that all of these three channels exist in the workplace and overlap. In 
the circumstance that a channel is absent, or that the three channels only 
serve to cover completely different employees, the construction of a self-
complementary ternary system will be brought to naught. This is often the 
case in reality.
While DP features a high prevalence in British workplaces, and relevant 
methods embrace all or most employees, the presence and coverage of RP 
and FP are significantly lower. Workplaces with any union members and 
those with any recognized unions respectively accounted for 23 percent 
and 22 percent of British workplaces, according to the 2011WERS. Fifty-
two percent of employees were union members in the former cross-section 
of workplaces, and 47 percent in the latter (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013: 14). 
Non-union employee representation is more infrequent in Britain, while 
representing all employees in the workplace. As mentioned previously, in 
2011, 7 percent of workplaces had JCCs and 7 percent had stand-alone non-
union representatives (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013: 14-15). With regard to FP, 
the absolute prevalence rate is not high in Britain, though exceeding that 
of many other European countries. The few enterprises with profit sharing 
schemes or share plans are mainly concentrated within the private sector, as 
pointed out earlier. In the public sector, the percentages of workplaces that 
used profit sharing schemes and employee share ownership plans in 2004 
were both 1 percent, and the corresponding figures increased to 5 percent 
and 4 percent in 2011(Van Wanrooy et al. 2013: 25). The problem is that RP 
(especially unions and JCCs) is in particular scarce in the private sector, and 
DP is also less prevalent than in the public sector (see Kersley et al. 2006: 
18). Moreover, even within the private sector only very small proportions 
of enterprises give non-managerial employees the access to profit sharing 
schemes and share plans, which has been reiterated several times in this 
chapter. It is conceivable that the overlap between the three channels of 
participation is indeed nonexistent or little in many workplaces. Is some 
sense, this is a more intractable issue that needs to be figured out ahead of 





Overall, the existence of overlapping RP, DP and FP is rare in the British 
workplace. Different methods are like jigsaw puzzle pieces scattered in 
the minority of workplaces, among which the structure and influence of 
employee participation vary significantly. Employees elsewhere may not 
have access to any vehicle of participation.
The legislative difficulties concerning how the situation can be changed 
are evident. Despite the perceivable significance of aligning FP with RP and 
DP, it is unrealistic that the huge gaps between the prevalence levels of the 
three channels can be filled via direct legal measures, let alone building a 
common structure for employee participation. To be concrete, the currently 
low and continuingly descending density of union membership, particu-
larly in the private sector, is largely attributable to the decline in union rec-
ognition since the 1980s (Blanchflower and Bryson2008). It seems that union 
recognition is not entirely up to employers – when an employer does not 
voluntarily recognize a union, it may still apply for ‘statutory recognition’ 
as long as possessing sufficient bargaining power. However, the dominant 
position of employers in making employment-related choices and the capa-
bility to decide to ‘go’ or ‘remain’ a non-union establishment still enables 
a turn back on trade unions  (See Blanchflower and Bryson2008; Bryson et 
al. 2004). This is fundamentally related to the lack of equilibrium between 
the capital and labor power in the employment market, and no legislative 
steps seem to be able to ‘turn the tables’ promptly enough. As union sup-
port is often unavailable at the moment, there is no reason why JCCs and 
stand-alone non-union representation should prevail. Both have to rely on 
the spontaneous election by employees who want to be represented.
Compared with RP, the introduction of DP and FP belongs more to 
what is at employers’ own will. DP blends the functions of the manage-
ment and ordinary employees, and FP blurs the boundary between capital 
and labor. A paternalistic employer might revolt against any change to the 
conventional management wisdom, whereas an opportunistic employer 
may regard new participation forms as viable excuses to bypass union 
officials and other employee representatives. It is also possible that FP or 
DP is brought in because the employer does have discerned the chances 
of enhancing employee motivation and improving organizational perfor-
mance. The uncertainty of the angle from which an employer observes 
and understands FP and DP is hard to address. While the UK’s legislation 
is favorable in offering tax incentives and has laid a solid foundation for 
the dissemination of FP across the country, opt-out enterprises are still in 
the majority. DP basically remains a ‘grey area’ in policy and legislation, 
but most enterprises have been attracted to practice it due to its easiness, 
plasticity and not touching upon the capital structure or highest levels of 
discretion.
There is little immediate prospect of legislative reform being able to 
re-boost the popularity of employee participation, and the way in which 
520066-L-bw-Hu
Processed on: 31-5-2018
Coordinating the ‘three channels’ of employee participation? Focusing on the British practices 123
an employer chooses to utilize the vehicles of employee participation 
often goes beyond the bounds of policy. However, policymakers should 
insist on guiding the practice by creating favorable conditions. It is worth 
contemplating the feasibility of adjusting the current legal arrangements in 
order to increase the efficiency and vitality of each participation channel. 
Possibilities include, but are not limited to, the following: further incentives 
and support should be provided so as to encourage enterprises to develop 
profit sharing schemes and share plans that let in non-managerial employ-
ees; with a view to keeping the prevalent DP methods on the right track, 
a legal framework needs to be established, rewarding enterprises that use 
productivity improvement to benefit employees with tax preferences and 
setting out different rules and conditions for workplaces where the inter-
vention from unions and other representative bodies is absent and present 
respectively; the ICER reflects a sensible principle that the establishment of 
a consultative body in the workplace should depend on the willingness of 
employees, but it is probably more rational to set a statutory structure of 
election by all employees.
7 Final Remarks
Britain is representative of countries that have cultivated RP, DP and 
FP – the three main channels of employee participation. Existing in more 
than one fifth of workplaces, unionism is the most common way British 
employees are represented, despite the dramatic decline since 1979. As 
alternatives to unions, the percentages of workplaces introducing JCCs and 
stand-alone non-union representation are lower than one third of that of 
unions. Regarding FP, diverse profit sharing schemes and employee share 
plans have been developed due to favorable legislation offering tax incen-
tives and the ample growing space ensured by the government. However, 
workplaces that have introduced FP are still in the minority on the whole, 
particularly the schemes embracing non-managerial employees. In contrast, 
meetings with entire workforce or team briefings, noticeboards, systematic use of 
management chain, and other DP methods have been prevailing among Brit-
ish enterprises with the highest prevalence rates. A probable reason is that 
DP is an easy, adaptable and harmless tool for the employer to improve 
organizational performance.
Since the end of 1990s, a tendency to connect RP and DP in order to pro-
duce better results has gradually replaced the erstwhile model of isolating 
the two from each other. This transformation by and large results from two 
facts. One is that DP is capable of making up for the inflexibility, formal-
ism, inefficiency of RP in communication and alleviating the conspicuous 
scarcity of RP in SMEs. The other is that RP has played a crucial role in 
strengthening DP and reducing the risk that productivity improvement 
resulting from DP threatens the job security and wage levels of employees. 




the necessity to covert FP into the third element that should be aligned 
with RP and DP. FP may serve as an additional compensation tool and help 
relieve the weakening ‘redistribution’ function of trade unions. Employee-
owned shares carrying substantial voting rights may enable employee 
shareholders to send representatives to the boards to compensate for the 
absence of a statutory right to board-level representation. Simultaneously, 
profit sharing and dividends may enhance employee enthusiasm for DP by 
providing a relatively fixed way of sharing the productivity improvement, 
and additionally, dilute the probability that it is all absorbed by manage-
ment to increase flexibility of crew sizes and working conditions. FP also 
needs reinforcement by the other two channels. DP helps to overcome the 
‘free-riding’ tendency and the lack of peer monitoring in FP, and reassures 
employees who fear to take financial responsibilities before exerting influ-
ence on managerial decisions. RP can play a crucial part in designing profit 
sharing schemes as well as employee share plans in order to reduce the 
risks faced by participants and improve the legitimacy and efficacy of FP. 
In this case,  RP, DP an FP coordinate with each other in a ternary system 
and make a good balance between greater voice and higher organizational 
performance.
However, the above deduction is likely to be frustrated by the actual 
prevalence rates and coverage of the three channels in the UK, which imply 
that they have  little or no overlap in most workplaces. It is perhaps more 
realistic to reexamine the subject by starting with the query of how to pro-
mote the substantial spread of the three channels, in particular RP and FP. 
Employer understanding as to the real influence of the three channels is the 
key to the issue, but from the legislative perspective no measure would help 
immediately. On the positive side, there is room for adjustment in the legal 





This research demonstrates several of the multifarious challenges for con-
temporary countries to legislate on domestic working conditions in times 
of globalization. Through dissecting the particular situations in which 
divergent stances, defective mechanisms and practical straits are entangled, 
it reveals where the vitality of working conditions law lies in the changing 
economic world. This research plays a part in the effort to depict the global 
impasse in terms of working conditions legislation, but there has been no 
ambition to examine all relevant problems. The whole thesis consists of five 
in-depth topics. The main findings of the five independent studies are as 
follows:
Chapter 2 suggests that working conditions legislation can gain a 
foothold in deepening globalization, despite the criticisms and doubt from 
opponents. Firstly, respecting the justifications for working conditions 
law, the instrumental value approach and human rights approach are 
both found to be defective. However, an alternative interpretation based 
on Kantian legal philosophy may overcome the drawbacks of the above 
primary approaches. Now that people, who are born with free will, are the 
ends of law, and the paramount goal of the law is to preserve the inherent 
freedom of individuals to the greatest degree, it is appropriate for the law to 
create various conditions needed by individuals to realize these freedoms, 
including necessary level of working conditions. Apart from the intrinsic 
legitimacy, it has been found that the effectivity of regulations on working 
conditions has been more or less underestimated, while the threats to the 
competitive power and to the employment level have been overestimated. 
It is argued that a country which is active in improving domestic work-
ing conditions is likely to achieve stronger internal growth, and has access 
to more international cooperation and preferential trade deals, with the 
increasing attention paid by the international community to CSR and the 
worldwide adjustment of FDI strategies. Moreover, the negative effects of 
working conditions law on employment are not as clear as is asserted by 
many economists. Lastly, it is put forward that working conditions legisla-
tion can gain a reliable foothold in globalization only by making an unflag-
ging effort to approach the balance point where the economic and social 
benefits are bound in perfect unity.
Chapter 3 analyzes how legislative deficiencies have worsened the 




negative role in the ongoing labor shortage in China’s construction industry. 
This section also reflects on solutions that may bring about fundamental 
improvement. To summarize, Chinese legislation associated with construc-
tion safety features low practicability and insufficient comprehensiveness, 
giving little consideration to the plight of millions of rural migrant workers, 
the primary construction workforce in China. A sound liability system and 
effective accountability mechanisms to deter various violations of construc-
tion safety obligations are also lacking. Five reformative measures are raised 
to ameliorate the current crisis: generalizing the IT system platform that has 
already been applied in a few provinces so as to facilitate the management 
of national construction labor, strengthening the combination of liabilities 
and incentives to guide hesitant building enterprises, attaching importance 
to absorbing migrant construction workers into unions, guaranteeing work-
ers easy access to post-accident remedies, and promoting the role of NGOs.
 Chapter 4 questions the momentum and efficiency of the German wage 
floor introduced in 2015 from a legislative perspective. By inspecting the 
German Minimum Wage Act in relation to the general minimum wage rate, 
flexibility in application, adjustment method and frequency, and its system 
of implementation, this section concludes that this legislation is an incom-
plete breakthrough which has a huge potential for improvement. Firstly, the 
entry point (8.5 euros) of the German minimum wage is not a very proper 
one. In line with the Kaitz index measurement, 8.5 euros is far from being 
able to curb the nationwide in-work poverty. A less pessimistic conclusion is 
reached by an evaluation in terms of PPS among EU countries, though. The 
main beneficiaries of the new wage floor are the serious poor, in particular 
female mini-jobbers, while the average poor can hardly benefit from it. In 
addition, the lack of successful coordination between the minimum wage 
law and the preexisting income support and tax and contribution collec-
tion systems may also detract from the appropriateness of the entry point 
of the German minimum wage. Secondly, the German Minimum Wage Act 
has established a distinct model regarding the flexibility within the general 
wage floor – only a standard rate is applied, and strict restrictions in relation 
to vocational training and education are put on the exempted groups. Such 
a system is easier to implement compared with those comprising several 
minimum wage rates, and in good cooperation with the dual vocational 
training for young people. The disadvantages are also obvious: it is diffi-
cult to exert actual influence on different levels of working poor, and one 
the other hand, the ethical and legal concerns faced by multi-rate systems 
cannot be avoided. In the meantime, Germany is unique within the EU by 
its adoption of a bipartite negotiation method of determining adjustments 
of the national minimum wage, and the biennial rhythm of adjustments is 
consequently fixed. This adjustment mechanism is unable to ensure timely 
and efficient adjustments in Germany. Lastly, the implementation system of 
the German minimum wage is found defective. There is no comprehensive 
guidance over the calculation of an employee’s hourly remuneration or over 




employer compliance with the minimum wage, but its present staff level 
is far from adequate to undertake the responsibility. German employees 
also face a higher risk of having to turn to judicial proceedings to protect 
personal interests, since the legislation fails to force offenders to repay wage 
arrears.
Chapter 5 makes a comparison between Swedish and American leg-
islation on parental leave, clarifying the differences between the models, 
underlying ideas, and results in practice. The two countries are poles apart 
on the adoption of mandatory paid parental leave, the length of the leave 
period, and the flexibility and coverage of the benefits. Practically opposite 
philosophies are held by the two countries giving rise to the divergent 
institutional arrangements. The Swedish policymakers insist that the social 
and economic benefits brought by a generous parental leave policy make 
up for the costs, whereas in the US, the federal and most state legislatures 
are afraid that the implementation of paid parental leave will result in 
economic turmoil. In reality, Sweden has obtained strong economic com-
petitiveness and managed to maintain high employment of both men and 
women, partly due to the great level of work-family balance achieved by 
dual-earner households. As one of the few exceptions that have failed to 
introduce paid parental leave, the US has been outperformed by Sweden in 
many areas with regard to economic growth, competitive power, or employ-
ment. In fact, the American federal legislation overlooks that paid parental 
leave is desired not only by most American employees but also by increas-
ingly more employers. Based on the experiences of the states that guarantee 
paid parental leave above the federal standard, employer resistance and 
government budget crises are not likely to be caused by a national policy 
mandating paid parent leave.
Chapter 6 observes the possibility of coordinating the three channels 
of employee participation in the British context. The three channels are 
representative participation (RP), direct participation (DP), and financial 
participation (FP). These channels can constitute a self-complementary 
system if coexisting in the workplace, because they all possess some 
attributes that enable complementation. In theory, the ‘alliance’ that has 
been built between RP and DP in recent years should be further enlarged 
to encompass FP, which would enhance the aforementioned two channels 
and increase its individual efficiency as a stand-alone channel of employee 
participation. When RP, DP, and FP interact in a ternary system, a better 
balance is likely to be made between employee voice and organizational 
performance. However, such an ideal conception has been thwarted by a 
practical difficulty that is hard to figure out by legal measures. This bar-
rier illustrates that even in Britain, a jurisdiction which features relatively 
rich experiences in developing RP, DP, and FP, huge gaps exist between the 
prevalence rates and coverage of the three channels. The three channels 




2 Messages behind the Kaleidoscopic Scene of the Current 
Global Impasse
Two central research questions are presented in the ‘Introduction’.
1) What is the main dilemma facing the regulation of working conditions 
in times of globalization?
Based on the above review of the five studies included in this research, the 
main dilemma always rests in the tension between labor protection and the 
economic objectives of countries and enterprises, although the challenges 
facing legislation on working conditions take on a variety of appearances. 
However, such a conclusion is not to restate the simple conflict between 
product prices, which are partially affected by labor costs, and a country’s 
competitive position in comparison with other countries producing the 
same products. On the contrary, a ‘zero-sum’ approach to understanding 
the relation between labor protection and the economic performance of a 
country has been argued against in this book. From the author’s point of 
view, the ‘tension’ between labor protection and the realization of economic 
objectives has two extra implications at the current stage of globalization. 
Firstly, reducing labor costs does not necessarily result in better economic 
performance, in particular in the long run, since many more factors have 
started to play important roles, such as the capability of integrating global 
resources, the productivity level, technological advantages, international 
cooperation and enterprise reputation. Policymakers ought to realize the 
growing significance of the new factors that influence global competition. 
Secondly, labor protection is not always in conflict with economic objectives. 
Policymakers should not be charmed by the idea that there is a direct and 
unchangeable negative relation between labor protection and the realization 
of economic objectives, but should perceive the potential to combine the 
two goals.
2) How effectively have policymakers reacted to the foregoing dilemma?
In general, many policymakers fail to emancipate themselves from the 
way of thinking before tackling the practical challenges. For instance, the 
German legislation on minimum wage implies that it is difficult for policy-
makers to get rid of the existing pattern of thinking, despite the significant 
changes to the institutional framework. The cautious stance that held back 
the introduction of a national wage floor continues to constrain the legis-
lature from establishing an efficient minimum wage regime. As a result, 
the primary purpose of enacting the Minimum Wage Act has been partly 
brought to naught.
Analogously, the stark contrast between the American and Swedish 
legislation on parental leave suggests that political ideologies play a crucial 
part in countries’ setting up models and formulating rules for regulating 
domestic working conditions, sometimes transcending the role of the objec-




Chinese law on construction safety exemplifies another type of inappro-
priateness of legislators’ perceptions of reality. There are a variety of chronic 
issues obstructing the overall efficiency of the legislation on construction 
safety, but the severity of these problems has been long underestimated in 
the culture centered on economic prosperity. It is noticeable that the econ-
omy has recently begun to pay the price for the serious labor shortage in the 
construction sector due to the generally unacceptable working conditions, 
in particular the poor protection of construction safety. National policymak-
ing is expected to respond at once. There is a very real prospect that some 
solutions which have been proposed widely by society would effectively 
ameliorate the economic and social crises triggered by the construction 
safety problems. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the central government 
is fully aware of the potential effects of these strategies and will take imme-
diate actions through different levels of legislation and implementation.
It has to be acknowledged that under a few circumstances objective 
barriers, rather than legislators’ defective perceptions, play a critical part 
in restricting the level of working conditions legislation. Take the last study 
on the three channels of employee participation in the British context, for 
instance. The rare coexistence of the three channels in the workplace is the 
first and foremost obstruction to the coordination of them, and this prob-
lem is difficult for legislators to cope with. In another word, the existing 
mechanisms for realizing the employee right to participation are hard to be 
optimized directly by legislative measures. Instead, the will of employers is 
the crucial factor that tips the balance, depending on the extent to which the 
potential effects of the three channels on company- level productivity are 
understood.
Specific advice is provided in each of the five studies included in this 
research. However, it is necessary to reiterate a few important points that 
have been made, in order to illuminate the path in which a country may be 
able to improve the efficiency of domestic legislation on working conditions 
in future. Firstly, policymakers should get rid of the outdated stereotype 
that improving domestic working conditions and promoting the competi-
tive power of the economy must be contradictory. With a view to fitting in 
with the global trend towards more intensive economic growth, a country 
needs to recognize the potential of decent working conditions to boost 
productivity and to facilitate long-term cooperation with other countries. 
Secondly, this research has no intention to peddle the idea that offering 
good working conditions is certain to lead to good economic performance, 
but there is room for national legislators to coordinate the goals of labor 
protection and economic development by applying appropriate rules and 
strategies, despite the huge challenges brought about by  the advancement 
of globalization. Lastly, there might be objective barriers prohibiting the law 
from responding effectively to the changing economic world. However, the 
legislation should endeavor to guide relevant social actors and create condi-






Perspectives on the Regulation of Working 
Conditions in Times of Globalization
Challenges & Obstacles Facing Regulatory Intervention
Labor law is facing unprecedented challenges, in terms of both its external 
and internal dimensions. This is the combined result of the vulnerabilities 
inherent to labor law and the advancement of globalization, which in recent 
decades has given rise to fundamental changes of global economic struc-
ture, management ideas, technologies, and capital-raising models.
Labor law is called into question on many levels. Firstly, the basic 
ideas and purposes of labor law have become obscured. Furthermore, it 
has become more complicated to determine the correctness of the methods 
employed by labor legislation. The worsening ambivalence in terms of the 
goals and means of labor law has inevitably resulted in an aggravation of 
the doubts surrounding the actual impact.
Working conditions are the essential elements of employment relation-
ships and the main point that legal interventions have been seeking to 
mediate. It is no exaggeration to say that working conditions legislation is at 
the center of the current crisis where labor law is procrastinating and tend-
ing to vacillate. Hence this research focuses on the regulation of working 
conditions in times of globalization.
The research comprises five independent studies: a general discus-
sion on the foundation and feasibility of regulating working conditions 
in globalization, followed by four parallel studies that deal with specific 
legislation in certain countries. These studies demonstrate the current 
multifarious practical difficulties for countries to legislate on domestic 
working conditions. By dissecting the situations in which divergent stances, 
defective mechanisms and practical straits are entangled, the crisis of labor 
legislation in times of globalization is concretized into specific problems 
while at the same time opportunities for change are revealed. Such an 
exploration is not a discursive one that collects together the debris of the 
current broken picture of global lawmaking on working conditions. Rather, 
a couple of questions continue to hover in the background throughout: 
1) what is the main dilemma facing the regulation of working conditions in 
times of globalization?
2) How effectively do policymakers react to the foregoing dilemma?
To be specific, in the face of warnings from economists, tenable reasons 
are needed for regulating the labor market and workplaces in a globalized 
world. Chapter 2 is devoted to examining the vitality of working conditions 
law on three levels. Firstly, in answering the question of why regulations on 
working conditions should not be discarded, the author puts forward an 




justifications. Secondly, by referring to a wide range of economic studies, 
she points out the cursoriness of the standpoint that regulating working 
conditions is bound to backfire. Finally, it is put forward that an approach 
that places stress on the balance or coordination, rather than the prioriti-
zation, of economic efficiency and labor protection may enable working 
conditions legislation to remain viable in today’s globalization.
Chapter 3 analyzes how the defective legislation on construction safety 
aggravates the ongoing labor shortage in China’s construction sector, and 
also, in the legislative dimension, what reformative measures are likely to 
bring about fundamental improvements. Three levels of description in this 
chapter show, respectively, the impracticability of the main construction 
safety rules, the malfunctions of the Labor Contract Law and the regula-
tions about work-related injury insurance, and the undermining of the 
responsibility system. It may be difficult to construct a more efficient legal 
framework right away, but immediate efforts can be made to address spe-
cific tough issues that are key to ameliorating China’s construction safety 
performance and to decelerating the outflow of the construction workforce. 
This chapter identifies five reformative measures that should be taken.
Chapter 4 reflects on how appropriately the German Minimum Wage 
Act –  the latest national minimum wage legislation within the EU –  has 
been constructed so as to remedy the fading role of collective bargaining in 
wage setting and curb the increasing in-work poverty across the country. 
Based on identifying four fundamental parts of a minimum wage regime, 
it examines successively the corresponding provisions in the German law, 
with frequent comparisons with the legislation of several other member 
states. It is found that Germany has refrained from learning the positive 
legislative experiences of its EU counterparts, and has developed a mini-
mum wage regime that is distinct in more than one aspect. Such a wage 
floor, however, loses efficiency and momentum before serving the original 
purposes of its own introduction.
Chapter 5 compares the models, underlying ideas, and results of Swed-
ish and American legislation on parental leave. It is found that Sweden, 
where parental leave policy is characterized by generosity and flexibility, 
has achieved quite positive outcomes respecting economic growth and the 
employment of both genders. In stark contrast, the US has failed to acquire 
stronger competitiveness or higher employment rates, despite implement-
ing a much less generous parental leave policy. The presupposed tradeoff 
between the level of parental benefits and economic performance has 
contradicted the empirical evidence so far. Paid parental leave is strongly 
demanded by American society, not only amongst employees but also 
amongst employers.
Concentrating on the experiences of Great Britain, Chapter 6 reflects on 
the possibility of coordinating the three channels of employee participation, 
for the purpose of balancing the dual goals of higher productivity and a 
stronger employee voice. The recent attempts seen in Great Britain to align 




nels respectively possessing some attributes which enable them to comple-
ment each other. However, the picture is far from complete. The ‘third 
channel’ – financial participation – may further enhance the representative 
and direct participation, and itself will become more efficient when united 
with the other two channels. In theory, the three channels are likely to form 
a self-complementary system, but a practical difficulty is that they rarely 
coexist and overlap in practice because of the different levels of popularity.
Based on the above studies, it can be seen that for the regulation of 
working conditions, the main dilemma always rests in the tension between 
labor protection and the economic objectives of countries and enterprises, 
although the challenges facing legislation on working conditions take on 
a variety of appearances. This is a constant puzzle and also the origin of 
conflict of interest that are taken into account in working conditions leg-
islation. However, many countries are actually failing to adopt adaptive 
strategies for regulating domestic working conditions in the era of global-
ization, mainly due to policymakers’ improper perceptions of the relation-
ship between labor protection and economic prosperity, and also because 
of some objective difficulties standing in the way of establishing effective 
rules. The author suggests that policymakers should get rid of the outdated 
stereotype that improving domestic working conditions and promoting the 
competitive power of the economy must be a zero-sum game. Despite the 
huge challenges brought about by the advancement of globalization, there 
is room for national legislators to apply appropriate rules and strategies in 
order to coordinate the goals of labor protection and economic develop-
ment. When objective barriers exist that prohibit the law from responding 
effectively to the changing economic world, legislation should endeavor 







Perspectieven op regulering van 
arbeidsvoorwaarden in tijden van globalisering
Uitdagingen en belemmeringen van regulerende interventie
Het arbeidsrecht staat voor ongekende uitdagingen zowel in intern als in 
extern opzicht. Dit is het gecombineerde resultaat van de kwetsbaarheden 
die inherent zijn aan het arbeidsrecht en de voortgang van de globalisering, 
die in de afgelopen decennia heeft geleid tot fundamentele veranderingen 
in de wereldwijde economische structuur, management opvattingen, tech-
nologieën en verdienmodellen.
Het arbeidsrecht wordt op vele niveaus ter discussie gesteld. Ten eerste 
zijn de fundamentele ideeën en doelen van het arbeidsrecht vertroebeld. 
Daarnaast is het moeilijker geworden om de juistheid van de instrumenten 
van arbeidswetgeving te waarderen. De toenemende ambivalentie over 
doelen en middelen van het arbeidsrecht heeft onvermijdelijk geleid tot 
toenemende twijfels omtrent zijn daadwerkelijke invloed.
Arbeidsvoorwaarden zijn essentiële elementen van arbeidsrelaties en 
het belangrijkste punt waarop juridische interventies proberen te interve-
niëren. Het is niet overdreven om te stellen dat de wetgeving over arbeids-
voorwaarden centraal staat in de huidige crisis waarin het arbeidsrecht 
talmt en aarzelt. Vandaar dat in dit onderzoek de focus wordt gelegd op het 
reguleren van arbeidsvoorwaarden in tijden van globalisering.
Het onderzoek omvat vijf afzonderlijke studies. Dit betreft allereerst een 
algemene discussie over de grondslag en de haalbaarheid van het reguleren 
van arbeidsvoorwaarden in tijden van globalisering. Dit wordt gevolgd 
door vier parallelle onderzoeken die handelen over specifieke wetgeving 
en bepaalde landen. Deze onderzoeken tonen de veelsoortige praktische 
problemen waar landen tegenaan lopen bij het opstellen van wetgeving 
inzake de binnenlandse arbeidsvoorwaarden. Door de situaties te ontleden 
waarin uiteenlopende standpunten, gebrekkige mechanismen en praktische 
knelpunten verstrengeld zijn, wordt de crisis van de arbeidswetgeving in 
tijden van globalisering geconcretiseerd in specifieke problemen. Tegelij-
kertijd worden er mogelijkheden voor verandering onthuld. Een dergelijke 
verkenning is geen onsamenhangende verkenning die het puin verzamelt 
van het huidige versnipperde beeld van wereldwijde wetgeving inzake 
arbeidsvoorwaarden. In plaats daarvan blijven er een aantal vragen op de 
achtergrond zweven, zoals:
1) wat is het belangrijkste dilemma bij het reguleren van arbeidsvoorwaarden in 
tijden van globalisering?, en:
2) hoe effectief reageren beleidsmakers op het voorgaande dilemma?
In het licht van waarschuwingen van economen zijn er houdbare redenen 
nodig voor het reguleren van de arbeidsmarkt en arbeidssituatie in een 
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geglobaliseerde wereld. Hoofdstuk 2 is gewijd aan het onderzoeken van de 
vitaliteit van de wetgeving inzake arbeidsvoorwaarden op drie niveaus. In 
de beantwoording van de vraag waarom regels over arbeidsvoorwaarden 
niet mogen worden afgedankt, stelt de auteur ten eerste een verklaring 
voor die de kwetsbaarheden van de reguliere filosofische rechtvaardigin-
gen overwint. Ten tweede wijst ze, onder verwijzing van een breed scala 
aan economische studies, op de vluchtigheid van het standpunt dat het 
reguleren van arbeidsvoorwaarden een averechts effect heeft. Tot slot wordt 
gesteld dat een aanpak die de nadruk legt op het evenwicht of op de coör-
dinatie, in plaats van op de prioriteitsstelling van economische efficiëntie 
en arbeidsbescherming, de arbeidsvoorwaardenwetgeving in het huidige 
tijdperk van globalisering levensvatbaar kan maken.
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert hoe de gebrekkige wetgeving inzake bouw-
veiligheid het aanhoudende tekort aan arbeidskrachten in de Chinese 
bouwsector vergroot. Tevens wordt geanalyseerd welke wettelijke hervor-
mingsmaatregelen tot fundamentele verbeteringen zouden kunnen leiden. 
Het hoofdstuk bespreekt drie niveaus, respectievelijk de onuitvoerbaarheid 
van de belangrijkste veiligheidsregels in de bouw, de tekortkomingen van 
de arbeidsovereenkomstenwetgeving en de verzekering tegen arbeidson-
gevallen en het ondermijnen van het aansprakelijkheidsstelsel. Het kan 
moeilijk zijn om direct een effectiever wettelijk kader op te stellen, maar 
er kunnen onmiddellijk verbeteringen bereikt worden. Dit kan gebeuren 
door specifieke heikele kwesties aan te pakken die van cruciaal belang zijn 
voor het verbeteren van de bouwveiligheid in China en door het vertragen 
van de uitstroom van de werknemers in de bouwnijverheid. Dit hoofdstuk 
onderscheidt vijf hervormingsmaatregelen die de moeite van het proberen 
waard zijn.
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt hoe passend de Duitse Minimumloonwet – de 
nieuwste nationale minimumloonwetgeving binnen de EU – is opgezet om 
de afnemende rol van collectieve onderhandelingen in de loonvorming te 
verhelpen en de toenemende armoede onder werkenden in het hele land 
in te dammen. Achtereenvolgens worden, op basis van vier fundamentele 
onderdelen van een minimumloonstelsel, de overeenkomstige bepalingen 
van de Duitse wet onderzocht, regelmatig in vergelijking met de wetgeving 
van andere EU-lidstaten. Hieruit volgt dat Duitsland geen gebruik heeft 
gemaakt van positieve ervaringen in de wetgeving van zijn EU-partners, en 
een minimumloonregime heeft ontwikkeld dat in verschillende opzichten 
van dat van de andere lidstaten afwijkt. De aldus ingevoerde loonvloer 
verliest echter aan doelmatigheid en vaart, ten koste van de oorspronkelijke 
doeleinden die werden beoogd met de invoering ervan.
Hoofdstuk 5 vergelijkt modellen, onderliggende ideeën en resultaten 
van de Zweedse en Amerikaanse wetgeving inzake ouderschapsverlof. 
Uit het onderzoek volgt dat Zweden, waar het ouderschapsverlofbeleid 
wordt gekenmerkt door ruimhartigheid en flexibiliteit, tamelijk positieve 
resultaten heeft geboekt wat betreft economische groei en de tewerkstel-




sterker concurrentievermogen of hogere werkgelegenheidscijfers verkre-
gen, ondanks een veel minder genereus beleid voor ouderschapsverlof. De 
veronderstelde afweging tussen de omvang van ouderschapsuitkeringen en 
de economische prestaties is tot nu toe dus in tegenspraak met het empi-
rische bewijs. In de Amerikaanse samenleving is er een sterke vraag naar 
betaald ouderschapsverlof. Dit speelt niet alleen onder werknemers, maar 
ook onder werkgevers.
Concentrerend op de ervaringen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk, reflecteert 
hoofdstuk 6 op de mogelijkheid om de drie wegen van medezeggenschap 
te coördineren, teneinde het tweeledige doel van hogere productiviteit en 
een sterker werknemersgeluid met elkaar in balans te brengen. De recente 
pogingen van Verenigd Koninkrijk om de vertegenwoordigende en de 
directe participatie op elkaar af te stemmen, zijn er inderdaad op gebaseerd 
dat deze twee wegen elkaar aanvullen, respectievelijk bevatten enkele 
onderdelen die hen in staat stellen dit te doen. Het beeld is echter verre van 
compleet. De ‘derde weg’ – financiële participatie – kan de vertegenwoor-
diging en directie participatie verder verbeteren en zal effectiever worden 
wanneer deze wordt gecombineerd met de twee andere. In theorie vormen 
de drie wegen waarschijnlijk een zichzelf aanvullend systeem, maar een 
praktische moeilijkheid is dat ze in de praktijk zelden naast elkaar bestaan 
en elkaar overlappen vanwege de verschillende maten van populariteit.
Op basis van bovenstaande onderzoeken kan worden vastgesteld dat, 
voor de regulering van arbeidsvoorwaarden, het belangrijkste dilemma ligt 
in de spanning tussen arbeidsrechtelijke bescherming en de economische 
doelstellingen van landen en ondernemingen. De uitdagingen waarvoor de 
wetgeving inzake arbeidsvoorwaarden staat kennen een grote variëteit aan 
verschijningsvormen. Dit vormt een constante puzzel voor beleidsmakers 
en tevens de oorzaak van belangenconflicten die in arbeidsvoorwaarden-
wetgeving in aanmerking moet worden genomen. Veel landen slagen er 
momenteel echter niet in om strategieën te vinden voor het reguleren van 
de binnenlandse arbeidsvoorwaarden in het tijdperk van globalisering. 
Dit is voornamelijk het gevolg van ontoereikende ideeën van beleidsma-
kers over de relatie tussen arbeidsbescherming en economische welvaart. 
Daarnaast staan er een aantal objectieve problemen in de weg aan het 
ontwikkelen van effectieve regels. De auteur suggereert dat beleidsmakers 
het verouderde stereotype beeld, dat het verbeteren van de binnenlandse 
arbeidsvoorwaarden en het bevorderen van de concurrentiekracht van de 
economie niet verenigbaar zijn moeten loslaten. Ondanks de enorme uitda-
gingen die de voortschrijdende globalisering met zich brengt, is er ruimte 
voor nationale wetgevers om passende regels en strategieën toe te passen 
om de doelstellingen van arbeidsbescherming en economische ontwikke-
ling te coördineren. Wanneer objectieve belemmeringen ertoe leiden dat het 
recht niet adequaat reageert op de veranderende economische wereld, moet 
wetgeving ernaar streven leiding te geven aan de relevante sociale actoren 
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